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on Education |
| By: | Charles Clotfelter; Elizabeth Glennie; Helen Ladd; Jacob Vigdor |
| Abstract: | For a three-year time period beginning in 2001, North Carolina awarded an annual bonus of $1,800 to certified math, science and special education teachers working in high poverty or academically failing public secondary schools. Using longitudinal data on teachers, we estimate hazard models that identify the impact of this differential pay by comparing turnover patterns before and after the program’s implementation, across eligible and ineligible categories of teachers, and across eligible and barely-ineligible schools. Results suggest that this bonus payment was sufficient to reduce mean turnover rates of the targeted teachers by 12%. Experienced teachers exhibited the strongest response to the program. Finally, the effect of the program may have been at least partly undermined by the state’s failure to fully educate teachers regarding the eligibility criteria. Our estimates most likely underpredict the potential outcome of a program of permanent salary differentials operating under complete information. |
| JEL: | I2 J33 J45 |
| Date: | 2006–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12285&r=edu |
| By: | Mottis, Nicolas (ESSEC Business School) |
| Abstract: | One of the drivers of university reforms in Europe over the last decade has been the need for a better harmonization of degrees and pedagogical systems. Launched by governments with a clear political objective – improve the competitiveness of Europe on a world scale – the European harmonization process structured by European Education Ministers summits and formal declarations (Paris, Bologna, Prague, Berlin, Bergen) every other year has fostered many changes in most countries. In business education, sector regulation mechanisms- like accreditations and rankings – also gained momentum over the same period of time. When analyzed carefully in practice, it is obvious that these three movements – Bologna process, accreditation and ranking – leave management education institutions much room to maneuver. The thesis of this paper is that underlying factors, like the internationalization of students and faculty recruitments or the pressure on public spending, play an equally significant role to explain the structural evolution of academic institutions. <p> Accreditations, rankings and the Bologna process are each capturing only a fraction of these phenomena. Taken altogether they do contribute to an upgrade in the management of European higher education institutions. But due to the cross-country differences in the adaptation to these changes and the various academic traditions, a harmonized European academic landscape is not for tomorrow… |
| Keywords: | AACSB; Accreditation; Bologna Process; Business Education; EFMD; MBA; Ranking |
| JEL: | A20 I21 I23 M53 |
| Date: | 2006–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ebg:essewp:dr-06006&r=edu |
| By: | Deng Quheng (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences); Bjorn Gustafsson (University of Göteborg and IZA Bonn) |
| Abstract: | In China hukou (the household registration system) imposes barriers on permanent migration from rural to urban areas. Using large surveys for 2002, we find that permanent migrants number about 100 million persons and constitute approximately 20 percent of all urban residents. Receiving a long education, being a cadre or becoming an officer in the People’s Liberation Army are important career paths towards urbanisation and permanent migrants are much better-off then their counterparts left behind in rural China. The probability of becoming a permanent migrant is positively related to parental education, belonging to the ethnic majority and the parent’s membership in the Communist Party. At the destination, most permanent migrants are economically well-integrated. They have a higher probability to be working than their urban-born counterparts and those who receive a hukou before age 25 typically earn at least as much as their urban-born counterparts. The exceptions for this are those permanent migrants who receive a hukou after age 25 and people who received their hukou through informal routes. |
| Keywords: | China, hukou, rural-to-urban migration |
| JEL: | J61 O15 P36 |
| Date: | 2006–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2152&r=edu |
| By: | Julie Berry Cullen; Randall Reback |
| Abstract: | We explore the extent to which schools manipulate the composition of students in the test-taking pool in order to maximize ratings under Texas' accountability system in the 1990s. We first derive predictions from a static model of administrators' incentives given the structure of the ratings criteria, and then test these predictions by comparing differential changes in exemption rates across student subgroups within campuses and across campuses and regimes. Our analyses uncover evidence of a moderate degree of strategic behavior, so that there is some tension between designing systems that account for heterogeneity in student populations and that are manipulation-free. |
| JEL: | D82 H39 I28 |
| Date: | 2006–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12286&r=edu |