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on European Economics |
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Issue of 2026–04–20
eighteen papers chosen by Simon Sosvilla-Rivero, Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico |
| By: | A. Triantafyllou (Audencia Business School); D. Bakas; I. Konstantakopoulou |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the validity of the tourism-led economic growth hypothesis for the Euro Area economies. We employ both linear and nonlinear Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) cointegration approaches to examine the symmetric and asymmetric effects of tourism on economic growth. Furthermore, we control for the presence of structural breaks in the time series, which account for the recent financial and debt crises in the Euro Area. The results support the positive impact of tourism on economic growth for most of the Euro Area economies and are robust to alternative tourism measures. The findings indicate that an asymmetric impact exists both in the long and the short run. Positive and negative shocks in tourism and the real exchange rate result in significantly different effects, both in terms of sign and magnitude, on economic growth. |
| Keywords: | Structural Breaks, Nonlinear ARDL, ARDL, Euro Area, Tourism-Led Growth Hypothesis |
| Date: | 2026–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05578402 |
| By: | Andreas Baur; Lisandra Flach; Xabier Moriana-Armendariz |
| Abstract: | The protectionist trade policy of the second Trump administration poses a significant challenge to the European economy, hitting export-oriented manufacturing particularly hard. Against this backdrop, this study quantifies the economic potential of a new European free trade initiative (“Global Europe 2.0”) centered on new trade agreements with seven key trading partners: the Mercosur countries, India, the United Arab Emirates, Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand (the P7). Despite accounting for 13 percent of global merchandise imports, the P7's share in EU exports has stagnated over recent decades, pointing to untapped potential that new agreements could help unlock. Using the ifo Trade Model, a quantitative general equilibrium model, we simulate two scenarios: a baseline capturing the medium-term effects of current US tariff policy, and a scenario adding new EU–P7 trade agreements. We find that P7 agreements would more than offset the adverse effects of US protectionism, generating a net positive effect on EU economic activity. Depending on agreement depth, EU real GDP rises by 0.18 to 0.43 percent and total exports by 1.3 to 3.4 percent. Gains are broad-based across all 27 member states, and the turnaround is most striking for EU manufacturing. |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:econpr:_57 |
| By: | Corrado, L.; Grassi, S.; Paolillo, A.; Ravazzolo, F. |
| Abstract: | We study how the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine reshaped energy prices and macroeconomic conditions in the Euro area. We develop and estimate a two-sector model in which oil, coal, and gas are combined to produce refined energy used by households and firms. The model allows for complementarities between energy and non-energy inputs, so shocks to individual energy markets propagate broadly through production, consumption, and inflation. Focusing on shocks specific to oil, coal, and gas from the onset of the pandemic to 2022:Q3, we find that they raised energy inflation by about 36 percentage points and headline inflation by 1.8 percentage points. Complementarities, wage indexation, and monetary policy amplify these effects, while subsidies offset them only partially. |
| Keywords: | Fossil Energy, Supply Shocks, Inflation, Complementarities, Monetary Policy, Fiscal Policy |
| JEL: | E31 E32 E52 E62 Q43 |
| Date: | 2026–04–15 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:2629 |
| By: | Giovanni Carnazza; Francesco Tomasone |
| Abstract: | This paper studies whether, and above which level of public debt, fiscal rules in the European Union become associated with systematically more pro-cyclical discretionary fiscal policy. We combine three elements that are rarely brought together in the same empirical framework: real-time ex ante fiscal plans and output-gap forecasts, time-varying estimates of fiscal cyclicality, and an identification strategy that addresses the simultaneity between fiscal policy and cyclical conditions. Using European Commission Autumn forecast vintages for 26 EU countries over 2008-2019, we first recover annual country-specific measures of planned discretionary fiscal cyclicality. To do so, we complement a Schlicht-type time-varying coefficient model with a kernel-based time-varying instrumental-variable estimator, instrumenting domestic cyclical conditions with a country-specific external-demand shifter. We then relate the estimated cyclicality coefficients to the strength of fiscal rules, measured through continuous indices based on both the IMF Fiscal Rules Dataset and the European Commission methodology, and allow for non-linearities through panel threshold methods. We find a robust debt threshold around 88 per cent of GDP. Above this threshold, stronger fiscal rules are associated with significantly more pro-cyclical discretionary fiscal behaviour; below it, the relationship is weak and generally not statistically distinguishable from zero. The result is robust across alternative rule indices, specifications, and estimation strategies, and is especially strong in the time-varying IV estimates. The evidence also shows that the Maastricht 60 per cent debt benchmark does not coincide with the empirically relevant regime shift in the stabilisation properties of fiscal rules. The findings suggest that, in persistently high-debt environments, rule-based surveillance may intensify cyclical pressures unless flexibility is explicitly designed around debt-contingent stabilisation needs. |
| Keywords: | Debt threshold effects; Fiscal cyclicality; Fiscal rules; European Union |
| JEL: | E32 E62 H60 H63 C14 C23 C26 |
| Date: | 2026–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sap:wpaper:wp279 |
| By: | Parisa Pakrooh (University of Milano-Bicocca); Matteo Manera (University of Milano-Bicocca and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei) |
| Abstract: | Despite the strong commitment of European countries to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050, the extent to which key policies and drivers jointly shape emissions dynamics remains insufficiently investigated. To fill this gap, the study investigates the combined effects of the circular economy, energy transition, emissions trading systems, carbon tax, and digitalization on carbon reduction in the EU member states. Using annual data from 2000 to 2023, the analysis integrates causal discovery, time-varying dependence modeling, and machine learning methods to unravel system-level causal structure, dynamic connectedness, and future emission trajectories. The Directed Acyclic Graph method, especially the Fast Adjacency Skewness algorithm, identifies both contemporaneous and lagged causal relationships, in which resource productivity acts as a transmission channel within the system. Lagged disequilibrium shocks propagate from upstream circular economy factor (material footprint) and digitalization to midstream efficiency (resource productivity), and ultimately are transmitted to emissions. Time-varying copula models confirm significant heterogeneity and evolving dependence among key factors, highlighting the nature of the dynamic relationships. Forecasting results, based on a Support Vector Regression model under the European Union’s 2030 climate policy target, indicate a persistently declining emission trajectory, however at an insufficient speed to meet the EU’s 2030 target. Sensitivity analysis indicates that this gap does not reflect a policy failure but the need for accelerated policy adjustments. |
| Keywords: | Carbon Emissions, Energy Transition, Emissions Trading System, Circular Economy, Digitalization, EU Climate Policy |
| JEL: | Q54 Q43 Q58 C55 C32 |
| Date: | 2026–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2026.14 |
| By: | König, Jörg; Meyer, Tim |
| Abstract: | Plans to introduce a digital euro are becoming increasingly concrete. The European Parliament is expected to vote on the proposal in May 2026, with the European legislative process set to be completed by the end of the year. However, the digital euro is likely to be primarily a prestige project of European institutions, whose benefits are difficult to discern. Its introduction would, with a high degree of probability, entail distortions of competition and risks to the financial system. It could also lead to a gradual displacement of cash, quietly driven forward by the various interested parties. Contrary to the expectations of its proponents, the digital euro is also unlikely to significantly foster technological progress or strengthen the euro's role as a global reserve currency. For this reason, an open-ended process without time pressure is needed-one that allows for the possibility of ultimately deciding against the introduction of a digital euro. Instead, alternative options should be incorporated into the decision-making process. In addition to the possibility of entrusting the ECB with the provision of digital infrastructure, priority should be given to private initiatives in the development of digital payment services. One point appears clear: Europe's shortcomings and dependencies in digital payment systems cannot be resolved through a more or less state-driven digital currency, but rather require trust in market-based processes and openness to private innovation. |
| Abstract: | Die Pläne zur Einführung eines digitalen Euros werden immer konkreter. Im Mai 2026 soll das Europäische Parlament über das Vorhaben abstimmen. Bis Ende des Jahres soll der europäische Gesetzgebungsprozess abgeschlossen sein. Der digitale Euro dürfte jedoch vor allem ein Prestigeprojekt europäischer Institutionen sein, dessen Nutzen nur schwer ersichtlich ist. Die Einführung des digitalen Euros hätte mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit Wettbewerbsverzerrungen und Risiken für das Finanzsystem zur Folge. Zudem könnte sie zu einer sukzessiven Verdrängung des Bargelds führen, die diskret von den unterschiedlichen interessierten Seiten vorangetrieben wird. Entgegen der Hoffnung seiner Befürworter dürfte der digitale Euro zudem kaum dazu in der Lage sein, technologischen Fortschritt zu befördern oder die Rolle des Euros als globale Reservewährung zu stärken. Deshalb bedarf es eines ergebnisoffenen Prozesses ohne Zeitdruck, an dessen Ende auch die Entscheidung stehen kann, den digitalen Euro nicht einzuführen. Vielmehr sollten andere Optionen in den Entscheidungsprozess einbezogen werden: Neben der Möglichkeit, der EZB die Bereitstellung der digitalen Infrastruktur anzuvertrauen, sollten private Initiativen Vorrang bei der Entwicklung digitaler Zahlungsdienstleistungen erhalten. Denn eines scheint offensichtlich: Europas Rückstände und Abhängigkeiten bei digitalen Zahlungssystemen lassen sich nicht durch eine mehr oder weniger staatliche Digitalwährung beheben, sondern erfordern Vertrauen in marktwirtschaftliche Prozesse und Offenheit gegenüber privaten Innovationen. |
| Keywords: | Bargeld, Digitalisierung, Europa, Finanzmärkte |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:smwpos:340005 |
| By: | Mario Holzner (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw) |
| Abstract: | This assessment provides a long-term analysis of Hungary’s economic trajectory under the administration of Viktor Orbán since 2010. Taking the start of the European financial crisis in 2009 as a baseline, it evaluates the impact of ‘Orbánomics’ – a policy mix defined by deterioration in institutional quality, state intervention and sectoral taxation for the creation of a nationalist, capitalist class, and an ‘Eastern Opening’ strategy to diversify away from the European Union. Through a comparative lens that focuses on the region of Central, East and Southeast Europe (CESEE), the study finds that Hungary has transitioned away from being a regional front-runner to languishing in the midfield. Key findings highlight a widening 7 percentage point GDP growth gap relative to the CESEE average, a significant slowdown in convergence toward the ‘Austrian Benchmark’, compared to peers like Croatia and Romania, and a regressive shift in sectoral specialisation from high-innovation ICT toward low-complexity real estate. Furthermore, the analysis underscores the severe ‘institutional tax’ resulting from deteriorating governance scores and the subsequent withholding of EU transfers, such as the funds from the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF). The study concludes that without urgent political and economic reform and institutional reconciliation, Hungary risks permanent entrenchment in a nationalist development trap. |
| Keywords: | Hungary, Economic Convergence, Foreign Direct Investment, Institutional Governance, Rule of Law, Sectoral Specialisation, EU Recovery and Resilience Facility |
| JEL: | E60 O47 O52 P26 P27 F21 |
| Date: | 2026–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wii:pnotes:pn:107 |
| By: | Ciani, Matilde |
| Abstract: | Das globale Rennen um die KI-Führerschaft hat begonnen, und Europa versucht, vorne mitzuspielen. Es besteht jedoch eine deutliche Diskrepanz zwischen der Planung von Rechenzentrumskapazitäten und der Stromversorgungsplanung in der EU. • Trotz ambitionierter Pläne droht die EU im globalen KI-Rennen weiter zurückzufallen: China will seine Rechenzentrumskapazität bis 2030 verdreifachen, die Vereinigten Staaten sind dabei, sie zu verdoppeln, wodurch Europa mit deutlich geringeren Anteilen an der globalen Kapazität zurückbleibt. • Der Strombedarf der EU-Rechenzentren wird sich in den nächsten fünf Jahren voraussichtlich verdoppeln, von etwa 80 auf 168 TWh. Die obere Grenze dieses Bereichs entspricht dem gesamten Elektrizitätsbedarf einer europäischen Industrienation, beispielsweise dem Bedarf von Polen im Jahr 2024. Der Anteil des gesamten EU-Strombedarfs, der auf Rechenzentren entfällt, wird daher rasch von rund 2% im Jahr 2023 auf rund 5% im Jahr 2030 ansteigen. • Die Deckung des zusätzlichen Strombedarfs, der durch Rechenzentren entstehen wird, ist nur möglich, wenn der Verbrauch der übrigen Wirtschaftsbereiche weit gehend konstant bleibt. Dies ist jedoch unwahrscheinlich, da der Bedarf auch in anderen Sektoren steigen wird, insbesondere im Wohnungsmarkt (Wärmepumpen) und im Verkehrssektor (Elektrofahrzeuge). • Bis 2030 entsteht dadurch eine erhebliche Lücke zwischen Strombedarf und verfügbarer Elektrizität, die dem Netto-Stromverbrauch von Ländern wie Belgien oder Finnland im Jahr 2024 entspricht. Ohne vorausschauende Planung droht der Europäischen Union ein gefährliches Trilemma: Sie müsste zwischen Wachstum, Klimaneutralität und einer führenden Rolle im KI-Rennen abwägen. |
| Abstract: | The Global Race for AI is on, and Europe is trying to play its part. However, there is a serious mismatch between data center capacity planning and energy supply planning in the EU. • Despite ambitious plans, the EU risks falling further behind: China is on track to triple its data center capacity by 2030, and the United States to double, leaving Europe with significantly lower shares of global capacity • EU data centers' electricity demand is forecast to double over the next five years, from ∼80 and 168 TWh; the upper end of this range is equivalent to the entire electricity demand of a country such as Polandin2024. The share of total EU electricity demand absorbed by data centers will thus rise rapidly from around 2% in 2023 to around 5% in 2030. • Covering the additional demand by data centers is only possible if the rest of the economy remains largely static. This is, however, unlikely, as the electricity demand in other sectors will increase as well, in particular in the housing market (heat pumps) and in the transportation sector (electric vehicles). • The uncovered additional electricity demand of data centers by 2030 is substantial and equivalent to the 2024 net electricity consumption of countries like Belgium or Finland. Poor planning may thus leave the European Union in a dangerous trilemma: giving up on growth, net-zero goals, or on the AI race. |
| Keywords: | Künstliche Intelligenz, Digitalisierung, Elektrizität, Artificial Intelligence, Digitalisation, Energy |
| JEL: | O33 Q43 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwkpb:340030 |
| By: | OECD |
| Abstract: | This public procurement brief explains to what extent and under which conditions third-country bidders have access to the EU procurement market in sectors other than security and defence. The brief explains the differential access for bidders from jurisdictions covered by trade agreements concluded by the EU and those from other jurisdictions without such agreements. It highlights some implications of recent Court of Justice of the European Union case law and initial decisions under the International Procurement Instrument and Foreign Subsidies Regulation for competition in the EU public procurement market, as well as in relation to the approach to international procurement for countries seeking to approximate their regulatory frameworks to the EU’s acquis. |
| Date: | 2026–04–15 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:govaag:40-en |
| By: | Crowley, M. A.; Palacios, M. D.; Faraglia, E.; Giannitsarou, C.; Havemeister, L. |
| Abstract: | Geopolitical uncertainty alters the incentives of firms to organise their corporate structure across borders, creating a distinct margin of adjustment in response to policy risk. We study this margin using the Brexit referendum as a quasi-natural experiment. We combine firm level data on parent-subsidiary links for UK and EU firms between 2011 and 2021 with measures of Brexit-related uncertainty and study changes in foreign subsidiary formation at the extensive margin. Following the referendum, there was an increase in the number of subsidiary formation from the UK into the EU, while the number of EU firms that expanded with subsidiaries into the UK dropped. UK firms establishing their first EU subsidiary after the referendum were systematically weaker ex ante than comparable firms that did so before the referendum. Increased Brexit-related uncertainty is associated with increased foreign subsidiary formation from the UK into the EU, driven primarily by small firms, alongside suggestive evidence of decreased domestic subsidiary incorporation by UK firms. We interpret these findings as evidence of a 'precautionary' foreign direct investment channel, operating through changes in the corporate structures of firms in response to geopolitical uncertainty. |
| Keywords: | Brexit, Foreign Subsidiary, Geopolitical Uncertainty, Parent Firm |
| JEL: | F21 F23 G32 F15 D22 |
| Date: | 2026–03–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:2619 |
| By: | Guschanski, Alexander; Wildauer, Rafael |
| Abstract: | We analyse the potential of wealth taxes to reduce CO2 emissions through two transmission channels: the inequality channel, which links reductions in wealth inequality to lower emissions, and the consumption channel, which analyses how wealth taxes affect consumption by top wealth holders. We simulate the effects of various wealth tax designs over one- and ten-year horizons using harmonised microdata from 22 European countries. Our analysis accounts for survey non-response bias, heterogeneous rates of returns across households, and behavioural responses to taxation. We find that, through the inequality channel, an annual progressive wealth tax could reduce annual CO2 emissions by 7.5%–14.7% after ten years relative to a no-tax scenario, depending on tax progressivity. Through the consumption channel, the average reduction is between 1.5%–3.6%. These findings highlight the potential of wealth taxes to serve a dual purpose: curbing wealth concentration and contributing meaningfully to climate mitigation and justice, by focusing on high-net worth households who account for a disproportionate share of emissions. |
| Keywords: | wealth tax; wealth distribution; environmental effect; CO2 emissions |
| Date: | 2025–10–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gpe:wpaper:51227 |
| By: | Ciani, Matilde |
| Abstract: | The Global Race for AI is on, and Europe is trying to play its part. However, there is a serious mismatch between data center capacity planning and energy supply planning in the EU. • Despite ambitious plans, the EU risks falling further behind: China is on track to triple its data center capacity by 2030, and the United States to double, leaving Europe with significantly lower shares of global capacity • EU data centers' electricity demand is forecast to double over the next five years, from ∼80 and 168 TWh; the upper end of this range is equivalent to the entire electricity demand of a country such as Polandin2024. The share of total EU electricity demand absorbed by data centers will thus rise rapidly from around 2% in 2023 to around 5% in 2030. • Covering the additional demand by data centers is only possible if the rest of the economy remains largely static. This is, however, unlikely, as the electricity demand in other sectors will increase as well, in particular in the housing market (heat pumps) and in the transportation sector (electric vehicles). • The uncovered additional electricity demand of data centers by 2030 is substantial and equivalent to the 2024 net electricity consumption of countries like Belgium or Finland. Poor planning may thus leave the European Union in a dangerous trilemma: giving up on growth, net-zero goals, or on the AI race. |
| Keywords: | Artificial Intelligence, Digitalisation, Energy, Künstliche Intelligenz, Digitalisierung, Elektrizität |
| JEL: | O33 Q43 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwkpb:340031 |
| By: | Röder, Jana; Tillmann, Peter; Winker, Peter; Yun, Jinyeong |
| Abstract: | German government debt is considered a safe asset in times of turbulence. We estimate the impact of changes in the risk appetite of global investors on weekly investment fund flows into the German sovereign bond market. Our key contribution is to allow the impact of such shocks to depend on the extent of disagreement about the path of fiscal policy, which we measure from the texts of all speeches delivered in the German Bundestag. An increase in global risk causes strong inflows into German government bonds if the coalition government is united, but only small and short-lived inflows if disagreement within the government is high. In contrast, disagreement between the government and the opposition has no moderating effect on fund inflows. We also find that the dependence of safe-haven flows on the prevailing level of fiscal disagreement is higher for actively managed funds and for funds domiciled abroad. |
| Keywords: | capital flows, disagreement, policy uncertainty, safe asset, text analysis |
| JEL: | F41 G15 H30 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:imfswp:340020 |
| By: | Giendl, Clara; Schwarzbauer, Wolfgang |
| Abstract: | This paper examines how regional economic diversity shapes economic resilience across European regions during major crises. Using sectoral diversity indicators at the NUTS-2 level, we analyze the impact of diversity on three dimensions of resilience: the depth of economic downturns, the strength of the initial recovery, and the duration of recovery, focusing on the 2008 financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic. Our results show that higher economic diversity consistently mitigates the severity of economic shocks, reducing the immediate decline in regional economic activity in both crises. However, this stabilizing effect comes with a trade-off: More diversified regions tend to exhibit weaker short-term recovery dynamics and longer recovery periods. In contrast, regions characterized by higher innovation intensity and productivity-driven specialization recover more quickly. These findings highlight the importance of balancing structural diversity and innovation. While diversity enhances shock absorption, innovation and specialization appear crucial for accelerating recovery. The paper contributes to the literature on regional resilience by providing EU-wide evidence across multiple crises and offers policy-relevant insights on how structural economic characteristics shape regional responses to shocks. |
| Abstract: | Wirtschaftskrisen treffen Regionen unterschiedlich stark. Warum kommen manche Regionen besser durch Krisen als andere? Das EcoAustria Research Paper untersucht, welche Rolle die wirtschaftliche Struktur - insbesondere die sektorale Diversität - für die Krisenresilienz von Regionen spielt. Auf Basis von Daten für europäische Regionen analysieren wir die Auswirkungen zweier großer Krisen: der Finanzkrise 2008 und der COVID-19-Pandemie. Dabei betrachten wir drei zentrale Dimensionen der Resilienz: die Tiefe des Einbruchs, der Beginn der ersten Erholung sowie die Dauer bis zur vollständigen Erholung. Die Ergebnisse zeigen ein klares Muster: Regionen mit einer stärker diversifizierten Wirtschaftsstruktur sind besser in der Lage, wirtschaftliche Schocks abzufedern. Da ihre Wertschöpfung auf mehrere Sektoren verteilt ist, sind sie weniger anfällig für Einbrüche in einzelnen Branchen. Allerdings geht diese Stabilität mit einem Zielkonflikt einher: Diversifizierte Regionen erholen sich tendenziell langsamer, während stärker spezialisierte Regionen häufig schneller und dynamischer aus der Krise herauswachsen. Eine wichtige Rolle spielt zudem Innovation. Regionen mit höherer Innovationskraft und Produktivität weisen schnellere Erholungsprozesse auf Insgesamt zeigen die Ergebnisse: Diversität und Innovation sind beide entscheidend für Resilienz, wirken jedoch unterschiedlich. Eine ausgewogene Kombination aus wirtschaftlicher Vielfalt und Innovationsstärke kann daher einen guten Schutz vor zukünftigen Krisen bieten. |
| Keywords: | regional economics, resilience, COVID-19, Economic and financial crisis 2008 |
| JEL: | R11 R15 N41 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ecoarp:340006 |
| By: | Zhangying Li (Economics and Management School, Wuhan University); O-Chia Chuang (School of Digital Economics, Hubei University of Economics); Rangan Gupta (Department of Economics, University of Pretoria) |
| Abstract: | The onset of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022 caused significant fluctuations in global energy markets, particularly in natural gas prices, highlighting the growing importance of natural gas for financial market stability. Using a structural econometric framework, we analyze the dynamic effects of natural gas supply shocks compared to three distinct oil shocks popularly used in the energy economics literature using constant and time-varying parameter local projections model, and associated historical decomposition. Our findings reveal that supply shocks of natural gas has replaced oil as the primary driver of stock market volatility, particularly during the 2022 energy crisis. Additionally, natural gas supply shocks are found to perform better in an out-of-sample forecasting exercise compared to oil supply shocks. These results suggest the need for policymakers and investors to incorporate natural gas price dynamics into financial risk management frameworks for Europe. |
| Keywords: | Natural Gas Price Supply Shocks, Oil price Supply Shocks, Stock Price Volatility, Local Projection, Forecasting |
| Date: | 2026–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pre:wpaper:202609 |
| By: | Hennessy, Hugh; Lawless, Martina; O'Connor, Ciara |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esr:wpaper:wp817 |
| By: | Richiardi, Matteo; Vittal Katikireddi, S.; Daniel, N; Agneta, Cederstrom; David, Sonnewald; Leszek, Morawski; Michal, Brzezinski; Mikael, Rostila; Claire, L |
| Abstract: | This report presents the construction and analysis of a Multidimensional Index (MDI) of Well-Being across four European countries ─ Sweden, Germany, Spain, and Poland ─ using EU-SILC cross-sectional survey data spanning 2004–2024. Based on the OECD well-being framework, the analysis covers ten (out of eleven) key dimensions, including income and wealth, housing, health, safety, environment, life satisfaction, social connections, as well as jobs and earnings, education, and work–life for the working-age population (25─64). Standardized well-being scores (0─1) were constructed for each dimension, with composite indices derived using principal component analysis (PCA) where multiple indicators were available. The MDI was computed as the average of the available dimension scores. The findings reveal notable cross-country variation in both individual dimensions and overall well-being. Sweden consistently ranks highest, followed by Germany, while Spain shows comparatively lower levels. Poland demonstrates the strongest improvement over time. Trends indicate overall progress between 2004 and 2019, a decline during the COVID-19 period, and partial recovery thereafter. Age-related disparities are evident, with older individuals more likely to experience lower well-being. These findings underscore the role of multidimensional approaches in capturing inequalities in well-being across populations and contexts. |
| Date: | 2026–04–13 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ese:cempwp:cempa7-26 |
| By: | Onaran, Özlem |
| Abstract: | A policy mix suggested by UNITE (2024) based on increasing public spending in health and education by increasing the wage rates of public sector workers by 23% and increasing employment amounting to a further 2.79%-point increase in public spending as a ratio to GDP, a 2%-point increase in public gross fixed capital formation, a 7.1%-point increase in the average effective tax rate on profit income, a progressive wealth tax on the top 1% increasing the average effective tax rate on wealth by %0.38%-point, and a New Deal for Workers increasing labour’s power, which is estimated to increase the wage rates in the private sector by 3.24% could lead to substantial improvements in income, employment and public finance. The estimated effects suggest that in response to this policy mix GDP increases by 22.44%, employment increases by 2.83%, private investment as a ratio to GDP increases by 6.50%, public debt/GDP decreases by 9.45%-point, thanks to a very strong increases in GDP, despite a high increase in public spending. |
| Keywords: | public spending; taxation; macroeconomy |
| Date: | 2024–06–17 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gpe:wpaper:47397 |