nep-ent New Economics Papers
on Entrepreneurship
Issue of 2016‒03‒10
four papers chosen by
Marcus Dejardin
Université de Namur

  1. Business in Genocide: Understanding and Avoiding Complicity By Stel, Nora; Naudé, Wim
  2. Firm Dynamics and Employment Protection: Evidence from Sectoral Data By A. Bottasso; M. Conti; G. Sulis
  3. Bank Lending Technologies and SME Credit Rationing in Europe in the 2009 Crisis By Giovanni Ferri; Pierluigi Murro; Zeno Rotondi
  4. Embracing the sharks: The impact of information exposure on the likelihood and quality of CVC investments By Mohammadi, Ali; Khashabi, Pooyan

  1. By: Stel, Nora (Maastricht School of Management); Naudé, Wim (Maastricht University)
    Abstract: Genocides and mass atrocities do not arise spontaneously, but tend to be meticulously sourced and managed. As such the concern in this paper is with the role of businesses in these processes, with a particular focus on the agency and decision making of entrepreneurs and managers. We critically explore the specific role entrepreneurs and businesses played in three of the most uncontested genocides of recent history: the Jewish, Kurdish, and Darfurian genocides. From this literature we seek to distill key insights into what entrepreneurs and socially responsible businesses can do to lessen the tensions, misunderstandings, exclusions, and marginalization that are among the complex causes of genocides and other mass atrocities. In order to better understand the complicity of business there is a need for a shift from diagnostic attention on how businesses are engaged in genocide to a more analytical exploration of why businesses have made the choices they did in the process of their engagement with genocide. This is also necessary to advance the debate on how to hold businesses accountable for gross human rights violations and moreover to provide incentives for businesses not only to avoid doing harm but also to proactively, preventively strive to protect and extend human rights.
    Keywords: business, entrepreneurship, genocide, mass killings, conflict, development
    JEL: D74 O19 L26 N40 M14
    Date: 2016–02
  2. By: A. Bottasso; M. Conti; G. Sulis
    Abstract: In this paper we analyse the impact of employment protection legislation (EPL) on firms’ entry and exit rates for a large sample of industries of thirteen countries selected from the most recent version of the OECD Structural and Business Statistics Database. Using a differences-in-differences identification strategy, we find that more stringent EPL is associated to lower entry and exit rates, particularly in industries characterized by higher job reallocation intensity. We also find that both collective and individual dismissal regulations reduce firms’ entry and exit rates. Interestingly, our results suggest that the negative effects of EPL is stronger in the case of firms between one and nine employees while, in the case of larger ones, results are not clear-cut. An extensive sensitivity analysis confirm the robustness of our findings.
    Keywords: entry & exit, turnover, employment protection legislation, reallocation
    JEL: J65 L11 L26
    Date: 2016
  3. By: Giovanni Ferri (LUMSA University); Pierluigi Murro (LUMSA University); Zeno Rotondi (UniCredit Bank)
    Abstract: The first wave of the global financial crisis hit Europe in the last part of 2008 and through 2009. With banks in a tailspin, credit rationing intensified – as measured in various different ways – particularly for the small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). The extent of such retrenchment in the supply of credit could reflect not only the worsened general condition of the European banks but also vary at the micro level depending on the lending technologies being used in the SME-main bank rapport. Using the EFIGE database, we examine SME credit rationing in seven EU countries (Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain and the UK) and try to assess the extent to which differences in the lending technologies and in the status of the firm-main bank relationship contributed to the phenomenon. We find that a firm matching with a bank using the transactional lending technology was more likely to end up rationed for credit during the first part of the financial crisis.
    Keywords: Bank-Firm Relationships, Asymmetric Information, Credit Rationing.
    JEL: G21 D82 G30
    Date: 2016–02
  4. By: Mohammadi, Ali (CESIS - Centre of Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies, Royal Institute of Technology); Khashabi, Pooyan (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität (LMU), Munich School of Management, Institute for Strategy, Technology and Organization)
    Abstract: For high-tech startups, gaining access to resources and funding is often considered crucial. This need has created technology markets to attract partners and resource providers. Corporate venturing is a form of markets for technology (MfT) that provides nurturing, specialized advice and resources to new technology by investing in startups. However the typical issues involved with MfT – namely misappropriation risks– have made startups reluctant about sharing their key technological information with corporate venture capitalists (CVC), potentially retarding efficient market matching and consequently technology development. Lifting informational constraints may facilitate the market and enable us to measure the pure impact of CVC investment. Assessing the potential impact of information constraints has been challenging due to severe endogeneity concerns. This study investigates the causal impact of technological information exposure on the likelihood, quality and timing of CVC-startup match formation. We exploit the American Inventor’s Protection Act (AIPA) as an exogenous shock to technological information publicity, which enables us to measure an unbiased impact of information exposure. The results confirm that strategic information withhold by startups has lowered the incident of CVC investments, while informational exposure increases the likelihood, quality and hazard rate of CVC-startup match.
    Keywords: American Inventor’s Protection Act; Corporate Venture Capital; Information revealing; high-tech startups; Misappropriation
    JEL: G14 L26 M13 O32
    Date: 2016–03–01

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