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on European Economics |
| By: | Domenico Giannone; Michèle Lenza; Huw Pill; Lucrezia Reichlin |
| Abstract: | This paper analyses the impact on the macroeconomy of the ECB’s non-standard monetary policy implemented in the aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers in the Fall of 2008. We study in particular the effect of the expansion of the intermediation of transactions across central bank balance sheets as dysfunctional financial markets seize up, which we regard as a key channel of transmission for non-standard monetary policy measures. Our approach is similar to Lenza et al. 2009 but we introduce the important innovation of distinguishing between private intermediation of interbank transactions in the money market and central bank intermediation of bank-to-bank transactions across the Eurosystem balance sheet. We do this by exploiting data drawn from the aggregate Monetary and Financial Institutions (MFI) balance sheet which allows us to construct a new measure of the ‘policy shock’ represented by the ECB’s increasing role as a financial intermediary. We find that bank loans to households and, in particular, to non-financial corporations are higher than would have been the case without the ECB’s intervention. In turn, the ECB’s support has a significant impact on economic activity: two and a half years after the failure of Lehman Brothers, the level of industrial production is estimated to be 2% higher, and the unemployment rate 0.6 percentage points lower, than would have been the case in the absence of the ECB’s non-standard monetary policy measures. |
| Keywords: | non-standard monetary policy measures; interbank market |
| JEL: | E50 E58 |
| Date: | 2012–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/108100&r=eec |
| By: | Knieps, Günter; Zenhäusern, Patrick |
| Abstract: | The railroad package of 2001 focusing on access regulation is in the process of a reform. Particularly, the European Commission intends to remove the obstacles to fair competition that have been identified since 2001. In this context, the paper points out the relevance of the disaggregated regulatory approach. It is necessary to differentiate between infrastructure components which are monopolistic bottlenecks (e.g. railway tracks) and competitive components (e. g. service functions like ticketing). Competition on the markets for railway transport services requires non-discriminatory access to the railway infrastructures. As well the horizontal interoperability between national railway networks is a prerequisite that full competition on European markets for railway services can evolve. Train access charges should provide incentives for the different track companies to participate in collaborations offering international cross-border based track capacities, whereas a regulatory prescription of international track corridors conflicts with the competence to allocate the track capacities of the different track companies. Finally, the complex question of the interplay between discrimination and the deficit problem is addressed in order to present solutions to avoid crosssubsidization between track infrastructure and markets for transport services and to guarantee the efficient usage of public funds. -- |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:aluivr:141&r=eec |