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on European Economics |
| By: | Marten Palme (Stockholm University); Annika Sunden (Swedish National Social Insurance Board); Paul Soderlind (University of St. Gallen) |
| Abstract: | In 1998, Sweden passed a pension reform that introduced a second tier of mandatory individual accounts, the Premium Pension, in the public system. Of the total contribution rate of 18.5 percent, 2.5 percentage points go to the accounts. The first investment selections in the Premium Pension plan took place in the fall of 2000 when all Swedes born after 1938 were able to choose how to invest their contributions from a menu of about 650 mutual funds. Approximately 70 percent of participants made an "active choice" while the remaining participants' contributions were invested in a government-run default fund. This paper examines investment choice in the Swedish individual account scheme. First, do workers with high risk in their human capital diversify their overall portfolio by investing their pension funds in low-risk funds? Second, to what extent do participants exhibit "home bias" and invest their pension funds in Swedish assets? The results show a positive relationship between income and the level of risk in the portfolio. But, looking into the details, the relationship is actually somewhat U-shaped: low-income investors take on more risk than middle-income earners. It also seems as if women who qualify for the guarantee benefit (low-income earners) take on more risk than motivated by their situation. We also find that workers in the manufacturing sector - that is, the sector that is probably most correlated with the Swedish stock market - are less likely to invest in foreign assets and thus are exhibiting "home bias." |
| Keywords: | Sweden, pension system, portfolio |
| JEL: | H55 G11 D81 |
| Date: | 2005–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crr:crrwps:2005-06&r=eec |
| By: | R. Kent Weaver (The Brookings Institution) |
| Abstract: | Sweden's new multi-pillar pension system includes a system of mandatory fully-funded individual accounts. The Swedish system tries to keep administrative costs down through centralized management of the collection of contributions, switching among fund options, and record-keeping and communication with account holders. The Swedish system offers contributors more than 600 fund options. However, in the most recent rounds of fund choice, more than 90 percent of new labor market entrants have not made an active choice of funds, and thus have ended up in a government-sponsored default fund. The Swedish system of individual accounts offers a number of lessons for countries considering adoption of a mandatory individual account tier. First, centralized administration of record-keeping, communication and trading functions can help to keep administrative costs down. Second, the lead time needed to set up such a system is considerable. Third, if entry barriers for funds are low, a very large number of fund options are likely to be offered. Fourth, engaging new labor market entrants in fund choice is likely to be difficult, and these barriers are likely to be particularly high for some groups-notably those with limited incomes and low English language skills. Fifth, in the absence of entry barriers for funds, a significant percentage of those making an active fund choice may choose funds that are very specialized and risky. Finally, the likelihood of limited active fund choice means that special care must be devoted both to the design of a default fund and to communicating to potential participants what asset allocation and risk-return trade-offs the default fund is likely to make. |
| Keywords: | Sweden, pension system, mandatory |
| JEL: | H55 |
| Date: | 2005–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crr:crrwps:2005-05&r=eec |