nep-edu New Economics Papers
on Education
Issue of 2005‒03‒20
ten papers chosen by
Joao Carlos Correia Leitao
Universidade da Beira Interior

  1. The Role of Education vis-à-vis Job Experience in Explaining the Transitions to Employment in the Spanish Youth Labour Market By Cristina Ferná
  2. Economic Inequality in Spain: The European Union Household Panel Dataset By Santiago Budría; Javier Díaz-Giménez
  3. Cross-skill Redistribution and the Tradeoff between Unemployment Benefits and Employment Protection By Tito Boeri; J. Ignacio Conde-Ruiz; Vincenzo Galasso
  4. Interfirm Mobility, Wages, and the Returns to Seniority and Experience in the U.S. By Buchinsky, Moshe; Fougère, Denis; Kramarz, Francis; Tchernis, Rusty
  5. Wage Inequality in Post-Reform Mexico By Airola, Jim; Juhn, Chinhui
  6. Names, Expectations and the Black-White Test Score Gap By David N. Figlio
  7. Ownership Change, Productivity, and Human Capital: New Evidence from Matched Employer-Employee Data in Swedish Manufacturing By Donald S. Siegel; Kenneth L. Simons; Tomas Lindstrom
  8. Returns to Schooling in China Under Planning and Reform By Belton M. Fleisher; Xiaojun Wang
  9. Which Workers Gain from Computer Use? By Sabrina Wulff Pabilonia; Cindy Zoghi
  10. Parental Transfers, Student Achievement, and the Labor Supply of College Students By Kalenkoski, Charlene Marie; Sabrina Wulff Pabilonia

  1. By: Cristina Ferná
  2. By: Santiago Budría; Javier Díaz-Giménez
    Abstract: This article uses data from the 1998 European Union Household Panel to study economic inequality in Spain. It reports data on the Spanish distributions of income, labor income, and capital income, and on related features of inequality, such as age, employment status, educational attainment, and marital status. It also reports data on the income mobility of Spanish households. We find that income, earnings, and, very especially, capital income are very unequally distributed in Spain.
  3. By: Tito Boeri; J. Ignacio Conde-Ruiz; Vincenzo Galasso
    Abstract: We document the presence of a trade-o. between unemployment benefits (UB) and employment protection legislation (EPL) in the provision of insurance against labor market risk. Di.erent countries’ locations along this trade-o. represent stable, hard to modify, politico-economic equilibria. We develop a model in which voters are required to cast a ballot over the strictness of EPL, the generosity of UBs and the amount of redistribution involved by the financing of unemployment Insurance. Agents are heterogeneous along two dimensions: employment status — insiders and outsiders — and skills — low and high. Unlike previous work on EPL, we model employment protection as an institution redistributing among insiders, notably in favour of the low-skill workers. A key implication of the model is that configurations with strict EPL and low UB should emerge in presence of compressed wage structures. Micro data on wage premia on educational attainments and on the strictness of EPL are in line with our results. We also find empirical support to the substantive assumptions of the model on the e.ects of EPL.
  4. By: Buchinsky, Moshe (UCLA,CREST-INSEE and NBER); Fougère, Denis (CNRS, CREST-INSEE, CEPR and IZA Bonn); Kramarz, Francis (CREST-INSEE, CEPR and IZA Bonn); Tchernis, Rusty (Indiana University)
    Abstract: Much of the research in labor economics during the 1980s and the early 1990s was devoted to the analysis of changes in the wage structure across many of the world’s economies. Only recently, has research turned to the analysis of mobility in its various guises. From the life cycle perspective, decreased wage mobility and increased job instability, makes the phenomenon of increasing wage inequality more severe than it appears to be at first sight. In general, workers’ wages may change through two channels: (a) return to their firm-specific human capital (seniority); or (b) inter-firm wage mobility. Our theoretical model gives rise to three equations: (1) a participation equation; (2) a wage equation; and (3) an interfirm mobility equation. In this model the wage equation is estimated simultaneously with the two decision equations. We use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to estimate the model for three education groups. Our main finding is that returns to seniority are quite high for all education groups. On the other hand, the returns to experience appear to be similar to those previously found in the literature.
    Keywords: wage mobility, interfirm mobility, returns to seniority, panel data, Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods
    JEL: C11 C15 J31 J63
    Date: 2005–03
  5. By: Airola, Jim (Naval Postgraduate School); Juhn, Chinhui (University of Houston and IZA Bonn)
    Abstract: Using the Mexican Household Income and Expenditure Survey (ENIGH) covering 1984-2000 we analyze wages and employment in Mexico after trade liberalization and domestic reforms. We find that wage inequality and returns to post-secondary schooling increased rapidly during 1984-1994 but stabilized since that period. The end of inequality growth was due to a severe macroeconomic crisis which adversely impacted the better educated, an increase in education levels at the end of the 1990s, and a slowdown in skill demand in the latter half of the 1990s. Between-industry shifts, consistent with trade-based explanations, account for a part of the increase in skill demand during 1984-1994, but these types of movements actually reduced the demand for skill in the latter part of the 1990s. The equalizing impact of trade was offset by within-industry demand shifts which continued to favor more educated workers. The Mexican experience in the 1990s suggests that market-oriented reforms have a sharp initial impact on inequality which dissipates over time. However, the opening of the economy to trade, foreign capital, and global markets also leads to a more long-run increase in the demand for skill.
    Keywords: wage inequality, reforms, skill demand
    JEL: J31
    Date: 2005–03
  6. By: David N. Figlio
    Abstract: This paper investigates the question of whether teachers treat children differentially on the basis of factors other than observed ability, and whether this differential treatment in turn translates into differences in student outcomes. I suggest that teachers may use a child's name as a signal of unobserved parental contributions to that child's education, and expect less from children with names that "sound" like they were given by uneducated parents. These names, empirically, are given most frequently by Blacks, but they are also given by White and Hispanic parents as well. I utilize a detailed dataset from a large Florida school district to directly test the hypothesis that teachers and school administrators expect less on average of children with names associated with low socio-economic status, and these diminished expectations in turn lead to reduced student cognitive performance. Comparing pairs of siblings, I find that teachers tend to treat children differently depending on their names, and that these same patterns apparently translate into large differences in test scores.
    JEL: I2
    Date: 2005–03
  7. By: Donald S. Siegel (Department of Economics, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY 12180-3590, USA); Kenneth L. Simons (Department of Economics, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY 12180-3590, USA); Tomas Lindstrom (National Institute of Economic Research, Box 3116, SE-103 62 Stockholm, Sweden)
    Abstract: Empirical studies of the impact of changes in ownership of manufacturing plants on productivity (e.g., Lichtenberg and Siegel (1987, 1990a, 1990b), McGuckin and Nguyen (1995, 2001), and Maksimovic and Phillips (2001)) have provided limited evidence on how such transactions affect investment in human capital and have been based strictly on U.S. and U.K. data. We attempt to fill these gaps, based on an analysis of matched employer-employee data from over 19,000 Swedish manufacturing plants for the years 1985-1998. The sample covers virtually the entire population of manufacturing plants with 20 or more employees and a probability-based sample of smaller plants. We assess whether there are differential effects on productivity and human capital for different types of ownership changes, such as partial and full acquisitions and divestitures, and related and unrelated acquisitions. Our results suggest that ownership change results in an increase in relative productivity. We also find that plants involved in these transactions experience increases in average employee age, experience, and the percentage of employees with a college education. Ownership change also leads to an increase in wages and a reduction in the percentage of female workers. All of these patterns emerge most strongly for full acquisitions and divestitures and unrelated acquisitions.
    JEL: G34 D24 C81
    Date: 2005–03
  8. By: Belton M. Fleisher; Xiaojun Wang
    Abstract: We estimate returns to schooling using a retrospective work history survey covering more than 4,000 workers over the period 1950 to 1994, with particular emphasis to the returns to schooling for workers who attended institutes of higher education and who graduated from college. We find evidence that schooling returns declined throughout the period leading up to the Cultural Revolution (CR), with returns for workers who did not attend college becoming negligible. Returns to those with some college education remained positive, but low compared to other countries. Consistent with other studies, we find that returns to schooling did not recover from their CR low until the 1990s. Increases in the return to schooling during the transition following the CR were not associated directly with workers changing jobs or with taking “new-economy” jobs but appear to have occurred for most workers across all ownership categories. Workers most likely to leave jobs in the traditional ownership sector for jobs in the private or jointventure categories were those who entered the labor force prior to 1967. We do not find evidence supporting other studies’ finding that schooling returns for college graduates increased more than for workers with lower levels of schooling attainment.
    Keywords: returns to schooling, skills, China
    JEL: J31 J24 O15
    Date: 2004–06–01
  9. By: Sabrina Wulff Pabilonia (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics); Cindy Zoghi (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics)
    Abstract: Workers who use computers earn more than those who do not. Is this a productivity effect or merely selection? Using the Canadian Workplace and Employee Survey, we control for selection and find a wage premium of 3.8% for the average worker upon adopting a computer. This premium, however, obscures important differences in returns to computer adoption across education and occupation groups. We find that long-run returns to computer use are over 5% for most workers. Differences between short-run and long-run returns may suggest that workers share training costs through sacrificed wages.
    Keywords: Computers, training, technological change
    JEL: J31 O30
    Date: 2004–06
  10. By: Kalenkoski, Charlene Marie (Ohio University); Sabrina Wulff Pabilonia (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics)
    Abstract: College students may participate in market work to finance their college educations. Using data from the NLSY97, three hypotheses are tested. First, smaller parental transfers lead to more hours worked while in school. Second, an increase in the net price of schooling leads to an increase in hours worked. Finally, an increase in hours worked leads to a decrease in a student's GPA. The results indicate that the number of hours a student works per week is unaffected by the schooling-related financial variables and that the number of hours worked per week does not affect a student's GPA.
    Keywords: schooling, educational finance, grades, college students
    JEL: J22 D1
    Date: 2004–07

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