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on European Economics |
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Issue of 2026–09–21
twelve papers chosen by Simon Sosvilla-Rivero, Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico |
| By: | Koetter, Michael; Noth, Felix; Wöbbeking, Carl Fabian |
| Abstract: | Real estate is a capstone connection between various economic agents and markets. It is the main store of household wealth, serves as collateral for mortgage loans in the banking system, aids the transmission of monetary policy, and can propagate financial crises when overvalued. Yet comparable house-price data across the European Union (EU) and the euro area is unavailable, which hinders the design and evaluation of common monetary and economic policy that operates across heterogeneous housing markets. We derive monthly subnational European Real Estate Indicators (EREI) from online residential property advertisements in 16 European countries. The release covers April 2024 to June 2026 and contains 48, 168 region-month-segment observations for 1, 154 NUTS 3 regions, aggregating more than 43 million listing observations across the monthly sale and rental cross-sections. Each region-month segment reports the number of advertisements and summary statistics for asking prices per square meter and listing durations. The release also includes sale-segment indices for Europe, the euro area, and individual countries. Thirteen covered countries are EU members, which represented 85% of EU-27 gross domestic product in 2024. EREI data support research on a wide range of socio-economic phenomena associated with real estate dynamics, such as the evaluation of monetary policy or macroprudential policy effects on financial stability. |
| Keywords: | European Real Estate Index, EREI, house prices |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iwhtrp:343585 |
| By: | Schwind, Patrick; Weinand, Sebastian |
| Abstract: | In the euro area, inflation is measured by the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP). Contributions of specific products to the overall inflation rate are derived by what is known as the Ribe approach. While this approach can be applied to the monthly HICP indices, it cannot be used for the annual HICP averages published by statistical offices, nor can it be used to calculate contributions to inflation over multiple years. This paper develops a generalization of Ribe's approach that overcomes both limitations. For annually chain-linked Laspeyres-type indices and their quarterly and annual averages, the proposed method allows contributions to price changes to be derived over arbitrary time periods. The resulting contributions consistently sum to the overall price change. As such, the method provides a useful tool for long-term monetary policy analysis. An application to HICP data shows that services have been the main driver of inflation in the euro area since 2002. |
| Keywords: | chain index, HICP, inflation measurement, Ribe approach |
| JEL: | E31 C43 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:bubtps:343533 |
| By: | Barbara Brix (Faculty of Economics, Technical University of Kosice, Slovak Republic); Marianna Siničáková (Faculty of Economics, Technical University of Kosice, Slovak Republic); Anna Tykhonenko (Université Côte d'Azur, CNRS, GREDEG, France) |
| Abstract: | The European Union combines a broadly common framework of rules-based fiscal governance with markedly heterogeneous domestic institutions, raising the question of whether legally similar fiscal rules are equally effective across member states. This article studies the effectiveness of fiscal rules by asking whether they constrain fiscal policy around elections, when the incentive to deviate from fiscal discipline is strongest. Using an unbalanced annual panel of EU-27 member states over 1995–2023, we relate the general-government primary balance to a fractional election-timing variable, the European Commission's Standardised Fiscal Rules Index, and the Worldwide Governance Indicators, estimated in dynamic two-way fixed-effects models. Election years are associated with weaker primary balances across the Union, but the moderating role of fiscal rules is not uniform: stronger rules significantly attenuate election-related fiscal deterioration in Western member states, whereas no comparable effect is found in Central and Eastern Europe. Triple-interaction estimates indicate that this heterogeneity tracks domestic governance quality (rule of law, control of corruption, and democratic accountability) rather than region as such. The findings suggest that the effectiveness of fiscal rules is conditional on the institutional environment in which they operate, with implications for EU fiscal governance and post-accession institutional development. |
| Keywords: | fiscal rules; fiscal governance; institutional quality; European Union; Central and Eastern Europe; political budget cycles |
| JEL: | E62 H62 H63 P35 D72 |
| Date: | 2026–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gre:wpaper:2026-23 |
| By: | Marlow, Joe (Central Bank of Ireland); Aydin Yakut, Dilan (Central Bank of Ireland) |
| Abstract: | This insight introduces a toolkit that integrates national-level macroeconomic, survey, commodity, and financial data to provide timely estimates of headline HICP inflation in the euro area. The toolkit is updated on a weekly basis and provides detailed breakdowns of how new data flows drive nowcast revisions, enabling transparent and informed policymaking. The model successfully identifies evolving inflationary pressures through frequent updates, as demonstrated by the March 2026 case study of energy price-driven inflation. |
| Date: | 2026–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cbi:stafin:10/si/26 |
| By: | Hüther, Michael; Demary, Markus; Fremerey, Melinda; Gerards Iglesias, Simon |
| Abstract: | Die internationale Währungsordnung befindet sich in einer Phase des strukturellen Umbruchs, die durch geopolitische Spannungen, handelspolitische Fragmentierung und nationale Selbstgenügsamkeit der USA geprägt ist. Das exportbasierte europäische Geschäftsmodell steht massiv unter Druck. Gleichzeitig erodiert die bisher unangefochtene Dominanz des US-Dollars als globale Leitwährung. Ursächlich hierfür sind eine stetig wachsende Verschuldung von Staat und privaten Akteuren in den USA, politische Unwägbarkeiten sowie die willkürliche Instrumentalisierung des Dollars in internationalen Konflikten. Dies eröffnet der Europäischen Union (EU) eine historische Gelegenheit, den Euro in einem zunehmend multipolaren Währungssystem strategisch stärker zu positionieren. Obwohl der Euro unbestritten die zweitwichtigste Reserve- und Transaktionswährung der Welt darstellt und die Europäische Zentralbank (EZB) eine hohe Reputation durch Unabhängigkeit und erfolgreiches Krisenmanagement erarbeiten konnte, stagniert sein globaler Bedeutungsanteil seit geraumer Zeit auf diesem Niveau. Eine wesentliche Ursache hierfür ist die anhaltende Fragmentierung der europäischen Finanzmärkte sowie das gravierende Fehlen eines tiefen, integrierten europäischen Marktes für sichere Anlageformen ("Safe Assets"). Während der US-Kapitalmarkt durch seine enorme Liquidität und Markttiefe besticht, konkurrieren in der Eurozone weiterhin zahlreiche nationale Emittenten mit stark divergierenden Risikoprofilen, Emissionsstrategien und Emissionsinfrastrukturen, was internationale institutionelle Investoren weniger attraktiv ist. Um die internationale Rolle des Euro zu stärken, müssen umfassende institutionelle Reformen umgesetzt werden. Zentral sind hierbei die Vollendung der europäischen Kapitalmarktunion sowie die Schaffung eines einheitlichen europäischen Referenzwerts durch gemeinsame Safe Assets (Eurobonds). Die vorliegende Studie skizziert hierfür einen pragmatischen, graduellen Pfad: In einer Übergangsphase könnten synthetische Währungskörbe aus bestehenden nationalen Staatsanleihen gebildet werden, um dem Markt erste standardisierte Liquidität zur Verfügung zu stellen. Langfristig ist jedoch eine echte gemeinsame Emissionsstruktur unabdingbar, das heißt eine gemeinsame europäische Emissionsinfrastruktur, die europäische Anleihen emittiert. Um politische Widerstände zu überwinden und das Moral-Hazard-Problem zu minimieren, sollten Eurobonds eng an eine europäische Investitions- und Verteidigungsunion gekoppelt werden. Neben der finanziellen Architektur erfordert der Status einer Leitwährung unweigerlich die Stabilität der Institutionen in der Eurozone sowie den Ausbau der geoökonomischen und militärischen "Hard Power". Historisch halten Staaten bevorzugt die Währungen jener Mächte, die glaubwürdig sicherheitspolitischen Schutz und territoriale Stabilität garantieren können. Die internationale Stärkung des Euro ist kein politisches Prestigeprojekt, sondern ein unverzichtbares Resilienzprogramm zur Sicherung der strategischen Autonomie und finanziellen Souveränität Europas. Ein starker Euro würde die Finanzierungskosten durch Wohlstandseffekte senken und die geopolitische Handlungsfähigkeit der EU durch Relevanz signifikant erweitern. |
| Abstract: | The international monetary order is currently undergoing a structural transformation characterized by geopolitical tensions and trade fragmentation. Europe's export-driven business model is under severe pressure. Concurrently, the historically undisputed dominance of the US dollar as the global reserve currency is eroding. This development is driven by the US twin deficit, a continuously growing national debt, political volatility, and the increasing weaponization of the dollar in international conflicts. Consequently, a historic window of opportunity has opened for the European Union to strategically strengthen the euro's position within an increasingly multipolar monetary system. While the euro indisputably remains the world's second most important reserve and transaction currency, its global market share has stagnated for some time. A primary cause for this is the persistent fragmentation of European financial markets and the critical lack of a deep, integrated market for safe assets. While the US capital market is characterized by its vast liquidity and market depth, the eurozone continues to feature numerous national issuers competing with highly divergent risk profiles-a dynamic that deters international institutional investors. Strengthening the Euro's international role requires the implementation of comprehensive institutional reforms. The completion of the Capital Markets Union and the Banking Union, alongside the establishment of a unified European benchmark through joint bonds (Eurobonds), are of paramount importance. To this end, the present study outlines a pragmatic, gradual roadmap: during a transitional phase, synthetic sovereign bond baskets comprising existing national debt could be introduced to provide the market with initial standardized liquidity. In the long run, however, a genuine joint issuance framework is indispensable. To overcome political resistance and mitigate moral hazard, genuine Eurobonds should be strictly tied to a European investment and defense union. Beyond financial architecture, achieving the status of a dominant reserve currency inevitably requires the expansion of geo-economic and military "hard power". Historically, states have demonstrated a strong preference for holding the currencies of powers capable of providing credible security guarantees and territorial stability. In conclusion, strengthening the international role of the euro is not merely a political prestige project, but an essential resilience program designed to safeguard Europe's strategic autonomy and financial sovereignty. A stronger euro would reduce financing costs through wealth effects and significantly enhance the EU's geopolitical agency. |
| JEL: | E42 F33 G15 H63 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iwkrep:343586 |
| By: | Tatar, Balint; Wieland, Volker |
| Abstract: | The German economy has been in stagnation for some time while the government is faced with high and rising costs of the social security system, defence and interest on debt. Structural reforms are needed to stabilize the social system and to strengthen potential growth. The recent reform package proposed by the German Pensions Commission represents an important step forward. Among other changes, it introduces a capital-funded element, which will help stabilize the existing pay-as-you-go statutory pension system. However, this will be financed by an increase of social security contributions on the order of 2 percentage points, which will dampen economic growth. According to our analysis using a large-scale structural macro model, the increase in contribution rates raises the cost of labour and may reduce GDP all else equal by approximately 0.6 percent in the medium term. The three economies in the model are calibrated to Germany, the rest of the euro area and the rest of the world. Spillover effects to the rest of the euro area remain very small. Our findings should not be understood as an argument against the much-needed pension reform, but should rather be taken to further strengthen the case for additional growth-oriented supply-side reforms. |
| Keywords: | pension system reform, social security contribution, macroeconomic modelling, GDP growth |
| JEL: | E27 E63 H55 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:imfswp:343583 |
| By: | Raymond De Pastor; Victor Frangin; Etienne Gruner; Rémi Odry Habab |
| Abstract: | Despite rapid growth in digital payments, demand for banknotes remains strong in France and Europe. It is being driven by three factors: transactional use, which is declining, precautionary holdings and demand from outside the euro area. Recent shocks may have altered the respective contributions of these factors to total demand. Examining the velocity of circulation of individual banknote denominations provides insights into these effects. <p> Malgré l’essor des paiements numériques, la demande de billets reste élevée en France et en Europe. Elle repose sur trois facteurs : l’usage transactionnel, en recul, les motifs de précaution et la demande provenant de l’étranger. Les chocs récents ont pu modifier leur part respective dans la demande globale. L’analyse des vitesses de circulation par dénomination permet d’en éclairer les effets. |
| Date: | 2026–09–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bfr:econot:459 |
| By: | Hinz, Sarah; Scheier, Franziska; Holst, Gregor; Jahn, Anja |
| Abstract: | Als hochgradig verflochtene Schlüsselbranche bildet die Halbleiterindustrie das technologische Rückgrat der digitalen und ökologischen Transformation. Europas Stärke liegt in spezialisierten Segmenten wie Leistungselektronik, Sensorik und Ausrüstungstechnologien. Zugleich bestehen erhebliche Abhängigkeiten von globalen Lieferketten, die geopolitische Risiken verschärfen. Mit dem European Chips Act verfolgt die EU einen industriepolitischen Strategiewechsel hin zu mehr Resilienz und Diversifizierung. Diese Neuausrichtung trifft auf Verschiebungen in der Fachkräftebasis und auf Herausforderungen für Arbeitsbedingungen, Tarifbindung und Mitbestimmung. Das Zusammenspiel von Innovation, nachhaltiger Produktion und qualifizierter Arbeit ist daher entscheidend für die Zukunftsfähigkeit der Branche. |
| Keywords: | European Chips Act, Mikroelektronik, Silicon Saxony, Chip-Krise, Foundries |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:hbsfof:343084 |
| By: | Bryson Joanna; Danneels Lieselot; Di Marco Diletta (European Commission - JRC); Dobbe Roel; Grimmelikhuijsen Stephan; Janowski Tomasz; Janssen Marijn; Lindgren Ida; Medaglia Rony; Mikalef Patrick; Millard Jeremy; Nasi Greta; Nikiforova Anastasija; Tangi Luca (European Commission - JRC); Rodriguez Müller Paula (European Commission - JRC); Pieterson Willem; Thabit Gonzalez Sara (European Commission - JRC); Viale Pereira Gabriela |
| Abstract: | EU digital sovereignty has become an increasingly urgent priority for public administrations across the European Union, which must identify, assess, and manage the dependencies and vulnerabilities that constrain their autonomy. Building digital sovereignty requires action along four areas: people, markets and products, infrastructure, and governance. Achieving greater sovereignty requires the coordinated action of a diverse network of people, aligned toward the shared goal of more autonomous and resilient administrations. At market level, public administrations play a dual role as catalysts for local innovation and, through procurement-driven strategies, as drivers of more diversified markets that reduce overreliance on a narrow set of critical suppliers. At the infrastructural level, ensuring that digital assets are robust, secure, and compliant with EU regulations and values is essential to safeguarding this autonomy. Finally, governing digital sovereignty demands clear goal-setting, the development of steering capacity, and a rethinking of institutional priorities—calling for coordinated, value-driven institutions capable of acting decisively while remaining adaptable to a rapidly evolving digital landscape. Despite its growing relevance, the practical implications of EU digital sovereignty for public administration remain insufficiently understood. This brief enters the discussion by detailing reflections on the actions needed by public administrations to strengthen their digital sovereignty, and concludes with a research agenda to build a common, coherent approach across the Union. |
| Date: | 2026–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipt:iptwpa:jrc146997 |
| By: | Bendiek, Annegret; Holste, Svenja |
| Abstract: | Die Arktis spielt bisher nur eine untergeordnete Rolle in den europäischen Bemühungen, digitale Souveränität zu erlangen. Doch für dieses Anliegen bildet die digitale Infrastruktur im Hohen Norden einen zentralen Baustein. Die Arktisstrategie der EU, die in diesem Jahr aktualisiert wird, sollte sich daher nicht auf klassische Sicherheitsaspekte beschränken. Dies gilt zumal vor dem Hintergrund hybrider Bedrohungslagen im Ostseeraum. Von besonderer Bedeutung sind europäische Projekte zum Ausbau arktischer Unterwasserkabel, bei denen es sich um kritische Infrastruktur handelt. Allerdings braucht es für diese Vorhaben eine ambitionierte EU, die sich ihrer Stärke bewusst ist, Innovation und Nachhaltigkeit bei der Entwicklung grüner Technologien zu verwirklichen. |
| Keywords: | Europäische Union (EU), Arktisstrategie der EU, digitale Souveränität Europas, Unterwasserkabel, kritische Infrastruktur, Arktischer Rat, West-Arktis-Passage, Polarpassage, Polar Connect, Far North Fiber |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpakt:343119 |
| By: | Manzoni Marina (European Commission - JRC); Farrell Eimear; Hernandez Quiros Lorena; Martin Bosch Jaume; Combetto Marco |
| Abstract: | Digital sovereignty has emerged as a central pillar of European strategic autonomy. EU digital sovereignty is defined as the capacity for strategic independence in the digital domain, while remaining open to global collaboration and aligning with democratic values. This Policy Brief focuses on digital sovereignty specifically through a public sector and public governance lens. It explores what digital sovereignty means when viewed not merely as technological independence, but as the capacity to contribute to the public good. It outlines the current status in the EU, provides an analysis of risks and opportunities, draws attention to the socio-economic importance and implications digital technologies have in enabling public governance and public services delivery, and provides a number of recommendations in identified strategic area of interventions. |
| Date: | 2026–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipt:iptwpa:jrc147599 |
| By: | Alvaro-Taus, Marta; Fitzgerald, Keith; Kren, Janez; O'Regan, Cynthia; O'Toole, Conor |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esr:wpaper:wp830 |