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on Entrepreneurship |
| By: | Karlsson, Charlie (Jönköping International Business School); Andersson, Martin (Jönköping International Business School) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we discuss the current status of the literature on entrepreneurship policy. The purpose is to discuss and assess several fundamental questions pertaining to entrepreneurship policies, such as “What is the optimal rate of entrepreneurship?” and “What entrepreneurship policies to pursue to remedy market failures and to avoid policy failures?”. In the entrepreneurship policies literature several contributors make distinctions between five types of entrepreneurship policy: government intervention on the demand side, as well as on the supply side; government policies aiming at influencing the supply of input factors of entrepre¬neurship, plus the preferences of potential entrepreneurs; along with government policies directly targeting the decision-making processes of potential and actual entrepreneurs. We conclude in this paper, there is a need for both a broad and a narrow definition of entrepreneurship poli¬cies. A broad perspective implies that the anal¬ysis also must consider the general conditions for entrepreneurship in terms of, for instance, insti¬tu¬tions. If the general conditions are wrong it can be meaningless as well as a waste of time and re¬sources to develop sophisticated policies targeting entrepreneurs. In these cases, the im¬portant entrepreneurship polices are those directed towards the general conditions. When the general conditions are reasonable, then it might be appropriate to develop and apply narrow entrepreneurship policies. Furthermore it is important to analyze how entrepreneurship policies should be de¬signed for countries and regions with different economic histories, different levels of economic development, different economic specializations, and different institutions. |
| Keywords: | Entrepreneurship Policies; Rate of Entrepreneurship; Market Failures; Policy Failures; Government Intervention; Entrepreneurial Opportunities |
| JEL: | D40 L22 L52 O38 |
| Date: | 2009–01–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:hjiseg:0007&r=ent |
| By: | Abbasian, Saeid (Jönköping International Business School); Bildt, Carina (Gotland University) |
| Abstract: | The study investigates whether entrepreneurship among immigrant women in Sweden may be a way to achieve integration in working life and thereby increase their empowerment. Sixteen female entrepreneurs were interviewed. They started their businesses for a number of reasons: unemployment, lack of suitable jobs and career possibilities, discrimination and forced privatization, desire for personal development, independence and freedom, or work within one’s own field of interest. We conclude that entrepreneurship can be a tool for increasing empowerment among educated immigrant women. |
| Keywords: | Entrepreneurship; Immigrant women; Empowerment; Integration |
| JEL: | J10 J20 J70 |
| Date: | 2009–03–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:hjiseg:0006&r=ent |
| By: | João Leão (MIT - Department of Economics, ISCTE - Department of Economics and UNIDE-ERC) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the use of exclusive dealing agreements to prevent the entry of rival firms. An exclusive dealing agreement is a contract between a buyer and a seller where the buyer commits to buy a good exclusively from the seller. One main concern of the literature is to explain how an incumbent seller is able to persuade the buyers to sign an exclusive dealing agreement that deters the entry of a more efficient rival seller. We propose a new explanation when the buyers are downstream firms and both the seller and the buyers face the threat of entry. In this case, the entry of more efficient upstream seller, by decreasing the market power of the upstream firms, can make entry in the downstream market more attractive. This can lead to further entry in the downstream market and to an increase in the competition faced by the downstream firms. Since part of the bigger surplus created by the entry of a more efficient seller is now captured by the downstream entrant firms, entry in the upstream market does not necessarily benefit the incumbent downstream firms. |
| Date: | 2008–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:isc:wpaper:ercwp2408&r=ent |