nep-ent New Economics Papers
on Entrepreneurship
Issue of 2006‒04‒22
seven papers chosen by
Marcus Dejardin
Facultes Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix

  1. A Selection-Based Theory of the Transition from Employment to Entrepreneurship: The Role of Employer Size By Simon C. Parker
  2. The Knowledge Filter and Economic Growth: The Role of Scientist Entrepreneurship By David B. Audretsch; Taylor Aldridge; Alexander Oettl
  3. Start-ups, firm growth and the consolidation of the French biotech industry By Avenel, E.; Corolleur, F.; Gauthier, C.; Rieu, C.
  4. The role of regional institutional entrepreneurs in the emergence of clusters in nanotechnologies By Mangematin, V.; Rip, A.; Delemarle, A.; Robinson, D.K.R.
  5. Does Social Capital Improve Labour Productivity in Small and Medium Enterprises? By Fabio Sabatini
  6. Vertical Product Differentiation, Entry-Deterrence Strategies, and Entry Qualities By Yong-Hwan Noh; GianCarlo Moschini
  7. Exit Dynamics with Adjustment Costs By Rolf Golombek and Arvid Raknerud

  1. By: Simon C. Parker (Durham University and IZA Bonn)
    Abstract: A simple occupational choice model is used to predict that entrepreneurs who found new firms are more likely to work for small than for large firms prior to start-up. The mechanism underlying the result is heterogeneous risk aversion. The model also predicts a positive association between new firm formation and previous self-employment experience. These predictions accord with previous empirical findings, but notably self-selection rather than productivity effects can explain them.
    Keywords: entrepreneurship, occupational choice, firm size
    JEL: J21 J23 J62
    Date: 2006–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2071&r=ent
  2. By: David B. Audretsch; Taylor Aldridge; Alexander Oettl
    Date: 2006–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esi:egpdis:2006-11&r=ent
  3. By: Avenel, E.; Corolleur, F.; Gauthier, C.; Rieu, C.
    Abstract: Based on an original dataset, we analyze empirically the determinants of firm growth in the French biotech industry during two periods, 1996-1999 and 1999-2002. We have two main results. First, Gibrat's law is violated. The growth of annual turnover is influenced by teh initial size of the firm. The effect is non-linear, negative for small firms. Second, location has a significant impact on growth. We use different sets of dummies to characterize location and different measures of firm growth. As a whole, our results point at Marseilles (and its region) and Nanterre (but not Paris and Evry) as favorable places for the growth of firms between 1999 and 2002. For the 1996-1999, the favorable places are Strasbourg (and Alsace) and Rh“ne-Alpes (Lyon/Grenoble). Our analysis thus suggests that the changes in the (notably legal) environment of French biotech firms that took place in 1999 had a drastic effect of the comparative advantages of locations for biotech firms.
    Keywords: BIOTECHNOLOGY; INDUSTRIAL CLUSTERING; FIRM GROWTH; FRANCE
    JEL: L25 L65 R30
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gbl:wpaper:200503&r=ent
  4. By: Mangematin, V.; Rip, A.; Delemarle, A.; Robinson, D.K.R.
    Abstract: In the case of new technologies like nanotechnology, institutional entrepreneurs appear who have to act at different levels (organizational, regional, national) at the same time. We reconstruct, in some detail, the history of two cases, in Grenoble and in Twente/Netherlands. An intriguing finding is that institutional entrepreneurs build their environment before changing their institution. They first mobilize European support to convince local and national levels before actual cluster building occurs. Only later will there be reactions against any de-institutionalisation caused at the base location. The Dutch case shows another notable finding: when mobilizing support the entrepreneur will have to agree to further conditions, and then ends up in a different situation (a broad national consortium) than originally envisaged (the final cluster involved a collaboration of Twente with two other centres). In general, an institutional entrepreneur attempts to create momentum, and when this is achieved, he has to follow rather than lead it.
    Keywords: INSTITUTIONAL ENTREPRENEUR; DEINSTITUTIONALISATION; CLUSTER; LOCATION; EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES; PROMISE; NANOTECHNOLOGY
    JEL: M13
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gbl:wpaper:200515&r=ent
  5. By: Fabio Sabatini
    Abstract: This paper carries out an empirical assessment of the relationship between social capital and labour productivity in small and medium enterprises in Italy. By means of structural equations models, the analysis investigates the effect of different aspects of the multifaceted concept of social capital. The bonding social capital of strong family ties and the bridging social capital shaped by informal ties connecting friends and acquaintances are proved to exert a negative effect on labour productivity, the economic performance, and human development. On the contrary, the linking social capital of voluntary organizations positively influences such outcomes.
    Keywords: Labour productivity, Small and medium enterprises, Social capital, Social networks, Structural equations models
    JEL: J24 R11 O15 O18 Z13
    Date: 2006–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sap:wpaper:92&r=ent
  6. By: Yong-Hwan Noh; GianCarlo Moschini (Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD))
    Abstract: We analyze the entry of a new product into a vertically differentiated market in which an entrant and an incumbent compete in prices. Here the entry-deterrence strategies of the incumbent firm rely on "limit qualities." With a sequential choice of quality, a quality-dependent marginal production cost, and a fixed entry cost, we relate the entry-quality decision and the entry-deterrence strategies to the level of entry cost and the degree of consumer heterogeneity. Quality-dependent marginal production costs in the model entail the possibility of inferior-quality entry as well as an incumbent's aggressive entry-deterrence strategies of increasing its quality level toward potential entry. Welfare evaluation confirms that social welfare is not necessarily improved when entry is encouraged rather than deterred.
    Keywords: entry deterrence; quality choice; vertical product differentiation.
    JEL: C72 D43 L13
    Date: 2005–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ias:cpaper:05-wp403&r=ent
  7. By: Rolf Golombek and Arvid Raknerud (Statistics Norway)
    Abstract: We use the Stock and Wise approximation of stochastic dynamic programming in order to identify the extent to which profitability can explain exit behavior. In our econometric model, heterogeneous firms engage in Bertrand (price) competition. Firms produce heterogeneous products, using labor, materials and capital as inputs. The stock of capital is changed through investments and disinvestments, where the firm incurs adjustment costs due to partial irreversibilities. The model is estimated for six manufacturing industries using Norwegian micro data for the period 1993-2002. We find that increased profitability lowers the exit probability, and this effect is statistically significant in all industries, while, ceteris paribus, high adjustment costs significantly decrease the probability of exit in five of the industries. Exiting firms are characterized by persistently, although only moderately higher, annual exit probabilities than the average firm. There is no tendency for exiting firms to have a high probability of exit just prior to exit.
    Keywords: Firm exit; adjustment costs; Bertrand game; manufacturing firms; mixed logit; state space model.
    JEL: C33 C51 C61 C72 D21
    Date: 2005–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ssb:dispap:442&r=ent

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