nep-ene New Economics Papers
on Energy Economics
Issue of 2005‒05‒07
four papers chosen by
Roger Fouquet
Imperial College, UK

  1. The Effect of Pollution Permit Allocations on Firm-Level Emissions By Meredith Fowlie; Jeffrey Perloff
  2. Environmental Regulation and Technological Innovation with Spillovers By Samiran Banerjee; João E. Gata
  4. Revenue Sharing, Natural Resources and Fiscal Equalization By Bob Searle

  1. By: Meredith Fowlie (University of California, Berkeley); Jeffrey Perloff (University of California, Berkeley, and Giannini Foundation)
    Abstract: According to the Coase theorem, if property rights to pollute are clearly established and emissions markets nearly eliminate transaction costs, the market equilibrium will be independent of how the permits are initially allocated across firms. Using panel data from Southern California's RECLAIM program, we find that initial allocations are a statistically significant determinant of firm-level emissions. This relationship between allocation and emissions is stronger among firms with relatively high transaction costs. Thus, care must be exercised in the initial allocation of permits to ensure efficiency.
    Keywords: emissions trading, transaction costs,
    Date: 2004–02–01
  2. By: Samiran Banerjee; João E. Gata
    Abstract: We present a two-period dynamic model of standard setting under asymmetric information to model the attempts by the Califormia Air Resources Board (CARB) in getting car manufacturers to comply with its phase-in of stringent emissions standards. After CARB chooses an initial emissions standard that ?rms are required to comply with, automakers respond by choosing R&D investment and production levels which provide CARB an imperfect signal whether they are more or less capable of complying with the standard. CARB resets the environmental standard and the ?rms once again choose research and production levels. Firms are Cournot duopolists in the product market and can choose to do research noncooperatively or cooperatively in the presence of spillovers. We show that ?rms will behave strategically and underinvest in research both under competitive and cooperative R&D, though the level of underinvestment — the ratchet effect — is greater under cooperative R&D when spillovers are large. We uncover a fundamental con?ict between the incentives of ?rms to do cooperative research and social welfare: that ?rms will want to engage in cooperative (resp. noncooperative) R&D only when spillovers are low (resp. high) while social welfare is greater under noncooperative (resp. cooperative) research.
    Keywords: Car emissions; dynamic technology-forcing regulation; selfregulation; pre-commitment; cooperative R&D; ratchet effect.
    JEL: L5 O3
  3. By: Vicent Alcantara Escolano (Departament d'Economia Aplicada, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona); Emilio Padilla Rosa (Departament d'Economia Aplicada, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona)
    Abstract: En el presente artículo se analiza la evolución de las emisiones de CO2 –el principal gas de efecto invernadero– en las diferentes áreas del mundo, prestando mayor atención a lo ocurrido en la Unión Europea y España. El análisis se centra especialmente en lo sucedido desde 1990, año de referencia en el protocolo de Kioto para la gran mayoría de países. Se investigan también los principales factores determinantes de las emisiones y su evolución utilizando el análisis de los factores de la identidad de Kaya. El análisis permite explicar las grandes diferencias que se dan entre unas zonas y otras y las distintas variaciones que se ha
    Keywords: diferencias entre regiones, evolución de emisiones, identidad de Kaya, protocolo de Kioto.
    Date: 2005–04
  4. By: Bob Searle
    Abstract: A nation’s fiscal transfer system has many facets. Usually, the central government has several objectives in transferring funds to local government . Individual local governments often have objectives that conflict with the central government and with other one another. This paper looks at the relationships between policies associated with reducing vertical fiscal imbalance and the achievement of horizontal fiscal equalization, often a major national (as opposed to a central government) objective. In considering possible ways of reducing VFI, the paper discusses public sector revenue sharing and, in particular, the revenues raised from natural resources, looking at the policy issues that arise and what the considerations are when deciding how these elements of a fiscal transfer system can be combined to meet governments’ overall objectives.
    Keywords: Revenue Sharing, Natural Resources and Fiscal Equalization
    Date: 2004–11–01

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