|
on European Economics |
|
Issue of 2026–01–26
nineteen papers chosen by Simon Sosvilla-Rivero, Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico |
| By: | Dallari, Pietro; Gattini, Luca |
| Abstract: | This paper applies the Growth-at-Risk (GaR) framework to assess downside risks to euro area GDP growth, and it examines its usefulness for stress testing. Supervisory stress-test scenarios are often criticized for being either too mild or implausibly severe, raising questions about calibration. This is consequential for banks' business plans as well as for systemic financial stability. We conduct a pseudo real-time evaluation of European Banking Authority (EBA) adverse scenarios published in the last decade, establishing a probabilistic benchmark against which their scenario severity can be evaluated. We find that, except for the 2021 and 2023 rounds, EBA adverse scenarios consistently lie below the 10th percentile threshold. After the pandemic shock, scenario severity and model-implied risks have moved in opposite directions, with GaR estimates pointing to declining downside risks and EBA scenarios becoming increasingly severe. However, these still fall within the models' probability distributions and therefore represent plausible-if extreme-realizations of downside risk. Supporting exercises attribute downside risks primarily to financial stress in the short-term, while medium-term horizons are shaped by term structure and housing or credit channels more. Taken together, these results suggest that GaR can serve as a transparent, data-driven complement to expert judgment in stress-test scenario design-helping to balance severity with plausibility and enhancing scenarios' credibility for financial stability assessments. |
| Keywords: | Growth-at-Risk (GaR), stress testing, scenario calibration, quantile regression, macro-financial conditions |
| JEL: | C22 C53 E32 E44 G21 G28 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:eibwps:335012 |
| By: | Martín Saldias; Roberto Panzica |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the impact of transition risk on the stability of the European financial system. Using a novel dataset, we assess the systemic relevance of euro area banks’ exposures to climate-relevant sectors as of 2024. By clustering banks into communities, we find that those more exposed to transition risk tend to have smaller total exposures towards non-financial corporation and greater sectoral diversification. We then introduce two climate stress-test methodologies: one based on a policy shock and another linked to a regulatory CO2 reduction target. The latter shows that shocks in carbon-intensive sectors propagate through industrial interdependencies, affecting less-intensive sectors and amplifying impacts on highly intensive ones. Under mild scenarios, voluntary capital buffers absorb losses in most banks, amounting to EUR 104 billion and EUR 54 billion for the two methodologies, indicating overall system resilience. In extreme scenarios, however, losses rise to EUR 209–220 billion, with capital depletion of 2.4–2.6% of risk-weighted assets; voluntary buffers cover losses in 85–90% of banks. The CO2-based approach highlights the importance of indirect input–output spillovers, which account for 73% of total losses. |
| JEL: | G01 G10 G21 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ptu:wpaper:w202520 |
| By: | Joana Passinhas; Isabel Proença |
| Abstract: | In 2022, the euro area started to experience very high levels of inflation relative to its history, prompting the European Central Bank to raise reference rates by 450 basis points from July 2022 to September 2023. The market anticipated this, with the Euro Interbank Offered Rate, that frequently serves as the reference rate in housing loans, rising as early as March 2022. In this context, we study the benefits of a debt service-to-income (DSTI) limit, namely the Portuguese one set in 2018, in changing the loan service-to-income (LSTI) ratio distribution of new loans for house purchase in the low interest rate (before March 2022) and in the new increasing interest rate environment. Using instrumental variable quantile regressions, we obtain the benefits of the limit by comparing the LSTI distribution of loans under the DSTI limit versus the one of loans included in the exceptions (i.e. with DSTI ratios above the limit). Findings show that DSTI limits effectively keep risky loans from entering the market and reduce individuals effort rate in both the low and rising interest rate environment. The benefits of the DSTI limit became more pronounced after interest rates began rising, highlighting their role in maintaining stringent lending standards in a higher-interest environment. |
| JEL: | C21 C26 E58 G21 G28 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ptu:wpaper:w02524 |
| By: | Matthieu Bordenave; Giovanna Ciaffi |
| Abstract: | This paper evaluates the macroeconomic impact of green public spending by quantifying the responses of GDP, private investment, employment, and labour productivity across 30 European countries from 1995 to 2020. Using linear and nonlinear Local Projection methods, our findings indicate that green fiscal policies can positively and persistently affect GDP and employment levels, crowding-in private investment and generating a positive impact on productivity dynamics. When distinguishing between low- and high-income countries, we observe that the multipliers on GDP and employment are higher for the latter group, although no significant gains in productivity are found. However, productivity gains, albeit small in magnitude, appear to be concentrated in low-income countries. Moreover, our results show that the impact of green investments on GDP and private investment is higher in countries with high levels of green public consumption expenditure over total green public expenditure. These findings underline the importance of tailored fiscal policies to maximize the benefits of green public expenditure across different economic contexts. |
| Keywords: | Green Public Spending, Fiscal Multipliers, Green Investment, Green Consumption, European Divide, Ecological Economics |
| JEL: | E62 Q54 Q58 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imk:fmmpap:121-2025 |
| By: | Diana Bonfim; Sujiao Zhao; Olivier De Jonghe |
| Abstract: | We study heterogeneity in households’ credit across nine European countries (Belgium, Spain, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, and Slovakia) during 2022-2024 using granular credit register data. We first document substantial between- and within-country variation in mortgage and consumer lending by borrower age, loan maturity, and interest rate fixation. We then quantify the pass-through of the ECB’s recent tightening cycle to household borrowing costs, and assess its heterogeneous impact across households. Passthrough is nearly complete for mortgages (around 0.9) but considerably weaker for consumer credit (around 0.4). While mortgage pass-through is relatively homogeneous across countries, consumer credit shows pronounced cross-country differences that cannot be explained by borrower or loan characteristics. Younger households face stronger mortgage pass-through but weaker consumer credit pass-through relative to older borrowers, and longer maturities are associated with stronger pass-through in both credit markets. |
| JEL: | E52 G21 D14 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ptu:wpaper:w202514 |
| By: | Stefano Herzel (DEF, University of Rome "Tor Vergata"); Marco Nicolosi (Università La Sapienza) |
| Abstract: | We analyze the sensitivity of the euro-area yield curve to revisions in market expectations of the ECB policy rate. Using changes in the maintenance-period forward OIS as a market-based measure of policy-rate surprises, we document that yield responses vary systematically across maturities. To interpret these patterns, we adopt a short-rate model with stochastic jumps occurring only at scheduled ECB meeting dates and derive closed-form expressions for the condi- tional sensitivity of yields to changes in the expected jump size. We compare the model-implied term-structure responses with realized yield changes on days of large revisions in expectations. The model reproduces the cross-sectional shape and magnitude of observed sensitivities, especially the pronounced peak at intermediate maturities, underscoring the importance of incorporating scheduled jump times when modeling interest-rate dynamics. |
| Keywords: | OIS, €STR, ECB, monetary policy surprises, scheduled jumps, term-structure sensitivity |
| JEL: | E43 E52 G12 |
| Date: | 2026–01–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:619 |
| By: | Lara Wemans; et al. |
| Abstract: | This paper presents a comprehensive characterization of “fiscal drag”—the increase in tax revenue that occurs when nominal tax bases grow but nominal parameters of progressive tax legislation are not updated accordingly—across 21 European countries using a microsimulation approach. First, we estimate tax-to-base elasticities, showing that the progressivity built in each country’s personal income tax system induces elasticities around 1.7–2 for many countries, indicating a potential for large fiscal drag effects. We unpack these elasticities to show stark heterogeneity in their underlying mechanisms (tax brackets or tax deductions and credits), across income sources (labor, capital, self-employment, public benefits), and across the individual income distribution. Second, we extend the analysis beyond these elasticities to study fiscal drag in practice between 2019 and 2023, incorporating observed income growth and legislative changes. We quantify the actual impact of fiscal drag and the extent to which government policies have offset it, either through indexation or other reforms. Our results provide new insights into the fiscal and distributional effects of fiscal drag in Europe, as well as useful statistics for modeling public finances. |
| JEL: | D31 H24 E62 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ptu:wpaper:w202516 |
| By: | Olteanu, Dan Constantin (Institutul National de Cercetari Economice al Academiei Romane) |
| Abstract: | : In this paper we verify and quantify the convergence trend of public social expenditure at European Union level (27 countries), as well as between Western European (WE) and Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries between 1995 and 2022, structured on the three social sectors (health care, education and social protection), and three destinations (public consumption, compensation of employees and social benefits). At the same time, we investigate the manner and extent to which the effects of the Covid-19 crisis in 2020-2022 have affected this convergence trend. |
| Keywords: | social convergence, public social expenditure, health, education, social protection, public consumption, public wages, social benefits |
| JEL: | H51 H52 H53 I18 I28 I38 |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ror:seince:251230 |
| By: | Balouktsi Despoina (European Commission - JRC); Joossens Elisabeth (European Commission - JRC); Le Blanc Julia (European Commission - JRC); Pagano Andrea (European Commission - JRC); Zeugner Stefan |
| Abstract: | Housing demand varies considerably between Member States and regions, reflecting diverse demographic and market conditions. In one third of all NUTS 3 regions construction did not manage to keep up with expanding demographic trends. Metropolitan areas have experienced strong household growth, partly due to smaller average household sizes. In contrast, many rural regions face lower demand or even an oversupply of housing. Based on ECFIN-JRC mapadomo data and population projections, a bottom-up approach is applied to estimate housing needs and the housing construction gap at granular, NUTS 3 level. Findings indicate that housing supply should expand significantly to keep pace with projected household numbers. |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipt:iptwpa:jrc144703 |
| By: | Gasior, Katrin; Jara, H. Xavier; Makovec, Mattia |
| Abstract: | By means of counterfactual simulation methods, this paper quantifies the role of tax–benefit policies in mitigating the shock of the COVID-19 pandemic to household income in the European Union. The tax-benefit microsimulation model for the European Union EUROMOD is used to decompose changes in the income distribution into the effects of: (i) earnings losses due to COVID-19, (ii) automatic stabilizers, (iii) monetary compensation schemes introduced during the pandemic; and (iv) COVID-19-specific reforms to taxes and benefits implemented by European Union governments. The results show a great deal of heterogeneity between countries in terms of earnings losses and the effect of tax-benefit policies during the COVID-19 pandemic. In most countries, the largest contribution to cushioning the economic shock of the pandemic comes from monetary compensation schemes. Automatic stabilizers also play a role, mainly through the effects of social insurance contributions, taxes, and unemployment insurance benefits. Tax-benefit systems cushioned incomes to a large extent even among those most severely affected by the shock to earnings, with an important role for monetary compensation schemes, but also a larger stabilizing effect of unemployment insurance. Among automatic stabilizers, social assistance benefits played an important role in cushioning the income shock for the poorest quintiles among the most severely affected, but only in selected countries. |
| Keywords: | social protection; social safety nets and transfers; social welfare; Covid-19; poverty and fiscal; financial and economic crisis; EU; income distribution; coronavirus |
| JEL: | D31 E24 H24 I38 |
| Date: | 2024–09–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:124121 |
| By: | Walter Farkas (University of Zurich - Department Finance; Swiss Finance Institute; ETH Zürich); Fabian Sandmeier (University of Zurich - Department of Finance; Swiss Finance Institute) |
| Abstract: | We analyze solvency and liquidity implications of Credit Default Swaps (CDS) in banking networks. We emphasize that one can neither isolate them, nor just analyze them in parallel, but needs to consider their complex interplay. By calibrating our model to the largest banks in the Euro area, we are able to run a large-scale stress test and isolate the effect of different network configurations, as well as different overall coverages of CDS, on systemic risk. An increase in CDS notional always leads to an increase in liquidity risk. The impact on solvency risk is conditional on the topology of the network. We provide a robust network configuration for which an increase in CDS notional leads to a decrease in solvency risk. |
| Keywords: | Systemic Risk, Financial Networks, Credit Default Swaps, Solvency Stress Testing |
| JEL: | C63 D85 G01 G21 G28 |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chf:rpseri:rp25107 |
| By: | Joseph Nyangon; Brecht Seifi |
| Abstract: | The global carbon market is fragmented and characterized by limited pricing transparency and empirical evidence, creating challenges for investors and policymakers in identifying carbon management opportunities. The European Union is among several regions that have implemented emissions pricing through an Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). While the EU ETS has contributed to emissions reductions, it has also raised concerns related to international competitiveness and carbon leakage, particularly given the strong integration of EU industries into global value chains. To address these challenges, the European Commission proposed the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) in 2021. CBAM is designed to operate alongside the EU ETS by applying a carbon price to selected imported goods, thereby aligning carbon costs between domestic and foreign producers. It will gradually replace existing carbon leakage mitigation measures, including the allocation of free allowances under the EU ETS. The initial scope of CBAM covers electricity, cement, fertilizer, aluminium, iron, and steel. As climate policies intensify under the Paris Agreement, CBAM-like mechanisms are expected to play an increasingly important role in managing carbon-related trade risks and supporting the transition to net zero emissions. |
| Date: | 2026–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2601.05490 |
| By: | Batista Filipe (European Commission - JRC); Curtale Riccardo (European Commission - JRC); Ribeiro Barranco Ricardo; Marconi Mattia; Tucci Michele (European Commission - JRC) |
| Abstract: | This study investigates place-based determinants of housing prices across the EU, looking at factors such as housing supply constraints, demographic trends, short-term rentals (STRs), accessibility, household income, geographical advantages, and other factors at municipal scale resolution. Key findings indicate that higher prices correlate with supply and demand imbalances (high demand driven by socioeconomic dynamics an limited supply elasticity). STRs, particularly in urban areas, have association with elevated sales prices, but the data does not allow to establish causality. STRs constitute only 1.2% of EU dwellings and are unlikely to generate widespread impact on the housing sector. The analysis reveals a nearly 20% stock of housing in 2021 which are not used as primary residence (either complete vacant or used ocasionally or seasonally), exacerbating supply shortages especially in areas in high demand for housing. Policy recommendations emphasize addressing structural barriers to housing supply, improving data on vacant properties, and a high subsidiarity in the management of STR, to better balance benefits and risks. The study supports the EU’s housing affordability agenda. |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipt:iptwpa:jrc145033 |
| By: | Roloff, Malte; Papen, Marie-Christin; Lundborg, Martin |
| Abstract: | Die vorliegende Studie untersucht die treibenden Faktoren hinter der Implementierung von Künstlicher Intelligenz in den Europäischen Mitgliedsstaaten. Während nordeuropäische Länder und die Benelux-Staaten bei der KI-Nutzung führend sind, liegt Deutschland nur knapp über dem europäischen Durchschnitt. Vor dem Hintergrund eines gemeinsamen europäischen Wirtschaftsraums und einer europäischen Digitalagenda stellt sich die Frage, was sich zwischen den fortschrittlicheren KI-Ländern und Ländern wie Deutschland unterscheidet. Die Analyse basiert auf einem zweistufigen Ansatz, um strukturelle Unterschiede zwischen KI-Vorreiter- und KI-Mittelfeld-Ländern zu identifizieren und mögliche Ansätze für Deutschland abzuleiten: Quantitative Analyse: In der quantitativen Analyse werden zunächst statistisch signifikante Unterschiede zwischen ausgewählten KI-Vorreiter-Ländern (Dänemark, Belgien, Niederlande) und dem KI-Mittelfeld (Deutschland, Schweden, Österreich) identifiziert. Dazu werden 270 KI-Variablen und 133.689 sozioökonomische, infrastrukturelle und bildungsbezogene Merkmale aus Eurostat-Daten für die Jahre 2021, 2023 und 2024 analysiert. Die Analyse erfolgt mittels Hauptkomponentenanalyse und Partial-Least-Squares-Regression; Mit diesen statistischen Methoden wird nach Mustern in der KI-Nutzung und nach möglichen erklärenden Variablen gesucht. Im Unterschied zu manuell erstellten Indizes mit subjektiven Gewichtungen oder einer Analyse einzelner Variablen wird mit einer automatisch ermittelten Gewichtung gearbeitet. Unsere Methode eignet sich somit insbesondere um nach bisher unentdeckten Treibern für die KI-Nutzung zu suchen. Qualitative Einordnung: Im zweiten Schritt werden die quantitativen Ergebnisse um ein vertiefendes Desk Research zu den Strategien und Programmen der KI-Vorreiter-Länder ergänzt, mit dem Ziel mögliche Erklärungsansätze für die identifizierten Unterschiede zu finden. Der Fokus liegt dabei auf Bereiche, in denen die KI-Vorreiter signifikant bessere Werte aufweisen als das KI-Mittelfeld. Die quantitative Analyse identifiziert systematische Unterschiede in vier Hauptbereichen. Im Bereich Bildung und Weiterbildung weisen KI-Vorreiter deutlich höhere Teilnahmequoten an formalen und nicht-formalen Lernaktivitäten auf, insbesondere bei IKT-Schulungen über alle Altersgruppen hinweg. Im Bereich Arbeitsmarkt weisen die Vorreiter-Länder niedrigere durchschnittliche Wochenarbeitsstunden auf, gleichzeitig ist die Arbeitsproduktivität aber durchweg höher, was auf effizientere Arbeitsmarktstrukturen hindeuten könnte. Im Bereich digitale Infrastruktur verzeichnen die Spitzenreiter höhere Internet-Konnektivität in Unternehmen aller Größenklassen. Das Benchmarking zeigt, dass die KI-Vorreiter Dänemark, Belgien und die Niederlande ihre digitale Transformation durch kohärente nationale Strategien, praxisorientierte Weiterbildungsangebote und enge Kooperationen zwischen Staat, Wirtschaft und Bildungseinrichtungen vorantreiben. Besonders erfolgsversprechend sind Programme zur gezielten Förderung unterrepräsentierter Gruppen im IKT-Bereich, flexible Jobrotationsmodelle zur Weiterqualifizierung. Für Deutschland ergeben sich mehrere Ansatzpunkte. Die systematische Integration von Weiterbildung in die nationale Digitalstrategie könnte priorisiert werden, wobei leicht zugängliche, praxisorientierte Angebote durch öffentliche Förderung und Kooperationen ermöglicht werden müssten. Programme nach dänischem Vorbild zur Jobrotation können Weiterqualifizierung und Fachkräftegewinnung effektiv verbinden. Die pragmatische Anerkennung nicht-formaler Qualifikationen, wie in Belgien und den Niederlanden praktiziert, kann berufliche Mobilität erhöhen. Zudem sollten einheitliche, verbindliche Ausbaukonzepte für digitale Infrastruktur mit klaren Zuständigkeiten etabliert werden, um die Digitalisierung von Unternehmensprozessen zu beschleunigen und die Datenverfügbarkeit für KI-Anwendungen zu verbessern. Die Studie verdeutlicht, dass erfolgreiche KIImplementierung nicht isoliert erfolgen kann, sondern eingebettet sein muss in umfassende Strategien zur digitalen Kompetenzentwicklung, Arbeitsmarktintegration und Infrastrukturausbau. |
| Abstract: | The present study investigates the drivers of AI implementation in EU member states. While Northern European countries and the Benelux states lead the field in AI usage, Germany ranks just above the European average. Given the existence of a common European economic area and a European digital agenda, the question arises as to what distinguishes the more advanced AI countries from countries such as Germany. The analysis is based on a two-stage approach to identify structural differences between AI frontrunners and AI midfield countries and to derive possible approaches for Germany: Quantitative analysis: In the quantitative analysis, statistically significant differences between selected AI leader countries (Denmark, Belgium, Netherlands) and AI midfield countries (Germany, Sweden, Austria) will be identified. For this purpose, 270 AI variables and 133, 689 socioeconomic, infrastructural, and education-related variables from Eurostat data for the years 2021, 2023, and 2024 are analysed. The analysis is performed using principal component analysis and partial least squares regression. These statistical methods are used to search for patterns in AI usage and possible explanatory variables. In contrast to manually constructed indices based on subjectively weighted variables or analyses of individual variables, our method seeks to identify hidden patterns. It is therefore particularly well suitable for identifying previously undiscovered drivers of AI usage. Qualitative assessment: In the second step, the quantitative results are supplemented by in-depth desk research on the strategies and programs of the AI leader countries, with the aim of finding possible explanations for the identified differences. The focus is on areas in which the AI leaders perform significantly better than the AI midfield. The quantitative analysis identifies systematic differences in four main areas. In the area of education and training, AI pioneers have significantly higher participation rates in formal and non-formal learning activities, particularly in ICT training across all age groups. In the labour market, the leading countries have lower average weekly working hours, but at the same time, labour productivity is consistently higher, which could indicate more efficient labour market structures. In the area of digital infrastructure, the frontrunners have higher internet connectivity in companies of all sizes. Benchmarking shows that the AI pioneers Denmark, Belgium, and the Netherlands are driving their digital transformation through coherent national strategies, practice-oriented continuing education programs, and close cooperation between government, industry, and educational institutions. Particularly promising are programs for the targeted promotion of underrepresented groups in the ICT sector and flexible job rotation models for further training. There are several possible approaches for Germany. The systematic integration of continuing education into the national digital strategy could be prioritized, whereby easily accessible, practice-oriented offerings would have to be made possible through public funding and cooperation. Programs based on the Danish model of job rotation can effectively combine further training and the recruitment of skilled workers. The pragmatic recognition of non-formal qualifications, as practiced in Belgium and the Netherlands, can increase professional mobility. In addition, uniform, binding expansion concepts for digital infrastructure with clear responsibilities should be established in order to accelerate the digitization of business processes and improve data availability for AI applications. The study makes it clear that successful AI implementation cannot take place in isolation, but must be embedded in comprehensive strategies for digital skills development, labour market integration, and infrastructure expansion. |
| Keywords: | Künstliche Intelligenz, Einführung, Vergleich, EU-Staaten |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:wikdps:334488 |
| By: | Assaf Razin |
| Abstract: | This paper examines how Brexit reshaped the volume and composition of UK migration flows. To address the inherent endogeneity of migration responses to political change, the study employs a Difference-in-Differences design that benchmarks the United Kingdom against Germany, a stable EU member unaffected by Brexit-related institutional shocks. Treating the 2016 referendum and the 2021 end of free movement as sequential shocks, the results show that migration volume increased after both shocks, but through different channels: the referendum reduced emigration relative to Germany, while the post-2021 points-based system triggered a reallocation of inflows away from EU free-movement migrants toward non-EU migrants from the rest of the world, with a markedly stronger skill-selective profile. The paper analyzes how Brexit reshaped migration flows into and out of the United Kingdom by exploiting the 2016 referendum and the 2021 termination of free movement as sequential institutional shocks. Using a Difference-in-Differences design with Germany as a stable EU benchmark, the results show that Brexit acted as a structural regime shock, not a border-tightening event. Net migration into the UK rose after both shocks—first due to a sharp post-referendum decline in emigration relative to Germany, and later due to a substantial expansion of non-EU immigration under the new points-based system. Immigration patterns exhibit a clear regime shift, with EU inflows contracting sharply after 2016 and globally sourced, skill-selective inflows rising after 2021. In the later period, a modest but notable increase in UK-born emigration relative to Germany also emerges, reflecting frictions in post-Brexit mobility. Overall, Brexit reoriented—rather than reduced—UK migration flows, transforming both their scale and composition. |
| JEL: | F3 F65 P0 |
| Date: | 2026–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34665 |
| By: | Gerresheim, Nils; Krahé, Max; van 't Klooster, Jens |
| Abstract: | Der US-Dollar verliert an Reservewährungsdominanz. Bisher konnte der Euro davon kaum profitieren. Wir untersuchen, ob eine stärkere Internationalisierung des Euro wünschenswert wäre. Dazu analysieren wir die strukturellen Vor- und Nachteile einer Reservewährung und quantifizieren die Effekte einer hypothetischen Euro-Dominanz. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen leicht positive Nettoeffekte von 0, 2 bis 0, 8 Prozent des Eurozonen-BIP. Dahinter verbergen sich jedoch beträchtliche Bruttoeffekte einzelner Kanäle. Eine Eurodominanz vergleichbar mit der des US-Dollar heute erscheint somit nicht eindeutig vorteilhaft: Während niedrige Kapitalkosten erhebliche Vorteile bieten, würde eine potenzielle Währungsaufwertung signifikante Kosten und sektorale Umverteilungen implizieren. Eine beschränktere Internationalisierung des Euros wäre nur vorteilhaft, falls es möglich ist, eine übermäßige Aufwertung zu vermeiden. |
| Keywords: | Reservewährung, Wechselkurse, Euro, Geldpolitik |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dzimps:334898 |
| By: | Laurens, Noémie |
| Abstract: | Critical minerals (CMs) have become a strategic priority for the European Union (EU) amid the green and digital transitions. These resources - including lithium, cobalt, rare earths and nickel - are essential for clean energy technologies, defence systems and electronics. Yet, their processing and refining are highly concentrated in a few countries, leaving the EU especially vulnerable to supply disruptions and fuelling geopolitical tensions. Recent shocks, including the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine, have further exposed the fragility of supply chains. At the same time, extracting and trading CMs pose severe environmental and social challenges, from high carbon footprints to local community impacts. EU trade policy is therefore confronted with a trilemma: how to safeguard economic competitiveness, ensure environmental sustainability and enhance security of supply. This policy brief summarises research tracing how the European Commission's trade discourse on CMs has evolved to address the trilemma (Laurens, 2025). Initially, communications focused narrowly on free trade and market access for raw materials. Gradually, sustainability and security considerations entered the narrative. Most recently, the EU has embraced a hybrid framing, simultaneously highlighting economic, environmental and security objectives in its trade discourse on CMs. Although this hybrid discursive approach can help build broader support for CM policies and agreements by appealing to diverse stakeholders, it also demands careful policy design to minimise trade-offs and deliver on its promises. Without credible implementation and genuine integration of economic, environmental and security objectives, hybrid framing risks remaining largely rhetorical and failing to steer policy in practice. Key policy messages: The EU should adopt an integrated approach that effectively addresses economic, sustainability and security goals together while anticipating trade-offs to support more robust CM policies. This requires strong coordination across trade, industry, environment and security-related directorates-general to align CM strategies, avoid policy conflicts and maximise synergies. It may also require short-term economic sacrifices for long-term resilience. Early and meaningful engagement with research institutions, civil society, local communities and industry should move beyond formal consultation and enable genuine co-creation of solutions. Dialogue should begin before key decisions on CMs are finalised, incorporate stakeholder input transparently, and respond to concerns about sustainability and security of supply. CM policies and agreements should provide for binding obligations and concrete implementation plans to ensure environmental and labour protection, local value addition, skills development and technology transfer in resource-rich but economically vulnerable regions. Listening to partner governments and local communities as well as investing in the knowledge of local political, social and environmental contexts are essential for building trust and long-term partnerships. International cooperation on CMs should be strengthened through inclusive arrangements that involve both major consumers and producing countries. Clubs composed primarily of resource-poor but wealthy economies risk being perceived as exclusionary. |
| Keywords: | competitiveness, critical minerals, discourse analysis, European Commission, framing, geopolitics, green transition, security, sustainability, trade |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:idospb:334560 |
| By: | Kolev-Schaefer, Galina |
| Abstract: | Im Januar 2026 tritt Bulgarien als 21. EU-Mitgliedstaat dem Euroraum bei und führt somit den Euro als offizielle Währung ein. Davon wird der Außenhandel profitieren: Es wird noch einfacher, Preise zu vergleichen und Geschäfte mit Unternehmen aus dem Euroraum abzuwickeln. Ähnlich wie in Deutschland entfielen bereits 2024 mehr als 40 Prozent des bulgarischen Außenhandels auf die Euroraum-Länder. Und auch die Urlauber aus den anderen Euroländern können demnächst mit der eigenen Währung in Bulgarien bezahlen. Zudem bekommt Bulgarien Mitspracherecht bei der Europäische Zentralbank (EZB) und wird bei Zinsentscheidungen berücksichtigt. Herausfordernd bleiben die Inflationsentwicklung sowie die institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen und die politische Instabilität. |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iwkkur:334580 |
| By: | Federico Di Pace; Giacomo Mangiante; Riccardo Masolo (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore; Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore) |
| Abstract: | We employ Synthetic Control Method techniques to estimate the causal effect of Brexit on the consumer price index (CPI) in the United Kingdom. We construct a counterfactual CPI index from a weighted pool of comparable economies and find that the price level of the United Kingdom rose approximately 7 percentage points more than its synthetic counterpart, between 2016Q2 and 2024Q4. This accounts for over a quarter of total inflation during the period. We attribute about 2 percentage points of this increase to the depreciation of the British pound after the Referendum and the remaining 5 percentage points to the change in trading relationships that ensued the 2021 Trade and Cooperation Agreement. |
| Keywords: | Brexit, Exchange Rate, Trade Barriers and Consumer Prices. |
| JEL: | C32 E31 F13 G10 |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ctc:serie1:def147 |