New Economics Papers
on Dynamic General Equilibrium
Issue of 2007‒01‒06
five papers chosen by



  1. Nominal Wage Rigidities in a New Keynesian Model with Frictional Unemployment By Vincent Bodart; Gregory De Walque; Olivier Pierrard; Henri R. Sneessens; Raf Wouters
  2. Calvo Wages in a Search Unemployment Model By Vincent Bodart; Olivier Pierrard; Henri R. Sneessens
  3. Do I Have What It Takes? Equilibrium Search with Type Uncertainty and Non-Participation By Armin Falk; David Huffman; Uwe Sunde
  4. Can Good Events Lead to Bad Outcomes? Endogenous Banking Crises and Fiscal Policy Responses By Celine Rochon; Andrew Feltenstein
  5. Self-Confidence and Search By Armin Falk; David Huffman; Uwe Sunde

  1. By: Vincent Bodart (Université catholique de Louvain); Gregory De Walque (National Bank of Belgium); Olivier Pierrard (Central Bank of Luxembourg and Université catholique de Louvain); Henri R. Sneessens (Université catholique de Louvain, Université catholique de Lille and IZA Bonn); Raf Wouters (National Bank of Belgium)
    Abstract: In this paper, we propose a search and matching model with nominal stickiness à la Calvo in the wage bargaining. We analyze the properties of the model, first, in the context of a typical real business cycle model driven by stochastic productivity shocks and second, in a fully specified monetary DSGE model with various real and nominal rigidities and multiple shocks. The model generates realistic statistics for the important labor market variables.
    Keywords: DSGE, search and matching, nominal wage rigidity, monetary policy
    JEL: E31 E32 E52 J64
    Date: 2006–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2528&r=dge
  2. By: Vincent Bodart (Université catholique de Louvain); Olivier Pierrard (Central Bank of Luxembourg and Université catholique de Louvain); Henri R. Sneessens (Université catholique de Louvain, Université catholique de Lille and IZA Bonn)
    Abstract: RBC models with search unemployment and wage renegotiation generate too much wage volatility and too stable unemployment rate. Shimer (2004) shows that it is possible to reproduce a volatility of unemployment similar to that observed in actual economies by imposing full real wage rigidity. We use a similar model but with Calvo wage contracts and we obtain a microfounded equation of real wage rigidities. The models with full wage flexibility or full wage rigidity are obtained as particular cases. We show that a contract length of about six quarters fits best the observed cyclical properties of wages and unemployment.
    Keywords: search unemployment, Calvo wage, cyclical properties
    JEL: E24 E32 J30 J41
    Date: 2006–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2521&r=dge
  3. By: Armin Falk (IZA, University of Bonn and CEPR); David Huffman (IZA); Uwe Sunde (IZA, University of Bonn and CEPR)
    Abstract: This paper presents a model of the labor market in which unemployed workers are uncertain about their relative ability to find a job. Unsuccessful search induces individuals to revise their beliefs downwards. Once self-confidence is sufficiently low, workers become discouraged and give up on search. This non-stationarity gives rise to structural flows from unemployment to non-participation in equilibrium. In contrast, existing models typically maintain stationarity and appeal to exogenous stochastic shocks to generate transitions from unemployment to non-participation. Our model is based on relaxing a single assumption in a standard matching framework - workers are uncertain about their job finding probability - and yet the model generates a variety of important implications. Our alternative assumption is supported by experimental evidence. The first implication of the model is a declining hazard from unemployment to employment, arising due to erosion of self-confidence in search. Second, because search outcomes are only a noisy signal about ability, some individuals can become overly discouraged and stop search too early due to wrong beliefs. Finally, workers with greater unemployment duration are less confident, and thus have a worse threat point in wage bargaining. Consequentially, they earn lower starting wages even if they are identical in terms of objective productivity. We discuss how the model provides a new, unifying explanation for a variety of important facts from field evidence.
    Keywords: learning, discouraged workers, subjective job finding probabilities
    JEL: E24 J60 J64
    Date: 2006–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2531&r=dge
  4. By: Celine Rochon; Andrew Feltenstein
    Abstract: In this paper, we study the impact of labor market restructuring and foreign direct investment on the banking sector, using a dynamic general equilibrium model with a financial sector. Numerical simulations are performed using stylized Chinese data, and banks failures are generated through increases in the growth rate of the labor force, a revaluation of the exchange rate or an increase in debt issue to finance the government deficit, as compared to a benchmark scenario in which banks remain solvent. Thus bank failures can result from what might seem to be either beneficial economic trends, or correct monetary and fiscal policies. We introduce fiscal policies that modify relative factor prices by lowering the capital tax rate and increasing the tax rate on labor. Such policies can prevent banking failures by raising the return to capital. It is shown that such fiscal policies are, in the short run, welfare reducing.
    Keywords: Banking failures , fiscal policies , Banking , China , Fiscal policy , Tax rates , Labor markets , Foreign investment , Economic models ,
    Date: 2006–11–29
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:06/263&r=dge
  5. By: Armin Falk (IZA Bonn, University of Bonn and CEPR); David Huffman (IZA Bonn); Uwe Sunde (IZA Bonn, University of Bonn and CEPR)
    Abstract: Standard search theory assumes that individuals know, with certainty, how they compare to competing searchers in terms of ability. In contrast, we hypothesize that searchers are uncertain about relative ability, with important implications for search behavior. We test our hypotheses in a laboratory experiment. The first main finding is that people are substantially uncertain about whether they are a type with a high or low probability of success, determined by being above or below the median in terms of ability. Self-confidence, defined as an individual’s self-assessed probability of being a high type, is too high (above zero) for many low types, and too low (below 1) for many high types. Second, people update beliefs based on search outcomes. Self-confidence increases or decreases in the right direction, but is less sensitive to new information than predicted by Bayes’ rule. Third, updating affects future search decisions: people are less likely to search as confidence about being a high type falls. Fourth, some search too little, and others search too much, due to wrong beliefs. Fifth, at the end of the experiment a substantial fraction turn down the chance to learn their exact rank. These are overwhelmingly those with low ability, suggesting an aversion to learning that one is one of the worst performers. Given that people are uncertain even in the simple setting of our experiment, our evidence strongly suggests that uncertainty about ability is relevant in more complex, real-world search settings, including search for a job or search for a mate. Focusing on the case of job search, we discuss how our findings can provide a new explanation for various important stylized facts from field evidence.
    Keywords: search, self-confidence, discouraged workers, unemployment, gender
    JEL: J64 D01 D83
    Date: 2006–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2525&r=dge

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