|
on European Economics |
| By: | Javier J. Pérez (Centro de Estudios Andaluces) |
| Abstract: | In this paper I evaluate the usefulness of a set of fiscal indicators as early-warning-signal tools for annual General Government Net Lending developments for some EMU countries (Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Ireland, Austria, Finland) and an EMU aggregate. The indicators are mainly based on monthly and quarterly public accounts' figures. I illustrate how the dynamics of the indicators show a remarkable performance when anticipating general government accounts' movements, both in qualitative and in quantitative terms. |
| Keywords: | Leading indicators; Fiscal forecasting and monitoring; General Government Deficit; European Monetary Union |
| JEL: | C53 E6 H6 |
| Date: | 2005 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cea:doctra:e2005_14&r=eec |
| By: | Maria Belen Usero; Zulima Fernandez |
| Abstract: | This study examines the relationship between erosion of the first-mover’s market share and the differences in competitive behaviour of pioneer firms and followers. Particularly, we pay particular attention to market actions related to innovation, pricing and promotion, and to non-market actions related to judicial issues. The empirical study has been carried out with companies that are present in a dynamic context, such as the European mobile telephone industry. Our results show that when followers take more non-market actions than pioneers the negative effect on the firstentrant’s advantage is more significant. On the contrary, we have not found a significant impact of innovating and pricing actions. |
| Date: | 2005–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cte:wbrepe:wb054812&r=eec |
| By: | Jaap Bikker; Michiel van Leuvensteijn |
| Abstract: | The lack of available prices in the Dutch life insurance industry makes competition an elusive concept that defies direct observation. Therefore, this paper investigates competition by analysing several factors which may affect the competitive nature of a market and various indirect measurement approaches. After discussing various supply and demand factors whic h may constitute a so-called tight oligopoly, we establish the existence of scale economies and the importance of cost Xinefficiency, since severe competition would force firms to exploit available scale economies and to reduce X-inefficiencies. Both scale economies and X-inefficiencies turn out to be substantial, although more or less comparable to those found for insurers in other countries and to other financial institutions. Further, we apply the Boone indicator, a novel approach to measuring the effects of competition. This indicator points to limited competition in comparison to other sectors in the Netherlands. Further investigations of submarkets should reveal where policy measures in order to promote competition might be appropriate. |
| Keywords: | Life insurance; market structure; concentration; competition; scale economies; X-inefficiency; profit margins; Boone indicator; translog cost functions; stochastic cost frontier approach. |
| JEL: | D4 D61 G22 L1 |
| Date: | 2005–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dnb:dnbwpp:047&r=eec |
| By: | Kjell G. Nyborg (UCLA Anderson School of Management); Ulrich Bindseil (European Central Bank); Ilya A. Strebulaev (Stanford University, Graduate School of Business) |
| Abstract: | Repo auctions are used to inject central bank funds against collateral into the banking sector. The ECB uses standard discriminatory auctions and hundreds of banks participate. The amount auctioned over the monthly reserve maintenance period is in principle exactly what banks collectively need to fulfil reserve requirements. We study bidder-level data and find: (i) Bidder behavior is different from what is documented for treasury auctions. Private information and the winner’s curse seem to be relatively unimportant. (ii) Underpricing is positively related to the difference between the interbank rate and the auction minimum bid rate, with the latter appearing to be a binding constraint. (iii) Bidders are more aggressive when the imbalance of awards in the previous auction is larger. (iv) Large bidders do better than small bidders. Some of our findings suggests that bidders are concerned with the loser’s nightmare and have limited amounts of the cheapest eligible collateral. |
| Keywords: | Repo auctions, Multiunit auctions, Reserve requirements, Loser’s nightmare, Money markets, Central bank, Collateral, Open market operations |
| JEL: | G21 G12 D44 E43 E50 |
| Date: | 2005–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2005.92&r=eec |
| By: | Aurelijus Dabušinskas (Bank of Estonia) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the relationship between money and prices in Estonia in the period 1997Q1-2003Q3. The concept of a price (or real money) gap suggested by the P-star theory is applied to investigate whether information about the current money stock can be used to explain and/or predict GDP deflator inflation over the sample period. The results show that the money gap measure dominates the output gap as an explanatory variable for inflation in the short run. However, the money gap does not seem to be a proper indicator for predicting inflation over longer horizons, say, 12 months ahead. There are some signs that the output gap is becoming a better indicator of future inflation over time, but more data are needed to confirm this hypothesis. |
| Keywords: | P-star, inflation, money demand |
| JEL: | E31 E41 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eea:boewps:wp2005-07&r=eec |