Abstract: |
The main idea behind this paper is that social capital is not, as generally
suggested by the socio-economic literature, an individual attitude towards
something which does not imply privately appropriable economic benefits.
Actually, SC might and should be interpreted as a public component of an
investment which implies private and public benefits entangled with each
other. In order to put forward this idea, a dynamic theoretical model that
assumes social capital as the public component of the impure public good R&D
is developed. It shows that the ‘civic culture’ of the district area in which
the firm works is not sufficient as an incentive to increase its investment in
social capital, because this investment strictly depends on the economic
convenience of investing in the impure public good. Social capital /networking
dynamics might positively and complementarily evolve only if the opportunity
cost of investing in innovation is sufficiently low. We consequently focus our
attention on a specialized industrial district located in the Emilia Romagna
region – the biomedical district of Mirandola (Modena) – characterised by a
strong pattern of innovative activity. Using a proxy for innovative activity
as dependant variable, we observe that R&D and networking/social capital arise
as complementary driving forces for innovation outputs. When empirical
evidence confirms that this complementarity plays a key role, and consequently
strong links exist between market and non-market dynamics relating to firms,
the role for policy actions targeted to social capital is larger. The policy
effort should be targeted toward both market and non-market characteristics
taken together, rather than solely to the production of (local) public goods
(social capital) or innovation inputs as independent elements of firm
processes. The input of SC alone is not sufficient to ensure innovation and
growth: economic incentives matter. On the other hand, whenever SC dynamics
are crucial for R&D private investments, the effect of economic incentives
depends on the presence and degree of their complementarity. |