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on European Economics |
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Issue of 2025–08–25
eighteen papers chosen by Simon Sosvilla-Rivero, Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico |
| By: | Sánchez Serrano, Antonio |
| Abstract: | Andersen and Sánchez Serrano (2024) define a methodology for building a map of the euro area financial system using data from the quarterly sectoral accounts of the euro area (complemented with data from other sources). This map can be useful for macroprudential authorities in regularly monitoring interconnections, contagion channels and systemic risk dynamics. We develop three extensions to the map that should increase its relevance: (i) the use of euro area Distributional Wealth Accounts to consider households according to their wealth; (ii) a breakdown of the other financial institutions sector into other financial intermediaries, financial auxiliaries, and captive financial institutions and money lenders; and (iii) using international investment position data to compute exposures to the rest of the world by country. In addition to the series codes on the ECB Data Portal to retrieve the relevant data, we illustrate the potential analytical application of each of the three extensions. In a nutshell, our analysis of the euro area household sector according to wealth shows that the aggregate figures conceal significant heterogeneity. Using data from the quarterly sectoral accounts, we are able to gain a clearer overview of other financial institutions, identifying the links with banks through securitisation vehicles and with non-financial corporations through captive financial institutions. Finally, although we cannot match exactly all the financial instruments in the balance sheet, data on the institutional investment position shows, among others, a continuous increase in the portfolio investments of euro area residents in the United States since 2013. JEL Classification: F30, G20, G50 |
| Keywords: | flow of funds, household finance, interconnections, international finance, non-bank financial intermediation |
| Date: | 2025–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:srk:srkops:202527 |
| By: | Vintu, Denis |
| Abstract: | The Maastricht Criteria, also known as the convergence criteria, are a set of economic and fiscal requirements established by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 to ensure that European Union (EU) member states maintain economic stability and are prepared for participation in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and adoption of the euro. Among these criteria, public debt plays a crucial role in maintaining fiscal discipline and preventing excessive government borrowing that could undermine economic stability. Specifically, the Maastricht Criteria set a limit on public debt at no more than 60\% of a country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), alongside a fiscal deficit ceiling of 3\% of GDP. These thresholds aim to promote sustainable public finances, reduce the risk of debt crises, and foster confidence among member states and investors. Understanding the criteria related to public debt is essential in assessing the fiscal health and convergence readiness of countries within the EU framework. |
| Keywords: | Maastricht Criteria, Public Debt, Fiscal Policy, Debt Sustainability, European Union, Economic and Monetary Union, Fiscal Discipline |
| JEL: | E62 F45 H63 H68 O52 |
| Date: | 2025–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:125712 |
| By: | De Sanctis, Alessandro; Kapp, Daniel; Vinci, Francesca; Wojciechowski, Robert |
| Abstract: | This study evaluates the effectiveness of EU Cohesion Policy as an investment programme, employing a novel dataset that links firm-level data from Orbis with project-level information from the Kohesio database. It focuses on two key questions: (1) Which firms receive EU funding? (2) How does receiving EU funding affect firm performance? By applying a logit model and a local projection difference-in-differences approach, we provide new insights into the allocation mechanisms of EU Cohesion Policy funds and their firm-level impact. Our findings show that funding tends to be allocated to firms that already perform relatively well, and that firms receiving EU funding experience a persistent productivity increase of approximately 3% after 4 years, with smaller and more financially constrained firms experiencing relatively greater improvements. Moreover, funding targeting “SME investment” tends to enhance firm performance disproportionately more than other categories, whereas projects directed the “green transition” appear comparatively less beneficial. JEL Classification: E22, D24, H54, O38, O52 |
| Keywords: | corporate investment, European Structural and Investment Funds, fiscal policy, place-based policy, productivity |
| Date: | 2025–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20253099 |
| By: | Gómez-biscarri Javier; López-espinosa Germán; Martinez Santos Fernando (European Commission - JRC) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we investigate the role played by banks in financing European fintech startups. We postulate that this role may be influenced by two conflicting objectives. First, banks could be motivated by value considerations, in that the objective would be to help the fintech scale-up and reach a successful exit, so value can be captured from returns on equity or debt investments. Alternatively, given that fintechs can be viewed as substitutes to banks, investment in fintechs might be motivated by a desire to curb down competition (“buying out competitors”). We examine these conflicting objectives using data on investments made by EU and non-EU banks in fintech startups, and take advantage of an exogenous shock to fintech value provided by the EU’s PSD2 policy. Our results suggest that EU banks are driven by the motive of reducing competition. On the contrary, the behavior of non-EU banks seems to be driven by the value capturing motive, and this may have generated a substitution after PSD2 in non-EU bank financing of EU fintechs towards debt. Our findings suggest that EU fintechs may need to reduce their reliance on bank financing in order to close the financing gap and achieve successful scaling up. |
| Date: | 2025–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrs:wpaper:202507 |
| By: | Nicolas Veron (Peterson Institute for International Economics) |
| Abstract: | The debate about a European Union single market for nonbank financial services goes back decades. In recent years, the economic and strategic case for the idea, rebranded as capital markets union in 2014 and included in a broader concept of savings and investments union in 2024, has strengthened. But progress towards that goal has been embarrassingly modest. This working paper argues that supervisory integration--the pooling of capital market supervision at the EU level--is the only realistic option to create a foundation for the successful development of competitive capital markets on a European scale. This could be achieved through a radical transformation of the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) into a single, independent, and authoritative European supervisor. ESMA would gradually take over the jobs currently done by national capital market and audit supervisors and would replace them with its own network of national offices in EU countries. This consolidation would undercut the current incentives for market fragmentation, competitive distortion, and supervisory arbitrage, while respecting the European Union's multiplicity of financial centers, diverse market environments, and differentiated national social models. It would also represent a major simplification of the current arcane decision-making processes, allowing the European Union to move closer to the vision of a single jurisdiction for capital markets. |
| Keywords: | Capital markets supervision, European Union, nonbank financial institutions |
| JEL: | G23 G24 G28 |
| Date: | 2025–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iie:wpaper:wp25-18 |
| By: | Lionel Fontagne (Paris School of Economics); Krasimir Shishmanov (Tsenov Academy of Economics); Penka Shishmanova (Tsenov Academy of Economics); Yoto Yotov (School of Economics, Drexel University) |
| Abstract: | Economic gains from trade integration channel through inward or outward multilateral resistance terms, hence through consumption or production effects. But these impacts differ in their relative intensity among members of the integrated region, which leads to asymmetric outcomes. We study these asymmetric effects of European integration on the exports vs. imports of the members of the Single Market and obtain disaggregated asymmetric EU estimates for 170 industries. The econometric analysis delivers a rich database of more than 9, 300 estimates of the EU effects on trade among its members. Three main findings emerge from our analysis. First, previous estimates where asymmetries were silenced underestimated the gains from EU integration. Second, these asymmetries in the effects of the Single Market on the members’ trade are very large. Third, the EU has benefited disproportionately the consumers in older/richer members and the producers in the new/poorer joiners. |
| Keywords: | European Integration, The Single Market, Asymmetric Trade Costs |
| JEL: | F10 F14 F16 |
| Date: | 2025–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:drx:wpaper:202533 |
| By: | Simon H. Kwan; Ville Voutilainen |
| Abstract: | Both the magnitude and the pace of monetary policy tightening in the euro area during 2022-23 were historically large and fast. Yet, the real economy proved to be resilient. In this paper, we analyze the pass through of the ECB’s changes in the policy rate to mortgage rates in Finland during the post-pandemic period of 2022-23, when the policy liftoff began at the negative interest rate territory, using the normal tightening cycle in 2006-08 as control. We use monthly data and three different empirical methodologies: event studies, high-frequency identification, and exposure-measure regressions. Our evidence suggests that the post-pandemic monetary policy transmission was significantly less effective than during the control period, implying that for the same amount of tightening in financial conditions, a bigger increase in the policy rate is needed. The loss in monetary transmission during the negative interest rate policy is also playing out when monetary policy changes course. Thus, while monetary policy remains effective in the negative interest rate territory, it creates headwind for policy normalization down the road. |
| Keywords: | monetary policy; mortgage rates; monetary policy normalization; Finland |
| JEL: | E42 E58 E52 G21 |
| Date: | 2025–08–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedfwp:101415 |
| By: | Kolev-Schaefer, Galina; Hüther, Michael |
| Abstract: | Trotz der grundsätzlichen Einigung der EU mit den USA bleibt die Unsicherheit bezüglich des weiteren Verlaufs des Handelskonflikts hoch. Selbst wenn die getroffene Vereinbarung umgesetzt wird und der Basiszoll auf US-Importe aus der EU bei 15 Prozent bleibt, wird das für die deutsche Volkswirtschaft Kosten in Höhe von 0, 4 Prozent des BIP oder 16 Milliarden Euro im Durchschnitt über die Jahre 2025-2028 mit sich bringen. Steigt der durchschnittliche Zollsatz hingegen wie zuletzt angedroht auf 35 Prozent, so ist mit Kosten von über 40 Milliarden Euro, mit entsprechender Vergeltung sogar über 50 Milliarden Euro jährlich zu rechnen. |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iwkkur:323598 |
| By: | Sarah Fritz; Catherine van der List |
| Abstract: | We study the effects of place-based policies on aggregate productivity using administrative data on projects co-financed by the EU in Italy linked to balance sheet data. We exploit quasi-experimental variation in funding for a large place-based policy stemming from measurement error in regional GDP estimates. Results show that the policy likely decreases productivity. Decompositions reveal that aggregate declines are driven by reallocation of labor to low-productivity firms. Mechanism analysis using firm-level event studies reveals that negative reallocation effects are caused by high-productivity firms taking up the funds and subsequently becoming more liquidity constrained, leading to slowdowns in employment growth. |
| Keywords: | place-based policy, productivity, EU cohesion policy |
| JEL: | R11 R58 J23 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12031 |
| By: | Chen Yujia; Ding Zhenghong; Barbaglia Luca (European Commission - JRC); Calabrese Raffaella; Fatica Serena (European Commission - JRC) |
| Abstract: | "This paper assesses the impact of floods on credit to European small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) using a discrete-time survival model. We find a statistically significant relationship between the default probability of loans to SMEs and floods occurring in the region where the firm is located. We propose a micro-level stress testing exercise to assess the performance of small business loans under different climate scenarios.Our results allow us to identify the European regions with heightened vulnerability under a stressed climate scenario and to quantify the impacts upon individual firms in terms of increases in loan default probability." |
| Date: | 2025–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrs:wpaper:202506 |
| By: | Holm-Hadulla, Fédéric; Leombroni, Matteo |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the role of financial intermediaries in the transmission of central bank corporate bond purchases to bond yields. Contrary to standard expectations, we find that mutual funds—typically viewed as price-elastic investors—amplify, rather than dampen, the effects of these interventions on bond spreads. Following the ECB’s corporate bond purchase announcements in 2016 and 2020, bonds predominantly held by mutual funds experienced significantly larger and more persistent declines in spreads compared to those held by price-inelastic investors such as insurance companies, even after controlling for a broad set of bond characteristics. Drawing on additional empirical evidence and an equilibrium asset pricing model, we show that the state-contingent nature of the policy reduces perceived market risk for procyclical investors like mutualfunds, thereby boosting demand and compressing risk premia. JEL Classification: E52, E58, G11, G23 |
| Keywords: | central bank asset purchases, corporate bonds, non-bank financial institutions |
| Date: | 2025–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20253101 |
| By: | Christian Conrad; Zeno Enders; Gernot Müller |
| Abstract: | Under inflation forecast targeting, central banks such as the ECB adjust policy to keep expected inflation on target. We evaluate the ECB’s inflation forecasts: they are unbiased and efficient but contain little information at forecast horizons beyond three quarters. In a New Keynesian model with transmission lags, inflation forecast targeting is indeed effective in stabilizing inflation—provided there is no forward-looking behavior—though the information content of forecasts is unrealistically high. In the presence of forward-looking behavior, the information content declines because monetary policy becomes more effective in meeting the target, but inflation is best stabilized by targeting current inflation. |
| Keywords: | inflation targeting, inflation forecast targeting, monetary policy, inflation forecast, information content, target horizon, ECB |
| JEL: | C53 E52 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12006 |
| By: | Andres Rodriguez-Pose; |
| Abstract: | This paper outlines a renewed vision for the EU’s Cohesion Policy amid the growing political uncertainty threatening its very viability. Drawing on the High-Level Group on the Future of Cohesion Policy’s findings, it advocates for a more dynamic, systemic approach emphasising institutional capacity, territorial sensitivity, global links, and performance-based delivery. These are areas where past reforms have underdelivered. It warns against marginalising cohesion in favour of top-down, centralised strategies, arguing it is more than a funding tool. Cohesion Policy is the EU’s most democratic mechanism, fostering trust, participation, and unity. Revitalising it is essential for competitiveness, resilience, and the very future of Europe. |
| Keywords: | EU Cohesion Policy, Regional development, Policy reform, EU enlargement |
| JEL: | R11 R58 O18 D72 |
| Date: | 2025–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:egu:wpaper:2524 |
| By: | Benjamin Schwanebeck (FernUniversität in Hagen, Germany); Luzie Thiel (University of Kassel, Germany) |
| Abstract: | The financial situation of households differs substantially across countries, but the implications of this heterogeneity are still vastly understudied. We examine the implications of this asymmetry for optimal monetary policy in a currency union. We build a two-country monetary union model with heterogeneous households leading to inequality due to imperfect insurance. Money is introduced through central bank digital currency (CBDC) as a liquid asset to self-insure against idiosyncratic risk. CBDC is a new instrument which allows the central bank to target heterogeneity within a monetary union. We derive a welfare function with two additional objectives, consumption inequality within and across countries. The more heterogeneous households are, the less important inflation stabilization becomes in favor of stabilizing consumption inequality through providing money. Our research provides important policy implications as we show that it is beneficial for a monetary union to have a country-specific instrument to compensate for country differentials. |
| Keywords: | Heterogeneous Households, Imperfect Insurance, Optimal Monetary Policy, Monetary Union, Two-Country Model |
| JEL: | E52 E61 F45 |
| Date: | 2025–04–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mar:magkse:202512 |
| By: | Eric Heyer (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Mathieu Plane (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Xavier Ragot (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po, ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Raul Sampognaro (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Xavier Timbeau (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po) |
| Abstract: | Le déficit de la France de 5, 8 % du PIB en 2024 est bien supérieur à la moyenne de la zone euro, qui est de 3, 1 %. L'écart de déficit entre la France et la zone euro s'est accru principalement de 2000 à 2007, puis après 2019 (graphique 2). Sans surprise, les différents historiques des déficits publics se traduisent par des évolutions différenciées des dettes publiques des États Membres de la zone euro. Sur la période 2000-2024, la dette publique augmente de 53 points de PIB en France, de 27 points en Italie, 44 points en Espagne et de 5 points en Allemagne (graphique 4). Depuis 2017, en France, le creusement du déficit de 2, 4 points de PIB s'explique par une baisse du taux de prélèvements obligatoires (de 2, 5 points de PIB), dont 1, 6 point se traduisent par une baisse des prélèvements payés par les ménages et 0, 9 point pour les entreprises (graphique 8). Au cours de cette période, les dépenses publiques sont restées stables. Cependant, les prestations et transferts ont baissé de 0, 8 point tandis que l'investissement public a augmenté de 0, 5 point de PIB (tableau 4). Selon nos simulations, l'application de la politique budgétaire inscrite dans le Plan budgétaire et structurel à moyen terme (PSMT) présenté par le gouvernement en octobre 2024 et actualisé dans le cadre du Rapport d'avancement annuel (RAA) d'avril 2025 conduirait à un déficit de 3, 0 % en 2030, et un pic de la dette à 121, 7 % du PIB en 2029. Le chômage augmenterait à 9 % dès 2027, avant de progressivement décroître à partir de 2030 (tableau 5). Selon nos calculs, l'ajustement nécessaire à long terme pour stabiliser la dette à 110 % du PIB est estimé à 3, 5 points de PIB, soit environ 100 milliards d'euros de 2025 (tableau 6). À l'horizon de 2029 (celui du PSMT), en appliquant un ajustement plus progressif, qui limite les impacts négatifs sur l'économie, l'ajustement devrait être de 2, 8 % du PIB, soit un peu plus de 80 milliards d'euros (contre un ajustement affiché dans le PSMT d'un peu plus de 110 milliards d'euros). Cependant l'ajustement de long terme est du même ordre de grandeur (tableau 6). Avec des taux d'intérêt plus bas, cet ajustement jusqu'à 2029 pourrait être réduit à 2, 5 % du PIB, soit 75 milliards d'euros. La France doit avoir une crédibilité budgétaire pluriannuelle pour un ajustement progressif (tableau 6). Des propositions institutionnelles sont faites (section 3). |
| Keywords: | finances publiques, zone euro, PIB, impacts économiques |
| Date: | 2025–07–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05187003 |
| By: | Zechlin, Linus |
| Abstract: | The economic complexity framework by César Hidalgo and Ricardo Hausmann has inspired a substantial body of literature throughout recent years. Following previous research, which explored the various drivers of economic complexity, this article contributes by exploring the interplay with financial development. For the base sample of the European Union, a positive effect of financial development on economic complexity is found, identifying the financial institutions channel as the strongest driver of the Economic Complexity Index. Critical reflection leads to the assumption that a holistic replication of the study on a global scale could retrieve non-linear characteristics of said relationship. |
| Keywords: | Economic Complexity, Financial Development, European Economics |
| JEL: | C51 G10 G20 O16 O30 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ipewps:323944 |
| By: | Christophe Blot (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Jérôme Creel (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); François Geerolf (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Giovanni Ricco (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Davide Romelli (Trinity College Dublin) |
| Abstract: | Les facteurs ayant freiné la croissance économique de la zone euro devraient s'atténuer en 2025. Toutefois, l'incertitude mondiale reste élevée en raison de la guerre commerciale et de la menace d'une hausse des droits de douane. Dans ce contexte, le recul de l'inflation a ouvert un espace pour un assouplissement monétaire dans la zone euro : le taux de facilité de dépôt de la BCE a ainsi été abaissé de 4 % en mai 2024 à 2 % depuis juin 2025. Jusqu'à présent, l'hétérogénéité de l'inflation n'a pas constitué un obstacle majeur, contrairement aux craintes exprimées au début de l'épisode inflationniste de 2022-2023. Cette dispersion des taux d'inflation s'expliquait en grande partie par les écarts de prix de l'énergie entre pays. Avec le repli des prix de l'énergie, les taux d'inflation nationaux convergent à nouveau en zone euro. Les pays ayant accordé un soutien public plus limité pour faire face à des factures énergétiques plus élevées ont connu une inflation plus forte lors de la phase de hausses de prix. Mais ils bénéficient aujourd'hui de baisses plus marquées. L'orientation monétaire actuelle traduit des signaux ambivalents. D'un côté, la baisse continue des taux d'intérêt à court terme reflète un assouplissement de la politique monétaire conventionnelle. De l'autre, la poursuite de la réduction du bilan de la BCE peut être interprétée comme un signal de resserrement de sa politique non conventionnelle. En définitive, c'est à travers les coûts d'emprunt supportés par les entreprises, les ménages et les États que l'orientation de la politique monétaire se manifeste le plus clairement. Si les taux des emprunts publics ont nettement reculé pour les échéances courtes, la tendance est plus incertaine pour les échéances plus longues, où la dynamique du marché demeure plus ambivalente. Du côté des taux bancaires, la baisse du coût du crédit immobilier pour les ménages reste modeste, mais réelle. En agrégeant ces évolutions à travers un taux synthétique (ou proxy rate, en anglais) on constate que le resserrement monétaire est sans doute moins marqué que ne le laisserait penser la seule trajectoire des taux directeurs. Au cours de la dernière décennie, la BCE a progressivement délaissé un langage technique et opaque au profit d'une communication plus claire et accessible. Entre janvier 2015 et avril 2025, la lisibilité moyenne des déclarations en conférence de presse s'est nettement améliorée. En revanche, les comptes-rendus des réunions du Conseil des gouverneurs demeurent, quant à eux, plus complexes et techniques. Le ton de la communication de la BCE a sensiblement évolué : les références aux droits de douane sont désormais plus fréquentes, plus explicites et intégrées à des analyses plus larges sur l'incertitude mondiale et les risques pesant sur la politique monétaire. Cela suggère que la BCE utilise de plus en plus ce canal pour explorer et anticiper des arbitrages politiques complexes, fournissant potentiellement aux acteurs du marché un aperçu plus précoce des délibérations internes du Conseil des gouverneurs que par le passé. L'incertitude économique et politique occupe une place croissante dans la communication de la BCE, tant dans ses conférences de presse que dans les comptes-rendus. Cette insistance accrue semble relever d'un choix stratégique : en soulignant cette incertitude, la BCE cherche sans doute à gérer les attentes et à signaler une certaine forme de prudence à destination d'un public plus large. |
| Keywords: | politique monétaire, BCE, incertitude économique |
| Date: | 2025–07–15 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05187026 |
| By: | Mounir Amdaoud (CNRS, EconomiX, Université Paris Nanterre, 92001 Nanterre); Nadine Levratto (CNRS, EconomiX, Université Paris Nanterre, 92001 Nanterre) |
| Abstract: | This article investigates the links between sectoral diversity and local employment growth in France over the period 2004‑2015. Starting from the seminal contribution of Frenken et al. (2007), we take into account both the within and between sectoral diversities at the local level and at the neighbourhood one. Our empirical investigations confirm that intrasector diver‑ sity (so called related variety) is positively associated with employment growth. Moreover, this association seems to be driven by the local related variety in growth phase and by the related variety in the neighbourhood in crisis period. We also find that the negative relationship between unrelated variety and employment growth goes only through the neighbourhood canal. |
| Abstract: | Cet article examine les liens entre la diversité sectorielle et la croissance de l'emploi local en France entre 2004 et 2015. Suivant les travaux précurseurs de Frenken et al. (2007), nous prenons en compte à la fois la diversité intrasectorielle (également appelée « variété reliée ») et la diversité intersectorielle (ou « variété non reliée »), au niveau local et au niveau du voisinage.Nos résultats confirment que la variété reliée est corrélée positivement avec la croissance de l'emploi. De plus, cette corrélation semble alimentée par la variété reliée locale en période de croissance et par la variété reliée du voisinage en période de crise. La variété non reliée est corrélée négativement avec la croissance de l'emploi, et ce lien ne passe que par le canal du voisinage. |
| Keywords: | related variety, unrelated variety, spatial interactions, France, employment growth, interactions spatiales, croissance de l'emploi, variété non reliée, variété reliée |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05185983 |