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on Energy Economics |
| By: | Dhruv Suri; Jacques de Chalendar; Ines Azevedo |
| Abstract: | Wind and solar electricity generation account for 14% of total electricity generation in the United States and are expected to continue to grow in the next decades. In low carbon systems, generation from renewable energy sources displaces conventional fossil fuel power plants resulting in lower system-level emissions and emissions intensity. However, we find that intermittent generation from renewables changes the way conventional thermal power plants operate, and that the displacement of generation is not 1 to 1 as expected. Our work provides a method that allows policy and decision makers to continue to track the effect of additional renewable capacity and the resulting thermal power plant operational responses. |
| Date: | 2024–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2408.05209 |
| By: | Mazzocco, Ilaria |
| Abstract: | Chinese firms are leading players in the production of clean energy technologies and appear set to expand further. This paper analyzes trends in Chinese clean tech manufacturing including internationalization, and the outlook for manufacturing facilities outside of China in the clean energy technology industry, including EVs, batteries, and wind turbines. Among the main findings: Chinese clean energy technology companies have been relatively quick to expand their foreign market share but production outside of China is still lagging. Europe is likely to be the preferred destination for Chinese battery, EV, and wind companies but current investments are limited to the battery industry. The production of different technologies is subject to different sets of incentives including cost and political considerations that will determine how quickly companies will internationalize production. Overall, the diversification of production would bolster the resilience of supply chains and economic development but is likely to proceed more quickly for batteries and more slowly for other technologies. |
| Keywords: | Social and Behavioral Sciences, China, renewable energy, technology, industrial policy, manufacturing |
| Date: | 2023–02–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:globco:qt19d8w4xm |
| By: | Imelda (Geneva Graduate Institute and CEPR); Xiaoying Guo (Geneva Graduate Institute) |
| Abstract: | In many developing and emerging economies, frequent power outages are often a consequence of electricity rationing, stemming from the insufficient generation capacity to meet peak demand. In an effort to minimize the disruption caused by sudden power outages, utilities often implement scheduled outages to allow consumers to prepare. However, these planned outages may inadvertently influence criminal behavior and planning. This study investigates the causal relationship between planned electricity outages and crime rates, leveraging a geographic discontinuity in outage duration due to differences in electricity suppliers within the City of Cape Town, South Africa. We compare crime trends in areas served by the municipal grid, which benefits from pumped hydro storage to mitigate outages, with those served by the national grid, where outages are more severe. We find that 10 hours per month more outages lead to an increase of 2.6 percent or eight more crime incidents. The analysis reveals that while overall crime rates are affected, specific types of crime, such as robbery, theft, and violent crime, are particularly sensitive to power outages. Outages caused by electricity rationing create opportunities for certain types of criminal activity, particularly at night. The larger the share of areas affected by severe load shedding, the higher the incidence of crime. Conversely, crimes less related to load shedding, such as commercial and drug-related offenses, are not affected by these outages.This research contributes to the growing body of evidence on the socioeconomic consequences of power outages and highlights the importance of reliable electricity access for public safety and development. |
| Keywords: | outages; developing countries; crime; law enforcement |
| JEL: | O18 O17 K42 |
| Date: | 2024–08–23 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gii:giihei:heidwp18-2024 |
| By: | Kohnert, Dirk |
| Abstract: | Depuis la guerre russe en Ukraine, de nombreux pays européens se sont efforcés de trouver des sources d'énergie alternatives. L'une des réponses consistait à augmenter les importations de gaz naturel liquéfié (GNL). En contournant l'utilisation de gazoducs venant de l'Est en construisant des terminaux GNL, l'UE a ouvert la porte à une plus grande variété de fournisseurs potentiels. Le Partenariat Europe-Afrique pour l'énergie et le climat fournit un cadre pour une alliance gagnant-gagnant. Les pays africains seront des acteurs clé à l'avenir, notamment les pays subsahariens comme le Nigeria, le Sénégal, le Mozambique et l'Angola. Selon le plan REPowerEU, les partenariats hydrogène en Afrique permettront d'importer 10 millions de tonnes d'hydrogène d'ici 2030, remplaçant environ 18 milliards de mètres cube de gaz russe importé. L'Algérie, le Niger et le Nigeria ont récemment convenu de construire un gazoduc transsaharien de 4 128 kilomètres qui traverserait les trois pays jusqu'à l'Europe. Une fois achevé, le gazoduc transportera 30 milliards de mètres cube de gaz par an. La Coalition africaine pour le commerce et l'investissement (ACTING) estime la capacité potentielle d'exportation de GNL subsaharienne à 134 millions de tonnes de GNL (environ 175 milliards de m3) d'ici 2030. L'Afrique subsaharienne devrait également devenir le principal producteur d'hydrogène vert d'ici 2050. Cependant, ce marché reste à développer et nécessite une expansion significative de la production renouvelable et de la disponibilité de l'eau. Cependant, les pays de l'UE et les entreprises concernées seraient bien avisés de prendre note de l'adoption d'objectifs européens beaucoup plus stricts de réduction des gaz à effet de serre pour 2030 et de la publication de la stratégie méthane de la Commission européenne. Cela étant dit, l'UE pourrait risquer de voir plus de la moitié des infrastructures GNL européennes inutilisées d'ici 2030, dans la mesure où la capacité européenne de GNL en 2030 dépasse la demande totale prévue de gaz, y compris le GNL et le gazoduc. Quoi qu'il en soit, il ne faut pas oublier que les pays africains souhaitent et doivent développer en priorité leurs marchés gaziers nationaux et que le potentiel d'exportation dépend de ce développement national. À long terme, un mix énergétique mondial serait nécessaire pour accélérer les changements induits par les nouvelles ressources, les nouvelles technologies et les engagements climatiques. Ces changements dans l'utilisation et la disponibilité des ressources énergétiques affecteraient également l'utilisation des combustibles fossiles. Quoi qu'il en soit, outre l'approvisionnement en GNL, l'UE doit également veiller à augmenter ses propres capacités de stockage afin de pouvoir garantir une réponse rentable à un goulot d'étranglement dans l'approvisionnement en gaz naturel. Cependant, le GNL seul ne suffit pas à assurer la résilience du système en cas de rupture d'approvisionnement. Les ressources énergétiques alternatives et les économies d'énergie restent essentielles. |
| Abstract: | Since Russia's war in Ukraine, many European countries have been scrambling to find alternative energy sources. One of the answers was to increase imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG). By bypassing the use of pipelines from the East by building LNG terminals, the EU opened up a wider variety of potential suppliers. The Europe-Africa Energy and Climate Partnership provides a framework for a win-win alliance. African countries will be key players in the future, including sub-Saharan countries such as Nigeria, Senegal, Mozambique and Angola. According to the REPowerEU plan, hydrogen partnerships in Africa will enable the import of 10 million tons of hydrogen by 2030, replacing about 18 billion cubic meters of imported Russian gas. Algeria, Niger and Nigeria recently agreed to build a 4, 128-kilometer trans-Saharan gas pipeline that would run through the three countries to Europe. Once completed, the pipeline will transport 30 billion cubic meters of gas per year. The African Coalition for Trade and Investment (ACTING) estimates potential sub-Saharan LNG export capacity at 134 million tonnes of LNG (approximately 175 billion m3) by 2030. Sub-Saharan Africa is also expected to become the main producer of green hydrogen by 2050. However, this market remains to be developed and requires significant expansion of renewable production and water availability. However, the EU countries and companies involved would be well advised to take note of the adoption of much stricter EU greenhouse gas reduction targets for 2030 and the publication of the European Commission's methane strategy. That being said, the EU could risk having more than half of Europe's LNG infrastructure idle by 2030, as European LNG capacity in 2030 exceeds total forecast gas demand, including LNG and pipeline gas. Regardless, it should not be forgotten that African countries want and need to develop their domestic gas markets as a priority, and that export potential depends on this domestic development. In the long term, a global energy mix would be needed to accelerate change driven by new resources, new technologies and climate commitments. These changes in the use and availability of energy resources would also affect the use of fossil fuels. Regardless of this, in addition to the LNG supply, the EU must also take care of increasing its own storage capacities to be able to guarantee a cost-efficient response to a natural gas supply bottleneck. However, LNG alone is not enough to ensure the resilience of the system in the event of a supply failure. Alternative energy resources and energy saving remain essential. |
| Abstract: | Seit Russlands Krieg in der Ukraine bemühen sich viele europäische Länder darum, alternative Energiequellen zu finden. Eine der Antworten bestand darin, den Import von Flüssigerdgas (LNG) zu steigern. Durch die Umgehung der Nutzung von Pipelines aus dem Osten mittels des Baus von LNG-Terminals erschloss sich die EU eine größere Vielfalt potenzieller Lieferanten. Die Europa-Afrika-Energie- und Klimapartnerschaft bietet einen Rahmen für eine Win-Win-Allianz. Afrikanische Länder werden in Zukunft zentrale Akteure sein, darunter auch Länder südlich der Sahara wie Nigeria, Senegal, Mosambik und Angola. Dem REPowerEU-Plan zufolge sollen Wasserstoffpartnerschaften in Afrika bis 2030 den Import von 10 Millionen Tonnen Wasserstoff ermöglichen und damit etwa 18 Milliarden Kubikmeter importiertes russisches Gas ersetzen. Algerien, Niger und Nigeria haben sich kürzlich auf den Bau einer 4.128 Kilometer langen Transsahara-Gaspipeline geeinigt, die durch die drei Länder nach Europa führen soll. Nach ihrer Fertigstellung wird die Pipeline 30 Milliarden Kubikmeter Gas pro Jahr transportieren. Die African Coalition for Trade and Investment (ACTING) schätzt die potenzielle LNG-Exportkapazität südlich der Sahara bis 2030 auf 134 Millionen Tonnen LNG (ca. 175 Milliarden m3). Es wird erwartet, dass Afrika südlich der Sahara bis 2050 auch zum Hauptproduzenten von grünem Wasserstoff wird Dieser Markt muss jedoch noch erschlossen werden und erfordert einen erheblichen Ausbau der erneuerbaren Produktion und der Wasserverfügbarkeit. Allerdings wären die beteiligten EU-Länder und Unternehmen gut beraten, die Verabschiedung deutlich strengerer EU-Treibhausgas-Reduktionsziele für 2030 und die Veröffentlichung der Methanstrategie der Europäischen Kommission zur Kenntnis zu nehmen. Außerdem könnte die EU riskieren, dass bis 2030 mehr als die Hälfte der europäischen LNG-Infrastruktur stillgelegt wird, da die europäische LNG-Kapazität im Jahr 2030 den gesamten prognostizierten Gasbedarf, einschließlich LNG und Pipelinegas, übersteigt. Ungeachtet dessen darf nicht vergessen werden, dass die afrikanischen Länder ihre inländischen Gasmärkte vorrangig weiterentwickeln wollen und müssen und dass das Exportpotenzial von dieser inländischen Entwicklung abhängt. Langfristig wäre ein globaler Energiemix erforderlich, um den durch neue Ressourcen, neue Technologien und Klimaverpflichtungen vorangetriebenen Wandel zu beschleunigen. Diese Veränderungen in der Nutzung und Verfügbarkeit von Energieressourcen würden sich auch auf die Nutzung fossiler Brennstoffe auswirken. Unabhängig davon muss sich die EU neben der LNG-Versorgung auch um den Ausbau ihrer eigenen Speicherkapazitäten kümmern, um eine kosteneffiziente Reaktion auf einen Erdgasversorgungsengpass gewährleisten zu können. Allerdings reicht LNG allein nicht aus, um die Widerstandsfähigkeit des Systems im Falle eines Versorgungsausfalls zu gewährleisten. Alternative Energiequellen und Energieeinsparungen bleiben von entscheidender Bedeutung. |
| Keywords: | GNL, économie hydrogène, e-carburant, gaz naturel, Afrique subsaharienne, UE |
| JEL: | E22 E23 F13 F54 L71 L95 N57 Q35 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:300910 |
| By: | Stutzmann, Sophia |
| Abstract: | Climate policies can have adverse social and economic effects on affected citizens. Against this backdrop, understanding the conditions under which electoral support or backlash to such policies occurs is crucial. In this paper, I set out to shed light on this issue by empirically analysing the electoral repercussions of the coal phase-out in Germany. By employing a series of fixed-effects models, I investigate whether the closures of coal plants and mines between 2007 and 2022 affected voting behaviour at the municipality level. I find that closures result in lower vote shares for the Social Democratic Party and higher abstention rates in affected municipalities. These findings document a punishment of the long-time issue owner and point towards the role of economic grievances in curbing political engagement. With the high politicisation around the issue of fossil fuel energy generation, these findings have important implications for the remaining coal phase-outs worldwide. |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cexwps:300836 |
| By: | Amalia, Shendy; Effendi, Kharisya Ayu; Riantani, Suskim |
| Abstract: | This research explores the impact of macroeconomic factors on the volatility of tin commodity futures contract prices, with a focus on inflation, interest rates and forward prices. The volatility of tin futures prices is important to investment strategies and risk management. Understanding the influence of these macroeconomic variables helps in making better investment decisions. The independent variables analyzed include inflation (X1), interest rates (X2), and forward prices (X3). Inflation reflects general price increases that can increase production costs and affect commodity prices. Interest rates are borrowing costs that influence investment decisions through the cost of capital. Forward prices reflect market expectations of future commodity prices. The dependent variable is the volatility of the tin commodity futures contract price (Y). This research methodology uses linear regression to analyze historical data from the three macroeconomic variables. Data is collected from economic reports, financial market data, and government publications. Analysis is carried out to determine the influence of each variable on futures price volatility. The research results show that inflation and forward prices have a significant influence on the volatility of tin futures contract prices, while interest rates have no significant influence. Increased inflation leads to increases in production costs and prices of goods, increasing future price uncertainty and volatility. High forward prices reflect expectations of future increases in commodity prices, which also increases volatility. Meanwhile, interest rates do not significantly affect borrowing costs, so they have no impact on futures contract price volatility. |
| Date: | 2024–07–30 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:4rydm |
| By: | Meissner, Leonie P. |
| Abstract: | To achieve net-zero emissions by mid-century, the removal of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere through negative emission technologies (NETs) will play an integral part. With renewable energy technologies (RETs), there has already been the introduction and expansion of a clean technology that faced similar obstacles as NETs—high up-front costs, limited competitiveness, and low public perception. This article compares NET policy proposals with the lessons learned from RET support. For NETs, the use of R&D support for innovation is unequivocal due to its nascency, yet the demand-pull instrument differs whether NETs are used as an alternative mitigation strategy, as a bridging technology or as a last resort. As an alternative mitigation method, a market-based approach by integrating NETs into emission trading systems is applicable because the use of NETs has no additional environmental benefit compared to abatement. Using NETs as a bridging technology requires restricting the demand for NETs to control the volume, and possibly type of NETs. This can be achieved via mandates or auctions. As a last resort, the removal via NETs requires heavy state involvement as emission removal constitutes a pure public good. This warrants public procurement or even state-led NET operation. |
| Keywords: | Carbon dioxide removal, renewable energy, environmental innovation, technology diffusion, pbulic policy |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwkie:300921 |
| By: | Zelaya Aguilar, Mario R.; Cabrera Porres, Pablo J.; Arroyo, José Manuel |
| Date: | 2023–07–31 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecr:col094:80458 |
| By: | Carl Heinz Daube; Alex Dulachyk; Leon Podinovic; Hendrik Ruschmeyer; Melissa Spiegeler |
| Abstract: | The aim of this working paper is to examine the current state of Circular Economy (CE) implantation in the aviation industry, with a particular focus on Lufthansa. The aviation industry must integrate Circular Economy principles to address environmental concerns and achieve sustainable growth. CE practices, such as reducing, reusing and recycling, can significantly reduce waste, optimize resource use and lower greenhouse gas emissions. Lufthansa initiatives in sustainable fuels and innovative technologies highlight the practical application of CE concepts, enhancing both sustainability and operational efficiency. However, challenges include high costs, stringent safety standards and regulatory changes. Despite these hurdles, coordinated efforts among stakeholders and advancements in technology and policy are essential for successful CE implementation in Aviation Industry. |
| Abstract: | Ziel dieses Working Papers ist es, den aktuellen Stand der Implementierung der Kreislaufwirtschaft (CE) in der Luftfahrtbranche, mit besonderem Fokus auf Lufthansa, zu untersuchen. Die Luftfahrtindustrie muss Prinzipien der Kreislaufwirtschaft integrieren, um Umweltprobleme anzugehen und nachhaltiges Wachstum zu erzielen. Praktiken der Kreislaufwirtschaft, wie “Reduzieren”, “Wiederverwenden” und “Recyceln” können Abfall erheblich reduzieren, zu einer effizienteren Ressourcennutzung führen und Treibhausgasemission senken. Lufthansa Initiativen in nachhaltigen Kraftstoffen und innovativen Technologien zeigen die praktische Anwendung von Konzepten der Kreislaufwirtschaft und verbessern sowohl die Nachhaltigkeit als auch die Betriebseffizienz. Allerdings gibt es Herausforderungen wie hohe Kosten, strenge Sicherheitsstandards und regulatorische Aspekte. Trotz dieser Hürden sind koordinierte Anstrengungen aller Beteiligten und Fortschritte in Technologie und Politik entscheidend für die erfolgreiche Umsetzung der Kreislaufwirtschaft in der Luftfahrt. |
| Keywords: | aviation industry, circular economy, ce practices, green aviation |
| JEL: | G01 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:301357 |
| By: | Daria Gritsenko; Jon Aaen; Bent Flyvbjerg |
| Abstract: | Digitalization is a core component of the green transition. Today's focus is on quantifying and pre-dicting the climate effects of digitalization through various life-cycle assessments and baseline sce-nario methodologies. Here we argue that this is a mistake. Most attempts at prediction are based on three implicit assumptions: (a) the digital carbon footprint can be quantified, (b) business-as-usual with episodic change leading to a new era of stability, and (c) investments in digitalization will be delivered within the cost, timeframe, and benefits described in their business cases. We problema-tize each assumption within the context of digitalization and argue that the digital carbon footprint is inherently unpredictable. We build on uncertainty literature to show that even if you cannot predict, you can still mitigate. On that basis, we propose to rethink practice on the digital carbon footprint from prediction to mitigation. |
| Date: | 2024–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2407.15016 |
| By: | Barbour, Elisa; Alvarez-Coria, Rosanely; Anderson, Hayden; Hosseinzade, Rey; Turner, Katherine; Handy, Susan |
| Abstract: | Vehicle travel, measured as vehicle-miles traveled (VMT), dropped precipitously in California following “stay-in-place” orders issued by the state and counties as a response to the Covid-19 pandemic. Although VMT rebounded relatively quickly, the state has an opportunity to leverage other changes in household travel behavior so as to achieve its VMT reduction goals while enhancing transportation equity. This report reviews the available evidence on changes in household travel behavior resulting from the Covid-19 pandemic and provides an overview of potential state, regional, and local-level policies that could help to preserve changes that help to reduce VMT and reverse those that tend to increase VMT. The review focuses on alternatives to driving, specifically telecommuting, public transit, ride-hailing, e-shopping, and active travel and micro-mobility. View the NCST Project Webpage |
| Keywords: | Social and Behavioral Sciences, telecommuting, public transit, ride-hailing, e-shopping, active travel, micro-mobility |
| Date: | 2023–07–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:itsdav:qt5q0076tq |
| By: | Kohnert, Dirk |
| Abstract: | Die Europäische Union (EU) hat einen dringenden Bedarf an Seltenen Erden, insbesondere an raffinierten Produkten, die für die Produktion von Elektroautos, Turbinen und anderen technischen Anwendungen unerlässlich sind. Allerdings ist der Raffinierungsprozess nicht nur energieintensiv, sondern birgt auch erhebliche Umweltrisiken. Folglich lehnen lokale Gemeinschaften, wie Beispiele in Spanien und Portugal zeigen, solche Operationen in ihrer Nähe vehement ab und befürworten eine „Beggar-thy-Neighbour“-Politik. Die EU ist derzeit stark von China abhängig, das den Großteil der weltweiten Verarbeitung kontrolliert und über 90 % aller Seltenen Erden und 60 % des Lithiums verfügt. Als Reaktion auf diese Herausforderungen hat die EU im November 2023 einen entscheidenden Schritt unternommen, indem sie eine vorläufige Einigung über den European Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) erzielte. Diese Gesetzesinitiative zielt darauf ab, die Versorgung der EU mit kritischen Rohstoffen (CRM) zu verbessern und zu diversifizieren, die Kreislaufwirtschaft zu fördern, die strategische Autonomie Europas zu stärken und Alternativen zur Verringerung der Abhängigkeit zu erkunden. Die jüngsten transnationalen Krisen, darunter Unterbrechungen der Lieferketten während der COVID-19-Pandemie und der russischen Invasion in der Ukraine, unterstreichen die Notwendigkeit sicherer Lieferketten in allen Wirtschaftssektoren. Diese Krisen unterstreichen auch den erheblichen Einfluss großer Schwellenländer, insbesondere der BRICS-Staaten (Brasilien, Russland, Indien, China und Südafrika), die wichtige globale Lieferketten, einschließlich derjenigen für kritische Rohstoffe (CRMs), dominieren. Russland spielt eine zentrale Rolle als einer der weltweit größten Lieferanten von Palladium (40 % des weltweiten Angebots), als zweitgrößter Lieferant von Platin (13 %) und Nickel (12 %) und als wesentlicher Lieferant von Aluminium und Kupfer. Darüber hinaus verfügt Russland aufgrund seiner umfangreichen Reserven über das Potenzial, sich zu einem wichtigen Akteur auf dem Markt für Seltene Erden zu entwickeln. Auf das Land entfällt auch ein beträchtlicher Anteil der EU-Akquisitionen, darunter Palladium (41 %), Platin (16 %), Kobalt (5 %) und Lithium (4 %). Insbesondere dient Russland als wichtigste EU-Quelle für die Verarbeitung von Metallen der Platingruppe (Iridium, Platin, Rhodium, Ruthenium; 40 %), die Gewinnung von Phosphatgestein (20 %), die Verarbeitung von Lithium (4 %) und die Verarbeitung von Scandium (1 %). Um eine größere Unabhängigkeit bei der externen CRM-Bereitstellung zu erreichen, muss die EU erhebliche Investitionen in ihre Bergbau- und Verarbeitungsanlagen tätigen. Allerdings stellt der Bergbau lediglich die Anfangsphase dar; Nachfolgende Schritte umfassen die Trennung seltener Erdelemente (REE) von Oxiden, die Raffinierung und das Schmieden von Legierungen, ein komplexer, hochspezialisierter, mehrstufiger Prozess. In dieser Hinsicht hinken relative Newcomer wie Europa hinterher, da China seine dominierende Stellung in jeder Phase durch eine konzertierte, langfristige Industriestrategie, die durch staatliche Subventionen unterstützt wird, gefestigt hat. |
| Abstract: | The European Union (EU) finds itself in a critical need for rare earths, particularly the refined products essential for the production of electric cars, turbines, and other technological applications. However, the refining process is not only energy-intensive but also poses significant environmental risks. Consequently, local communities, as evidenced by instances in Spain and Portugal, vehemently oppose having such operations in their vicinity, advocating a "beggar thy neighbour" policy. The EU currently relies heavily on China, which controls the majority of global processing, commanding 90% of all rare earths and 60% of lithium. In response to these challenges, the EU took a crucial step in November 2023 by reaching a preliminary agreement on the European Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA). This legislative initiative aims to enhance and diversify the EU's supply of critical raw materials (CRM), foster the circular economy, fortify Europe's strategic autonomy, and explore alternatives to mitigate dependence. Recent transnational crises, including disruptions to supply chains during the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia's invasion of Ukraine, underscore the imperative of secure supply chains across all economic sectors. These crises also underscore the significant influence wielded by major emerging economies, notably the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), which dominate key global supply chains, including those for critical raw materials (CRMs). Russia plays a pivotal role as one of the world's largest suppliers of palladium (40% of global supply), the second-largest supplier of platinum (13%) and nickel (12%), and a substantial contributor of aluminium and copper. Furthermore, Russia possesses the potential to emerge as a major player in the rare earths market due to its extensive reserves. The country also accounts for a considerable share of the EU's acquisitions, including palladium (41%), platinum (16%), cobalt (5%), and lithium (4%). Notably, Russia serves as the primary EU source for platinum group metals processing (iridium, platinum, rhodium, ruthenium; 40%), phosphate rock extraction (20%), lithium processing (4%), and scandium processing (1%). To attain greater independence in external CRM provision, the EU must make significant investments in its mining and processing facilities. However, mining represents merely the initial phase; subsequent steps involve the separation of rare earth elements (REE) from oxides, refining, and alloy forging a complex, highly specialized, multi-stage process. In this regard, relative newcomers like Europe lag behind, as China has solidified its dominant position in each phase through a concerted, long-term industrial strategy supported by state subsidies |
| Keywords: | Seltene Erden, Klimawandel, Energiewende, Umweltverschmutzung, Russland, Deutschland, Frankreich, Italien |
| JEL: | D24 D43 F13 F18 F64 N17 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:300884 |
| By: | Kohnert, Dirk |
| Abstract: | Human activity has transformed the planet at a pace and scale unprecedented in recorded history, causing irreversible damage to communities and ecosystems. Countries have focused their capacities on economic growth, with too little attention to externalities in terms of environmental quality. The world will not avoid catastrophic warming unless wealthy nations accelerate their reduction of own emissions and help poorer countries to do the same. North America and Europe have contributed 62 % of carbon dioxide emissions since the industrial revolution, while Africa has contributed only 3%. However, it is in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) that the impacts are most severe and the people most vulnerable. Developed countries, in their own interests, should focus on ways to help developing countries phase out fossil fuels and transition to renewable energy. However, there are tensions between richer and poorer nations over who should pay the costs of global warming. Rich countries have a responsibility to act more quickly than their low-income counterparts. Yet governments continue to subsidise the use of fossil fuels, and banks and companies still invest more in polluting industries than in climate solutions. The consumption habits of the richest 10 % of people generate three times more pollution than those of the poorest 50 %. Emerging economies such as China and India, which plan to achieve net-zero emissions by 2060 and 2070 respectively, should join the developed world in accelerating emissions reductions. It is not just the way we produce and use energy that needs to change quickly. It's the way we consume food, the way we protect nature. It's everything, everywhere, all at once. The agricultural sector is particularly vulnerable, especially in SSA countries where agriculture is central to the economy. Among the top eight countries with the highest cumulative net emissions from agriculture, forestry and other land use are two SSA countries, Nigeria and DR Congo. Most of these emissions are embodied in trade and are caused by consumption in regions such as Europe, the United States and China. The establishment of the Loss and Damage Fund agreed at COP27 will not be enough to turn the tide, nor will it necessarily translate into climate finance commitments, given the lack of progress in delivering the promised US$100 billion in annual climate finance from rich countries. African countries themselves need to reflect on their own strengths and step up their efforts in a timely and substantial way. |
| Abstract: | Menschliche Aktivitäten haben den Planeten in einem in der Geschichte beispiellosen Tempo und Ausmaß verändert und irreversible Schäden an Gemeinschaften und Ökosystemen verursacht. Die Länder haben ihre Kapazitäten auf das Wirtschaftswachstum konzentriert und dabei den damit verbundenen externen Effekten im Hinblick auf die Umweltqualität wenig Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt. Die Welt wird eine katastrophale Erwärmung nicht vermeiden können, wenn wohlhabende Nationen ihre eigenen Emissionsreduzierungen nicht beschleunigen und ärmeren Ländern dabei helfen, dasselbe zu tun. Nordamerika und Europa haben seit der industriellen Revolution 62 % der Kohlendioxidemissionen verursacht, während Afrika nur 3 % beitrug. Allerdings sind die Auswirkungen in Subsahara-Afrika (SSA) am schwerwiegendsten und die Menschen am stärksten gefährdet. Industrieländer sollten sich in ihrem eigenen Interesse darauf konzentrieren, Entwicklungsländern beim Ausstieg aus fossilen Brennstoffen und beim Übergang zu erneuerbaren Energien zu helfen. Es gibt jedoch Spannungen zwischen reicheren und ärmeren Ländern darüber, wer die Kosten der globalen Erwärmung tragen soll. Reiche Länder haben die Verantwortung, schneller zu handeln als ihre einkommensschwachen Länder. Dennoch subventionieren Regierungen weiterhin die Nutzung fossiler Brennstoffe, und Banken und Unternehmen investieren immer noch weitaus mehr in umweltverschmutzende Industrien als in Klimalösungen. Die Konsumgewohnheiten der reichsten 10 % der Menschen verursachen dreimal mehr Umweltverschmutzung als die der ärmsten 50 %. Schwellenländer wie China und Indien, die bis 2060 bzw. 2070 Netto-Null-Emissionen erreichen wollen, sollten sich den Industrieländern anschließen und die Emissionsreduzierung beschleunigen. Nicht nur die Art und Weise, wie wir Energie produzieren und nutzen, muss sich schnell ändern. Es ist die Art und Weise, wie wir Lebensmittel konsumieren, die Art und Weise, wie wir die Natur schützen. Es gilt alles, überall, und alles auf einmal zu ändern. Der Agrarsektor ist besonders gefährdet, insbesondere in SSA-Ländern, in denen die Landwirtschaft für Wirtschaft und Produktivität von zentraler Bedeutung ist. Zu den acht Ländern mit den höchsten kumulierten Nettoemissionen aus Land- und Forstwirtschaft sowie anderer Landnutzung gehören zwei SSA-Länder, Nigeria und die DR Kongo. Die meisten dieser Emissionen sind durch internationalen Handel induziert und werden durch den Konsum in industrialisierten Regionen wie Europa, den Vereinigten Staaten und China verursacht. Allerdings wird die Einrichtung des auf der COP27 vereinbarten Verlust- und Schadensfonds nicht ausreichen, um das Blatt zu wenden. Er wird sich auch nicht zwangsläufig in Verpflichtungen zur Klimafinanzierung niederschlagen, da bei der Bereitstellung der versprochenen jährlichen Klimafinanzierung in Höhe von 100 Milliarden US-Dollar durch die Reichen bisher keine Fortschritte erzielt wurden. Die afrikanischen Länder selbst müssen sich auf ihre eigenen Stärken besinnen und ihre Anstrengungen rechtzeitig und substanziell verstärken. |
| Keywords: | Environmental sustainabily, Carbon neutrality, climate change, Carbon dioxide, Sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria |
| JEL: | E26 F18 F54 H23 N17 O55 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:300880 |
| By: | Kohnert, Dirk |
| Abstract: | The African continent is increasingly becoming a battleground in the race between superpowers for access to critical minerals needed for the 'Green Revolution', such as rare earth minerals (REE). Companies from China, the USA and Russia play a major role. In most cases, critical minerals are mined by international mining companies supported by their governments and organizing complex global value chains. So far, China has dominated supply chains and has secured mining contracts across sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Currently, China produces 58% of all REEs worldwide. It is the main importer of minerals from Africa, with mineral exports from sub-Saharan Africa to China totalling USD 10 bn in 2019. Its dominance of the global rare earths market is rooted in politics, not geography. Rare earths are neither that rare nor that concentrated in China. Beijing has adopted a strategy of imports, dumping and control of rare earths that is hardly consistent with WTO rules. Therefore, in June 2022, a newly founded 'Minerals Security Partnership', consisting of the USA, the EU, Great Britain and other Western industrialized countries, invited mineral-rich African countries to counter Chinese dominance. These included resource-rich countries such as South Africa, Botswana, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The West's push became even more urgent after Beijing imposed export controls on the strategic metals gallium and germanium in July 2023, sparking global fears that China could be next to block exports of rare earth or processing technology. Because African markets are small, they are forced to rely on foreign financing. However, so far, foreign direct investment in rare earth production has confirmed the 'pollution haven' hypothesis about the environmentally harmful effects of FDI flowing into the affected countries. Although the full potential of rare earths in SSA has remained largely untapped due to low exploration, the dark side of the energy transition is becoming increasingly visible. These include pollution of soil, air and water as well as inadequate disposal of toxic residues and intensive water and energy use, occupational and environmental risks, child labour and sexual abuse as well as corruption and armed conflicts. In August 2023, Nigeria, Africa's largest economy, suspended certain illegal Chinese mining activities within its borders, including the activities of Ruitai Mining Company due to its involvement in illegal titanium ore mining. Namibia and the DR Congo followed suit. |
| Abstract: | Der afrikanische Kontinent wird immer mehr zum Schlachtfeld im Wettlauf zwischen Supermächten um den Zugang zu kritischen Mineralien, die für die ‚Grüne Revolution‘ benötigt werden, wie zum Beispiel seltene Erden (REE). Eine große Rolle spielen Unternehmen aus China, den USA und Russland. In den meisten Fällen werden kritische Mineralien von internationalen Bergbauunternehmen abgebaut, die von ihren Regierungen unterstützt werden und komplexe globale Wertschöpfungsketten organisieren. Bisher dominiert China die Lieferketten und hat sich Bergbauverträge in ganz Afrika südlich der Sahara (SSA) gesichert. Derzeit produziert China 58 % aller REEs weltweit. Es ist der Hauptimporteur von Mineralien aus Afrika, wobei sich die Mineralienexporte aus Afrika südlich der Sahara nach China im Jahr 2019 auf insgesamt $USD 10 Mrd. beliefen. Seine Dominanz auf dem globalen Markt für seltene Erden hat seine Wurzeln in der Politik, nicht in der Geographie. Seltene Erden sind weder so selten noch so stark in China konzentriert. Peking hat eine Strategie der Einfuhr, Dumpings und Kontrolle seltener Erden eingeführt, die kaum mit den Regeln der WTO übereinstimmt. Daher lud im Juni 2022 eine neu gegründete ‚Minerals Security Partnership‘, bestehend aus den USA, der EU, Großbritannien und anderen westlichen Industrieländern, mineralreiche Länder Afrikas ein, der chinesischen Dominanz entgegenzuwirken. Dazu gehörten rohstoffreiche Länder wie Südafrika, Botswana, Angola, Mosambik, Namibia, Tansania, Sambia, Uganda und die Demokratische Republik Kongo. Der Vorstoß des Westens wurde noch dringlicher, nachdem Peking im Juli 2023 Exportkontrollen für die strategischen Metalle Gallium und Germanium eingeführt hatte, was weltweit Befürchtungen weckte, dass China als nächstes den Export von Seltenen Erden oder Verarbeitungstechnologie blockieren könnte. Da die afrikanischen Märkte klein sind, sind sie gezwungen, auf ausländische Finanzmittel zurückzugreifen. Bisher haben die ausländischen Direktinvestitionen in die Produktion von Seltenen Erden jedoch die ‚Pollution haven‘ Hypothese über die umweltschädlichen Auswirkungen der in die betroffenen Länder fließenden FDI bestätigt. Obwohl das volle Potenzial der seltenen Erden in SSA aufgrund der geringen Exploration bisher weitgehend ungenutzt blieb, werden die Schattenseiten der Energiewende zunehmend sichtbar. Darunter fallen die Verschmutzung von Boden, Luft und Wasser sowie die unzureichende Entsorgung giftiger Rückstände und die intensive Wasser- und Energienutzung, Arbeits- und Umweltrisiken, Kinderarbeit und sexueller Missbrauch sowie Korruption und bewaffnete Konflikte. Im August 2023 stellte Nigeria, Afrikas größte Volkswirtschaft, bestimmte illegale chinesische Bergbauaktivitäten innerhalb seiner Grenzen ein, einschließlich der Aktivitäten der Ruitai Mining Company wegen ihrer Beteiligung am illegalen Titanerzabbau. Namibia und die DR Kongo folgten diesem Beispiel. |
| Keywords: | rare earths, energy transition, climate change, pollution, emerging markets, Sub-Saharan Africa |
| JEL: | D24 D43 D52 E23 F13 F18 F63 L61 N54 Q53 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:300906 |
| By: | Kohnert, Dirk |
| Abstract: | The European Union (EU) finds itself in a critical need for rare earths, particularly the refined products essential for the production of electric cars, turbines, and other technological applications. However, the refining process is not only energy-intensive but also poses significant environmental risks. Consequently, local communities, as evidenced by instances in Spain and Portugal, vehemently oppose having such operations in their vicinity, advocating a "beggar thy neighbour" policy. The EU currently relies heavily on China, which controls the majority of global processing, commanding 90% of all rare earths and 60% of lithium. In response to these challenges, the EU took a crucial step in November 2023 by reaching a preliminary agreement on the European Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA). This legislative initiative aims to enhance and diversify the EU's supply of critical raw materials (CRM), foster the circular economy, fortify Europe's strategic autonomy, and explore alternatives to mitigate dependence. Recent transnational crises, including disruptions to supply chains during the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia's invasion of Ukraine, underscore the imperative of secure supply chains across all economic sectors. These crises also underscore the significant influence wielded by major emerging economies, notably the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), which dominate key global supply chains, including those for critical raw materials (CRMs). Russia plays a pivotal role as one of the world's largest suppliers of palladium (40% of global supply), the second-largest supplier of platinum (13%) and nickel (12%), and a substantial contributor of aluminium and copper. Furthermore, Russia possesses the potential to emerge as a major player in the rare earths market due to its extensive reserves. The country also accounts for a considerable share of the EU's acquisitions, including palladium (41%), platinum (16%), cobalt (5%), and lithium (4%). Notably, Russia serves as the primary EU source for platinum group metals processing (iridium, platinum, rhodium, ruthenium; 40%), phosphate rock extraction (20%), lithium processing (4%), and scandium processing (1%). To attain greater independence in external CRM provision, the EU must make significant investments in its mining and processing facilities. However, mining represents merely the initial phase; subsequent steps involve the separation of rare earth elements (REE) from oxides, refining, and alloy forging a complex, highly specialized, multi-stage process. In this regard, relative newcomers like Europe lag behind, as China has solidified its dominant position in each phase through a concerted, long-term industrial strategy supported by state subsidies. |
| Abstract: | Die Europäische Union (EU) hat einen dringenden Bedarf an Seltenen Erden, insbesondere an raffinierten Produkten, die für die Produktion von Elektroautos, Turbinen und anderen technischen Anwendungen unerlässlich sind. Allerdings ist der Raffinierungsprozess nicht nur energieintensiv, sondern birgt auch erhebliche Umweltrisiken. Folglich lehnen lokale Gemeinschaften, wie Beispiele in Spanien und Portugal zeigen, solche Operationen in ihrer Nähe vehement ab und befürworten eine „Beggar-thy-Neighbour“-Politik. Die EU ist derzeit stark von China abhängig, das den Großteil der weltweiten Verarbeitung kontrolliert und über 90 % aller Seltenen Erden und 60 % des Lithiums verfügt. Als Reaktion auf diese Herausforderungen hat die EU im November 2023 einen entscheidenden Schritt unternommen, indem sie eine vorläufige Einigung über den European Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) erzielte. Diese Gesetzesinitiative zielt darauf ab, die Versorgung der EU mit kritischen Rohstoffen (CRM) zu verbessern und zu diversifizieren, die Kreislaufwirtschaft zu fördern, die strategische Autonomie Europas zu stärken und Alternativen zur Verringerung der Abhängigkeit zu erkunden. Die jüngsten transnationalen Krisen, darunter Unterbrechungen der Lieferketten während der COVID-19-Pandemie und der russischen Invasion in der Ukraine, unterstreichen die Notwendigkeit sicherer Lieferketten in allen Wirtschaftssektoren. Diese Krisen unterstreichen auch den erheblichen Einfluss großer Schwellenländer, insbesondere der BRICS-Staaten (Brasilien, Russland, Indien, China und Südafrika), die wichtige globale Lieferketten, einschließlich derjenigen für kritische Rohstoffe (CRMs), dominieren. Russland spielt eine zentrale Rolle als einer der weltweit größten Lieferanten von Palladium (40 % des weltweiten Angebots), als zweitgrößter Lieferant von Platin (13 %) und Nickel (12 %) und als wesentlicher Lieferant von Aluminium und Kupfer. Darüber hinaus verfügt Russland aufgrund seiner umfangreichen Reserven über das Potenzial, sich zu einem wichtigen Akteur auf dem Markt für Seltene Erden zu entwickeln. Auf das Land entfällt auch ein beträchtlicher Anteil der EU-Akquisitionen, darunter Palladium (41 %), Platin (16 %), Kobalt (5 %) und Lithium (4 %). Insbesondere dient Russland als wichtigste EU-Quelle für die Verarbeitung von Metallen der Platingruppe (Iridium, Platin, Rhodium, Ruthenium; 40 %), die Gewinnung von Phosphatgestein (20 %), die Verarbeitung von Lithium (4 %) und die Verarbeitung von Scandium (1 %). Um eine größere Unabhängigkeit bei der externen CRM-Bereitstellung zu erreichen, muss die EU erhebliche Investitionen in ihre Bergbau- und Verarbeitungsanlagen tätigen. Allerdings stellt der Bergbau lediglich die Anfangsphase dar; Nachfolgende Schritte umfassen die Trennung seltener Erdelemente (REE) von Oxiden, die Raffinierung und das Schmieden von Legierungen, ein komplexer, hochspezialisierter, mehrstufiger Prozess. In dieser Hinsicht hinken relative Newcomer wie Europa hinterher, da China seine dominierende Stellung in jeder Phase durch eine konzertierte, langfristige Industriestrategie, die durch staatliche Subventionen unterstützt wird, gefestigt hat. |
| Keywords: | rare earths, climate change, energy transition, pollution, Russia, Germany, France, Italy |
| JEL: | D24 D43 D52 E23 F64 Q53 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:300882 |
| By: | Kohnert, Dirk |
| Abstract: | Le continent africain devient de plus en plus un champ de bataille dans la course entre les superpuissances pour l'accès aux minéraux essentiels à la « révolution verte », tels que les minéraux des terres rares (REE). Les entreprises chinoises, américaines et russes jouent un rôle majeur. Dans la plupart des cas, les minéraux critiques sont extraits par des sociétés minières internationales soutenues par leurs gouvernements et organisant des chaînes de valeur mondiales complexes. Jusqu’à présent, la Chine a dominé les chaînes d’approvisionnement et a obtenu des contrats miniers dans toute l’Afrique subsaharienne (ASS). Actuellement, la Chine produit 58 % de tous les REE dans le monde. C'est le principal importateur de minéraux d'Afrique, les exportations de minéraux de l'Afrique subsaharienne vers la Chine totalisant 10 milliards de dollars en 2019. Sa domination sur le marché mondial des terres rares est ancrée dans la politique et non dans la géographie. Les terres rares ne sont ni si rares ni si concentrées en Chine. Pékin a adopté une stratégie d'importation, de dumping et de contrôle des terres rares peu conforme aux règles de l'OMC. C’est pourquoi, en juin 2022, un nouveau « Partenariat pour la sécurité minière », composé des États-Unis, de l’UE, de la Grande-Bretagne et d’autres pays industrialisés occidentaux, a invité les pays africains riches en minéraux à contrer la domination chinoise. Il s'agissait notamment de pays riches en ressources telles que l'Afrique du Sud, le Botswana, l'Angola, le Mozambique, la Namibie, la Tanzanie, la Zambie, l'Ouganda et la République démocratique du Congo. L’action de l’Occident est devenue encore plus urgente après que Pékin a imposé des contrôles à l’exportation sur les métaux stratégiques, le gallium et le germanium, en juillet 2023, suscitant des craintes mondiales selon lesquelles la Chine pourrait être la prochaine à bloquer les exportations de terres rares ou de technologies de transformation. Les marchés africains étant petits, ils sont contraints de recourir au financement étranger. Cependant, jusqu'à présent, les investissements directs étrangers dans la production de terres rares ont confirmé l'hypothèse d'un « refuge pour pollueurs » concernant les effets néfastes sur l'environnement des IDE affluant vers les pays touchés. Bien que le plein potentiel des terres rares en ASS soit resté largement inexploité en raison du faible niveau d’exploration, le côté obscur de la transition énergétique devient de plus en plus visible. Ceux-ci incluent la pollution du sol, de l’air et de l’eau ainsi qu’une élimination inadéquate des résidus toxiques et une consommation intensive d’eau et d’énergie, les risques professionnels et environnementaux, le travail des enfants et les abus sexuels ainsi que la corruption et les conflits armés. En août 2023, le Nigeria, la plus grande économie d'Afrique, a suspendu certaines activités minières chinoises illégales à l'intérieur de ses frontières, notamment celles de la Ruitai Mining Company en raison de son implication dans l'extraction illégale de minerai de titane. La Namibie et la RD Congo ont emboîté le pas. |
| Abstract: | The African continent is increasingly becoming a battleground in the race between superpowers for access to critical minerals needed for the 'Green Revolution', such as rare earth minerals (REE). Companies from China, the USA and Russia play a major role. In most cases, critical minerals are mined by international mining companies supported by their governments and organizing complex global value chains. So far, China has dominated supply chains and has secured mining contracts across sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Currently, China produces 58% of all REEs worldwide. It is the main importer of minerals from Africa, with mineral exports from sub-Saharan Africa to China totalling USD 10 bn in 2019. Its dominance of the global rare earths market is rooted in politics, not geography. Rare earths are neither that rare nor that concentrated in China. Beijing has adopted a strategy of imports, dumping and control of rare earths that is hardly consistent with WTO rules. Therefore, in June 2022, a newly founded 'Minerals Security Partnership', consisting of the USA, the EU, Great Britain and other Western industrialized countries, invited mineral-rich African countries to counter Chinese dominance. These included resource-rich countries such as South Africa, Botswana, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The West's push became even more urgent after Beijing imposed export controls on the strategic metals gallium and germanium in July 2023, sparking global fears that China could be next to block exports of rare earth or processing technology. Because African markets are small, they are forced to rely on foreign financing. However, so far, foreign direct investment in rare earth production has confirmed the 'pollution haven' hypothesis about the environmentally harmful effects of FDI flowing into the affected countries. Although the full potential of rare earths in SSA has remained largely untapped due to low exploration, the dark side of the energy transition is becoming increasingly visible. These include pollution of soil, air and water as well as inadequate disposal of toxic residues and intensive water and energy use, occupational and environmental risks, child labour and sexual abuse as well as corruption and armed conflicts. In August 2023, Nigeria, Africa's largest economy, suspended certain illegal Chinese mining activities within its borders, including the activities of Ruitai Mining Company due to its involvement in illegal titanium ore mining. Namibia and the DR Congo followed suit. |
| Abstract: | Der afrikanische Kontinent wird immer mehr zum Schlachtfeld im Wettlauf zwischen Supermächten um den Zugang zu kritischen Mineralien, die für die ‚Grüne Revolution‘ benötigt werden, wie zum Beispiel seltene Erden (REE). Eine große Rolle spielen Unternehmen aus China, den USA und Russland. In den meisten Fällen werden kritische Mineralien von internationalen Bergbauunternehmen abgebaut, die von ihren Regierungen unterstützt werden und komplexe globale Wertschöpfungsketten organisieren. Bisher dominiert China die Lieferketten und hat sich Bergbauverträge in ganz Afrika südlich der Sahara (SSA) gesichert. Derzeit produziert China 58 % aller REEs weltweit. Es ist der Hauptimporteur von Mineralien aus Afrika, wobei sich die Mineralienexporte aus Afrika südlich der Sahara nach China im Jahr 2019 auf insgesamt $USD 10 Mrd. beliefen. Seine Dominanz auf dem globalen Markt für seltene Erden hat seine Wurzeln in der Politik, nicht in der Geographie. Seltene Erden sind weder so selten noch so stark in China konzentriert. Peking hat eine Strategie der Einfuhr, Dumpings und Kontrolle seltener Erden eingeführt, die kaum mit den Regeln der WTO übereinstimmt. Daher lud im Juni 2022 eine neu gegründete ‚Minerals Security Partnership‘, bestehend aus den USA, der EU, Großbritannien und anderen westlichen Industrieländern, mineralreiche Länder Afrikas ein, der chinesischen Dominanz entgegenzuwirken. Dazu gehörten rohstoffreiche Länder wie Südafrika, Botswana, Angola, Mosambik, Namibia, Tansania, Sambia, Uganda und die Demokratische Republik Kongo. Der Vorstoß des Westens wurde noch dringlicher, nachdem Peking im Juli 2023 Exportkontrollen für die strategischen Metalle Gallium und Germanium eingeführt hatte, was weltweit Befürchtungen weckte, dass China als nächstes den Export von Seltenen Erden oder Verarbeitungstechnologie blockieren könnte. Da die afrikanischen Märkte klein sind, sind sie gezwungen, auf ausländische Finanzmittel zurückzugreifen. Bisher haben die ausländischen Direktinvestitionen in die Produktion von Seltenen Erden jedoch die ‚Pollution haven‘ Hypothese über die umweltschädlichen Auswirkungen der in die betroffenen Länder fließenden FDI bestätigt. Obwohl das volle Potenzial der seltenen Erden in SSA aufgrund der geringen Exploration bisher weitgehend ungenutzt blieb, werden die Schattenseiten der Energiewende zunehmend sichtbar. Darunter fallen die Verschmutzung von Boden, Luft und Wasser sowie die unzureichende Entsorgung giftiger Rückstände und die intensive Wasser- und Energienutzung, Arbeits- und Umweltrisiken, Kinderarbeit und sexueller Missbrauch sowie Korruption und bewaffnete Konflikte. Im August 2023 stellte Nigeria, Afrikas größte Volkswirtschaft, bestimmte illegale chinesische Bergbauaktivitäten innerhalb seiner Grenzen ein, einschließlich der Aktivitäten der Ruitai Mining Company wegen ihrer Beteiligung am illegalen Titanerzabbau. Namibia und die DR Kongo folgten diesem Beispiel. |
| Keywords: | terres rares, transition énergétique, réchauffement climatique, pollution, Afrique subsaharienne, UE |
| JEL: | D24 D43 D52 E23 F13 F63 L63 Q53 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:300907 |
| By: | Kohnert, Dirk |
| Abstract: | Der afrikanische Kontinent wird immer mehr zum Schlachtfeld im Wettlauf zwischen Supermächten um den Zugang zu kritischen Mineralien, die für die ‚Grüne Revolution‘ benötigt werden, wie zum Beispiel seltene Erden (REE). Eine große Rolle spielen Unternehmen aus China, den USA und Russland. In den meisten Fällen werden kritische Mineralien von internationalen Bergbauunternehmen abgebaut, die von ihren Regierungen unterstützt werden und komplexe globale Wertschöpfungsketten organisieren. Bisher dominiert China die Lieferketten und hat sich Bergbauverträge in ganz Afrika südlich der Sahara (SSA) gesichert. Derzeit produziert China 58 % aller REEs weltweit. Es ist der Hauptimporteur von Mineralien aus Afrika, wobei sich die Mineralienexporte aus Afrika südlich der Sahara nach China im Jahr 2019 auf insgesamt $USD 10 Mrd. beliefen. Seine Dominanz auf dem globalen Markt für seltene Erden hat seine Wurzeln in der Politik, nicht in der Geographie. Seltene Erden sind weder so selten noch so stark in China konzentriert. Peking hat eine Strategie der Einfuhr, Dumpings und Kontrolle seltener Erden eingeführt, die kaum mit den Regeln der WTO übereinstimmt. Daher lud im Juni 2022 eine neu gegründete ‚Minerals Security Partnership‘, bestehend aus den USA, der EU, Großbritannien und anderen westlichen Industrieländern, mineralreiche Länder Afrikas ein, der chinesischen Dominanz entgegenzuwirken. Dazu gehörten rohstoffreiche Länder wie Südafrika, Botswana, Angola, Mosambik, Namibia, Tansania, Sambia, Uganda und die Demokratische Republik Kongo. Der Vorstoß des Westens wurde noch dringlicher, nachdem Peking im Juli 2023 Exportkontrollen für die strategischen Metalle Gallium und Germanium eingeführt hatte, was weltweit Befürchtungen weckte, dass China als nächstes den Export von Seltenen Erden oder Verarbeitungstechnologie blockieren könnte. Da die afrikanischen Märkte klein sind, sind sie gezwungen, auf ausländische Finanzmittel zurückzugreifen. Bisher haben die ausländischen Direktinvestitionen in die Produktion von Seltenen Erden jedoch die ‚Pollution haven‘ Hypothese über die umweltschädlichen Auswirkungen der in die betroffenen Länder fließenden FDI bestätigt. Obwohl das volle Potenzial der seltenen Erden in SSA aufgrund der geringen Exploration bisher weitgehend ungenutzt blieb, werden die Schattenseiten der Energiewende zunehmend sichtbar. Darunter fallen die Verschmutzung von Boden, Luft und Wasser sowie die unzureichende Entsorgung giftiger Rückstände und die intensive Wasser- und Energienutzung, Arbeits- und Umweltrisiken, Kinderarbeit und sexueller Missbrauch sowie Korruption und bewaffnete Konflikte. Im August 2023 stellte Nigeria, Afrikas größte Volkswirtschaft, bestimmte illegale chinesische Bergbauaktivitäten innerhalb seiner Grenzen ein, einschließlich der Aktivitäten der Ruitai Mining Company wegen ihrer Beteiligung am illegalen Titanerzabbau. Namibia und die DR Kongo folgten diesem Beispiel. |
| Abstract: | The African continent is increasingly becoming a battleground in the race between superpowers for access to critical minerals needed for the 'Green Revolution', such as rare earth minerals (REE). Companies from China, the USA and Russia play a major role. In most cases, critical minerals are mined by international mining companies supported by their governments and organizing complex global value chains. So far, China has dominated supply chains and has secured mining contracts across sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Currently, China produces 58% of all REEs worldwide. It is the main importer of minerals from Africa, with mineral exports from sub-Saharan Africa to China totalling USD 10 bn in 2019. Its dominance of the global rare earths market is rooted in politics, not geography. Rare earths are neither that rare nor that concentrated in China. Beijing has adopted a strategy of imports, dumping and control of rare earths that is hardly consistent with WTO rules. Therefore, in June 2022, a newly founded 'Minerals Security Partnership', consisting of the USA, the EU, Great Britain and other Western industrialized countries, invited mineral-rich African countries to counter Chinese dominance. These included resource-rich countries such as South Africa, Botswana, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The West's push became even more urgent after Beijing imposed export controls on the strategic metals gallium and germanium in July 2023, sparking global fears that China could be next to block exports of rare earth or processing technology. Because African markets are small, they are forced to rely on foreign financing. However, so far, foreign direct investment in rare earth production has confirmed the 'pollution haven' hypothesis about the environmentally harmful effects of FDI flowing into the affected countries. Although the full potential of rare earths in SSA has remained largely untapped due to low exploration, the dark side of the energy transition is becoming increasingly visible. These include pollution of soil, air and water as well as inadequate disposal of toxic residues and intensive water and energy use, occupational and environmental risks, child labour and sexual abuse as well as corruption and armed conflicts. In August 2023, Nigeria, Africa's largest economy, suspended certain illegal Chinese mining activities within its borders, including the activities of Ruitai Mining Company due to its involvement in illegal titanium ore mining. Namibia and the DR Congo followed suit. |
| Keywords: | Seltene Erden, Energiewende, Klimawandel, Umweltverschmutzung, Subsahara Afrika, EU |
| JEL: | D24 D43 E23 F51 F64 L63 N17 Q53 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:300908 |
| By: | Holtemöller, Oliver; Sardone, Alessandro |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we discuss how environmental damage and emission reduction policies affect the conduct of monetary policy in a two-sector (clean and dirty) dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. In particular, we examine the optimal response of the interest rate to changes in sectoral inflation due to standard supply shocks, conditional on a given environmental policy. We then compare the performance of a nonstandard monetary rule with sectoral inflation targets to that of a standard Taylor rule. Our main results are as follows: first, the optimal monetary policy is affected by the existence of environmental policy (carbon taxation), as this introduces a distortion in the relative price level between the clean and dirty sectors. Second, compared with a standard Taylor rule targeting aggregate inflation, a monetary policy rule with asymmetric responses to sector-specific inflation allows for reduced volatility in the inflation gap, output gap, and emissions. Third, a nonstandard monetary policy rule allows for a higher level of welfare, so the two goals of welfare maximization and emission minimization can be aligned. |
| Keywords: | climate change, environmental policy, inflation, macroeconomic stabilization, monetary policy |
| JEL: | E32 E52 E58 Q54 Q58 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iwhdps:301153 |
| By: | Zheng, X.; Daud, A.; Taasim, S.I.; Rosli, A. |
| Abstract: | Beef and mutton to be as the essential daily consumption, their prices have been given much attention by the government, researchers, and households. And some of researchers thinks that the instability of their prices is the result of the market gaming. However, the aim of my study is to employ and develop the VAR model of order p (price) and relative impulse response functions to account for the role that endogenous variables and oil price effect to the price fluctuation. We ask to how analyze and in what methods endogenous variable and oil price play a role for price transmission, movement and formation. We do so to enable agricultural policy makers, producer, and academics to understand the nuances of what factors and how they can have an obvious impact on price changes. Collecting 20 year monthly relevant data, we show that price changes are mutually affected by endogenous variables (retail price, producer price, international price and corn price) and oil price under VAR system analysis. The significance of this study is that it informs our theoretical understanding of forecasting the trend of prices by demonstrating the movement of prices of beef and mutton under introducing econometric VAR model, and informs our empirical understanding of stabilizing prices and guiding production. |
| Keywords: | Agricultural Finance, Supply Chain |
| Date: | 2024–04–28 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:asea24:344441 |
| By: | Efrem Castelnuovo (University of Padova, CESifo, and Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis); Lorenzo Mori (University of Padova); Gert Peersman (Ghent University) |
| Abstract: | We employ a structural VAR model with global and US variables to study the relevance and transmission of oil, food commodities, and industrial input price shocks. We show that commodities are not all alike. Industrial input price changes are almost entirely endogenous responses to other shocks. Exogenous oil and food price shocks are relevant drivers of global real and financial cycles, with food price shocks exerting the greatest influence. We then conduct counterfactual estimations to assess the role of systematic monetary policy in shaping these effects. The results reveal that pro-cyclical policy reactions exacerbate the real and financial effects of food price shocks, whereas counter-cyclical responses mitigate those of oil shocks. Finally, we identify distinct mechanisms through which oil and food shocks affect macroeconomic variables, which could also justify opposing policy responses. Specifically, along with a sharper decrease in nondurable consumption, food price shocks raise nominal wages and core CPI, intensifying inflationary pressures. Conversely, oil price shocks act more like adverse aggregate demand shocks absent monetary policy reactions, primarily through a decrease in durable consumption and spending on goods and services complementary to energy consumption, which are amplified by financial frictions. |
| Keywords: | Commodity price shocks, transmission mechanisms, monetary policy. |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pad:wpaper:0311 |
| By: | Gerardo Juárez (Banco de México); Emmanuel Chávez (Division of Economics, CIDE); Irvin Rojas (Division of Economics, CIDE) |
| Abstract: | We investigate the effects of the 2014 international oil price bust on economic activity and fiscal outcomes in local oil-producing economies in Mexico. Using synthetic control estimators, we find that the 2014 price bust leads to a substantial decline in economic activity. We estimate an average gap in economic activity of 19.5% in the post-shock period between the realized outcome and the counterfactual scenario with no price shock. The largest estimated effect occurs in the southeastern state of Tabasco (21.6% decrease in economic activity). A collapse in local labor markets and government revenues follows. Fiscal transfers from the federal government do not act as a buffer, leaving local oil-producing states highly vulnerable to price fluctuations. |
| Keywords: | Oil price shock, subnational economies, fiscal policy, synthetic control |
| JEL: | E62 H71 H72 Q35 |
| Date: | 2024–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:emc:wpaper:dte635 |
| By: | Lee, Jukwan (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Lee, Cheon-Kee (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Park, Ji Hyun (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Park, Hyeri (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Kim, Min-Sung (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)) |
| Abstract: | 이 보고서는 무임승차와 탄소 누출을 억제하기 위한 기후클럽의 등장에 주목한다. 국제사회로부터의 탄소중립과 기후클럽 참여 요청에 직면한 우리나라의 입장에서 G7 주도 기후클럽의 제안과 미국-EU 간의 철강 알루미늄 협상을 검토하였다. 또한 기후클럽 가입에 따른 경제적 영향 분석과 국내 산업계의 의견을 반영한 기후클럽 참여의 방향성을 제시하고, 무역과 기후변화의 균형을 이루면서 국제적 노력에 한국이 기여할 수 있는 대응방안을 모색하였다. South Korea faces a dilemma between responding to an invitation from a climate club advocating for rapid carbon reduction and addressing the domestic burden of decarbonization, rooted in its carbon emission-intensive industrial structure. The Korean government must strike a balance between the goals of achieving climate neutrality and sustaining economic growth. These two issues represent a kind of Gordian knot, notoriously difficult to untangle. Yet, the reality is stark, and the urgency of the climate crisis is undeniable. In this context, this paper aims to introduce the theory of the climate club. Utilizing this framework, we examine the G7-initiated climate club and the GSSA as real-world case studies. In chapter 2, we analyze the global carbon reduction effort by examining investment data from the International Energy Agency (IEA) and FDI markets to analyze the investment patterns in the climate and environmental sectors at both government and private firm levels. This reveals a disparity between inward and outward investment patterns. We also observe that the main destination for investment is renewable energy, yet capital flow into fossil fuels remains substantial. This reflects the varied levels of NDC (Nationally Determined Contributions) achievements between the G7 and developing countries, which amplifies concerns over carbon leakage and the issue of competitiveness in developed countries. Based on these findings, we recognize the increasing number of new initiatives concerning climate change. Among them, due to their inclusiveness and comprehensiveness, the IDA, IFCMA, IDDA, Breakthrough Agenda, FMC, JETP are particularly noteworthy. (the rest omitted) |
| Keywords: | climate club; decarbonization; real-world case studies; G7-initiated climate club; GSSA |
| Date: | 2023–12–30 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:kieppa:2023_014 |
| By: | Iuliia Myroshnychenko (Paderborn University); Thomas Gries (Paderborn University) |
| Abstract: | This paper introduces a welfare-centered energy transition model (“the Model†) as a complex framework for assessing and projecting welfare indicators using the EUROGREEN integrated assessment model and system dynamics principles. The Model focuses on simulating the impact of policy incentives on various indicators of welfare, with a particular focus on the transition toward the increased deployment of renewable energy. The Model incorporates a multidimensional welfare index comprising indicators pertaining to income, employment, education, environment, health, social security, and income inequality topics. Using the EUROGREEN model calibrated for the French economy, we simulate three scenarios: Baseline, Energy Mix, and Green Growth. The findings indicate that, while all three scenarios project an overall increase in welfare, the Green Growth scenario, which is characterized by the significant adoption of renewable energy sources and improvements in energy efficiency, offers the most significant gains. By contrast, the Baseline scenario exhibits the slowest growth in welfare metrics. Our analysis also reveals a relationship between GDP growth and welfare improvements, indicating that significant enhancements in societal welfare are achievable even with moderate economic growth. The study highlights the need to develop comprehensive policy frameworks that can effectively address adverse effects on employment and entrepreneurship while also providing economic incentives for businesses to accelerate the energy transition and adopt low-carbon technologies. The results of these projections highlight the importance of implementing social protection transfers and training programs to assist stakeholders during the transition period. Further, we demonstrate how different schemes for weighting welfare components can influence projections, underscoring the significance of methodological choices in welfare assessments. |
| Keywords: | welfare, energy transition, renewable energies, integrated assessment model |
| JEL: | I31 Q48 E17 |
| Date: | 2024–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pdn:ciepap:161 |
| By: | Melita Van Steenberghe; Aislinn D’hulster; Johannes Weytjens; Marten Ovaere; Koen Schoors (-) |
| Abstract: | This study investigates the demographic and financial profiles of members of 25 renewable energy cooperatives (RECs) in Belgium from 2012 to 2022, representing around 100, 000 members. Analyzing anonymous transaction data from 1.3 million bank customers, we find that REC members typically have higher wealth, income, and consumption levels than nonmembers, with the gap widening over time. New members closely match the financial and age profiles of existing members, following the same upward, diverging trajectory, and indicating a trend towards a homogeneous and aging membership. To diversify REC membership, we conducted surveys with REC members and non-members. The results reveal that potential new members are typically younger and wealthier residents who have a better knowledge of RECs and a more pro-environmental mindset. These findings highlight the opportunity for RECs to innovate and engage a more diverse membership of citizens participating in the renewable energy transition. |
| Date: | 2024–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rug:rugwps:24/1093 |
| By: | Marco Due\~nas; Antoine Mandel |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the effectiveness of the ``low-carbon economy'' expenditures from European Structural and Investment Funds in fostering reductions in greenhouse gas emissions within European regions, focusing on the 2007-2013 and 2014-2020 programme periods. By decomposing emissions time series into trend and cycle components and considering them within a panel data framework, our research highlights that the impacts of low-carbon economy expenditures vary, qualitatively and quantitatively, with the targeted regions' development level. We find significant emissions reductions in developed and transition regions yet less favourable outcomes in less developed areas. Further analysis into specific greenhouse gas emissions types (CO$_2$, CH$_4$, and N$_2$O) reveals inconsistent impacts, underscoring the complexity of achieving emissions reductions. Our findings emphasise the need for tailored environmental strategies that accommodate the economic disparities of regions in the European Union. |
| Date: | 2024–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2408.01782 |
| By: | Stefan Bach; Claudia Kemfert; Barbara Praetorius |
| Abstract: | Vor 30 Jahren hat das DIW Berlin eine einflussreiche Studie mit dem Vorschlag zu einer ökologischen Steuerreform vorgelegt. Untersucht wurde eine langfristig steigende Energiesteuer, die ein Aufkommen von bis zu fünf Prozent der Wirtschaftsleistung erzielt hätte. Mit den Einnahmen sollten die Sozialbeiträge der Arbeitgeber*innen gesenkt und ein „Öko-Bonus“ an die privaten Haushalte gezahlt werden. Energieverbrauch und CO2-Emissionen wären langfristig spürbar zurückgegangen, das Wirtschaftswachstum kaum beeinträchtigt worden und die Beschäftigung gestiegen. Realisieren ließen sich diese Vorschläge damals nicht. Ab 1998 erhöhte die neue rot-grüne Bundesregierung die Energiesteuer nur bei Kraftstoffen nennenswert. Sozialpolitisch war das erfolgreich, die Einnahmen stabilisieren bis heute Rentenbeiträge und Renten – für das Klima hat es aber nicht viel gebracht. Die Klimapolitik setzte stattdessen auf Förderprogramme, vor allem für die Stromerzeugung aus erneuerbaren Energien. Seit einigen Jahren wird die CO2-Bepreisung über Emissionshandelssysteme gestärkt. Wäre Deutschland in den 1990er Jahren den damaligen Reformvorschlägen für eine langfristig angelegte Energiesteuer und ökologische Steuerreform gefolgt, stünde Deutschland beim Klimaschutz heute deutlich besser da. |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwakt:96de |
| By: | Lee, Sul-Ki (Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade) |
| Abstract: | The global energy landscape is undergoing aseismic shift. As nations move to adopt low-carboneconomies, the focus of policies designedto achieve this have extended beyond climatechange mitigation: the new energy landscapehas become host to a strategic race amongnations to dominate the new energy frontier.Amid this race, South Korea, heavily reliant onimported fossil fuels and emissions-intensiveindustries, finds itself at a crossroads. Striking abalance between economic growth and aggressivedecarbonization is critical. Korea must notonly curb greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions butalso cultivate a domestic renewable energy industryas a new engine of economic growth. Thank you for reading this abstract of a paper by the Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade! We are South Korea's premier think tank studying the nexus where trade and industry intersect. http://www.kiet.re.kr/en https://www.ssrn.com/index.cfm/en/korea- inst-industrial-econ-trade-res/ |
| Keywords: | EU; Carbon Border Adjustrment Mechanism; decarbonization; carbon neutrality; renewable energy; alternative energy; green energy; environmental economics; Korea; KIET |
| JEL: | Q40 Q42 Q43 Q48 Q56 Q58 |
| Date: | 2024–05–31 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:kieter:2024_013 |
| By: | Jamel Saadaoui (University of Paris 8) |
| Abstract: | This note explores the impact of geopolitical relationships between the US and China on the oil price. Using time-varying local projections, my analysis reveals that these dynamic effects are unstable over time. Indeed, these effects have been more observable since the global financial crisis, with China being increasingly perceived as a threat in the U.S. Instability is detected around the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. During this period, geopolitical risks and political tensions influence oil price at different time horizons. |
| Keywords: | Time-Varying Local Projections, China, Oil Price, Political Relations, Geopolitical Risks, Global Financial Crisis, COVID-19 pandemic |
| JEL: | Q |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:inf:wpaper:2024.13 |
| By: | Lionel Sopgoui |
| Abstract: | In this work, we propose a model to quantify the impact of the climate transition on a property in housing market. We begin by noting that property is an asset in an economy. That economy is organized in sectors, driven by its productivity which is a multidimensional Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, while the climate transition is declined thanks to the carbon price, a continuous deterministic process. We then extend the sales comparison approach and the income approach to valuate an energy inefficient real estate asset. We obtain its value as the difference between the price of an equivalent efficient building following an exponential Ornstein-Uhlenbeck as well as the actualized renovation costs and the actualized sum of the future additional energy costs. These costs are due to the inefficiency of the building, before an optimal renovation date which depends on the carbon price process. Finally, we carry out simulations based on the French economy and the house price index of France. Our results allow to conclude that the order of magnitude of the depreciation obtained by our model is the same as the empirical observations. |
| Date: | 2024–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2408.02339 |
| By: | Gilles Grolleau (ESSCA - School of Management); Naoufel Mzoughi (ECODEVELOPPEMENT - Ecodéveloppement - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Emilien Prost (ESSCA - School of Management) |
| Abstract: | Incentives have been extensively studied in the management and policy literature, with most attention focusing on their type, magnitude, alignment, and effects. More recently, scholars paid attention to discounting issues and how these issues impact the effectiveness of incentives. Building on the nascent literature related to incentive timing, we argue that timing can offer an additional dimension to better characterize incentives and leverage their power by exploiting windows of opportunity. Using conceptual reasoning, we identify several mechanisms by which the timing of incentives can be used to increase their behavioral power. Specifically, well-timed (green) incentives can harness temporal landmarks, intermittence, immediacy and surprise effects, and intrinsic motivation reinforcement to reach environmental goals without significantly increasing the overall costs. We also indicate new avenues for further research such as designing a timing menu or considering time itself as an incentive. |
| Keywords: | environmental policies, incentives, opportunity window, temporal landmarks, timing |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04389954 |
| By: | Blouin, Simon; Herwix, Alexander; Rivers, Morgan; Tieman, Ross; Denkenberger, David C. |
| Abstract: | The food supply chain's heavy reliance on electricity poses significant vulnerabilities in the event of prolonged and widespread power disruptions. This study introduces a system-dynamics model that integrates five critical infrastructures—electric grid, liquid fossil fuels, Internet, transportation, and human workforce—to evaluate the resilience of food supply chains to major power outages. We validate the model using the 2019 Venezuelan blackouts as a case study, demonstrating its predictive validity. We then explore how more extreme electricity losses would disrupt the supply chain. More specifically, we model the impact of a large-scale cyberattack on the US electric grid and a high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) event. A cyberattack severely damaging the US electric grid and allowing for recovery within a few weeks or months would lead to substantial drops in food consumption. However, it would likely still be possible to provide adequate calories to everyone, assuming that food is equitably distributed. In contrast, a year-long recovery from a HEMP event affecting most of the continental US could precipitate a state of famine. Our analysis represents a first attempt at quantifying how food availability progressively worsens as power outages extend over time. Our open-source model is made publicly available, and we encourage its application to other catastrophic scenarios beyond those specifically considered in this work (e.g., extreme solar storms, high-lethality pandemics). |
| Date: | 2024–08–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:dc529 |
| By: | Jackson Dorsey; Derek C. Wolfson |
| Abstract: | We examine technology adoption and consumer welfare disparities across demographic groups using data from an online solar photovoltaic (PV) marketplace. Low-income households are 25% less likely to purchase solar through the platform and obtain 53% lower expected consumer surplus than high-income households. Moreover, Black and Hispanic households are relatively less likely to purchase solar through the platform and obtain lower consumer surplus than White and Asian households. We develop a method to decompose the drivers of consumer welfare disparities between demographic groups. Differences in demand fully account for the consumer surplus disparities between high- and low-income households and between White and Hispanic households. However, supply-side factors explain 37% of the consumer surplus gap between White and Black households. Black households get relatively fewer bids and face higher prices, and installers have higher implied costs to serve them. Lastly, we assess counterfactuals that offer targeted price discounts to certain demographic groups. |
| JEL: | D22 D44 D63 H23 L11 Q4 Q41 Q48 |
| Date: | 2024–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32814 |
| By: | Pabón, César (FEDESARROLLO) |
| Abstract: | Este estudio se centra en dos objetivos principales. En primer lugar, realiza proyecciones de crecimiento económico (PIB) por actividad económica utilizando enfoques de oferta y demanda de manera trimestral y anual. Las estimaciones de crecimiento consideran expectativas altas, bajas y base, lo que permite pronósticos variados para el consumo de energía. En segundo lugar, se realiza un análisis de sensibilidad de la intensidad energética para diferentes escenarios de crecimiento económico en diversos sectores. El trabajo destaca la importancia de la velocidad de la transición energética, la inversión en infraestructura y la política de reindustrialización en el crecimiento económico y en la intensidad energética. Finalmente, se concluye que realizar una transición energética responsable es crucial para evitar impactos económicos negativos. Además, alcanzar los objetivos del PAI-PROURE es fundamental para mejorar la eficiencia energética. |
| Keywords: | Intensidad Energética; Producto Interno Bruto; PIB PAI-PROURE; Energy Efficiency |
| JEL: | O13 O41 P18 |
| Date: | 2023–12–23 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:000124:021035 |
| By: | de Preux, L.;; Miraldo, M.;; Rizmie, D.; |
| Abstract: | Road traffic is the primary source of air pollution in urban areas, as well as an important source of noise. It is increasingly regulated in Europe with noticeable positive effects on air quality and health outcomes. Co-benefits of traffic regulations, such as increased physical activity, are put forward to support the development of such policies. One co-benefit that has yet to be documented is sleep despite being a key determinant of health. We consider a flagship traffic policy in France, the Paris Respire campaign, 1 that was implemented in 2016 and intends to episodically reduce engine traffic related emissions across the city in targeted areas. We estimate its impact on sleep by relying on personalised sleep tracker data capturing individuals’ sleep quantity and quality between 2015 and 2019 (N=938, 386), and implementing a spatial and temporal difference-in-differences framework. The policy decreased daily vehicular traffic in target areas by 24.9% on average across the zones along with non-negligible temporal and geographical spillover effects decaying with distance. Controlling for these spillover effects, we estimate the impact of the policy increases the minutes of total sleep by 2.2% on the night following the application of the policy. We discuss the possible pathways of air pollution and noise pollution, with changes in traffic-related emissions likely being the driver of the effects of the policy. The policy implications are that, if the policy were to be uniformly enforced every weekend over a year, it would result in approximately 2 extra nights of 7-hour sleep inside a target zone. This study offers valuable insights for policymakers and urban planners seeking holistic approaches to improve urban well-being. |
| Keywords: | air pollution; traffic; pedestrianisation; sleep; social impacts; |
| JEL: | I19 I31 Q50 Q51 Q53 |
| Date: | 2024–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:yor:hectdg:24/12 |