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on Development |
| By: | Luca, Spinesi |
| Abstract: | In this paper I consider two symmetric countries/regions which trade in final goods. In each country is active the manufacturing sector and both vertical and horizontal innovation conduced by individuals with heterogenous ability. I show that a more globalized world, as represented by lower iceberg-type transportation cost, spurs human capital accumulation, and widens skill premium within each country. However, it may be the case that globalization reduces the per-capita output growth rate of each region, but has positive effect on output level. Moreover, when a region has larger domestic market it also has higher human capital accumulation, higher skill premium, and higher per-capita mass of product lines, i.e. the country with larger domestic market invents a larger mass of varieties. This implies that skilled labor force residing in larger domestic market benefits of higher consumption flows. I show that even if a country has larger domestic market full agglomeration of either activity does not happen : both the regions remain active in both manufacturing and R&D. I show that the same result hold in the case of localized spillovers and specialized knowledge between regions. |
| Keywords: | R&D and Growth,;Globalization; Migration |
| Date: | 2005–05–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ctl:louvec:2005028&r=dev |
| By: | Chris Papageorgiou; Shankha Chakraborty; Fidel Perez-Sebastian |
| Abstract: | This paper examines two related questions: what effects do infectious diseases exert on growth and development, and are they quantitatively important? We present evidence on the effect of health and infectious diseases on economic development using Hansen’s (2000) endogenous threshold methodology. Taking into account various proxies for infectious diseases as potential threshold variables we show that countries are clustered in regimes that obey different growth paths and thus provide direct evidence of threshold effects. Motivated by this evidence we propose an epidemiological overlapping generations model where the transmission and incidence of an infectious disease depend upon economic incentives and rational behavior. The economic cost of the disease comes from its effect on mortality (infected individuals can die prematurely) and morbidity (lower productivity and/or lower flow of utility from a given consumption bundle). Our main theoretical finding is that if infectious diseases are particularly virulent or debilitating, growth- or development-traps are possible. Numerical results from a calibrated version of the model show that threshold effects of diseases are quantitatively important and in particular, significant health interventions are required to propel disease-afflicted countries to a high-growth trajectory. |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lsu:lsuwpp:2005-12&r=dev |
| By: | Lindsay M. Tedds |
| Abstract: | We investigate firm tax noncompliance using a survey of firms from around the world. Overall, we find that small firms are less and large firms are more compliant. Foreign owned firms, exporters and firms that have audited finance statements are also more compliant, as found by others, but, quite surprisingly, government ownership is insignificant. Not surprisingly, organized crime, high taxes, and government corruption all result in lower compliance. Finally, we find that firms around the world engage in tax noncompliance but, holding all else constant, compliance in highest in OECD countries and the lowest in Latin American, African & Middle Eastern countries. |
| Keywords: | Underground Economy, Tax Noncompliance, Firm Characteristics, Interval Regression |
| JEL: | C24 D21 O17 |
| Date: | 2005–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mcm:deptwp:2005-01&r=dev |
| By: | Mariapia MENDOLA |
| Abstract: | In this paper we study the interrelationship between determinants of migration, conceived as a family strategy, and the potential impact of having a migrant household member on people left behind . Labour migration is often related to poverty but given its lump y-investment nature, poverty may constitute a motivation to migra te as well as a constraint to do it. We use cross-sectional house hold data from two rural regions of Bangladesh to test whether mi gration is a form of income diversification strategy that signifi cantly influences the risk-taking behaviour of source farm househ olds in agricultural activities. We account for heterogeneity of migration constraints differentiating between domestic (temporary and permanent) and international moving destinations. We find th at richer and large-holder households are more likely to particip ate in costly high-return migration (i.e. international migration ) and employ modern technologies, thereby achieving higher produc tivity. Poorer households, on the other hand, are not able to ove rcome entry costs of moving abroad and fall back on migration wit h low entry costs, and low returns (i.e. domestic migration); the latter does not help them to achieve production enhancements and may act as a poverty-trap locking households into persistent pov erty. |
| Keywords: | Internal and International Migration, Farm Household Behaviour, Agricultural Production Choices. |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mil:wpdepa:2005-15&r=dev |
| By: | Nejat Anbarci (Department of Economics, Florida International University); Jonathan Hill (Department of Economics, Florida International University); Hasan Kirmanoglu (Department of Economics, Bilkin University) |
| Abstract: | Growth volatility is a major factor that retards growth. Recent studies that link democracy and volatility can not account for a link between democracy and investment volatility. Here, instead, we focus on a specific channel that links individualistism and low volatility. Unlike an individualistic society, in a collectivistic society agents choose to invest together or choose not to invest together. We construct a two-equation system of investment and income growth volatility. We find individualism significantly directly and indirectly influences volatility negatively. We also find that, unlike individualism, democracy’s influence on investment depends on the measure of democracy and econometric specification used. |
| Keywords: | Growth volatility, investment volatility, democracy, individualism/collectivism |
| JEL: | E32 O10 P16 |
| Date: | 2005–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fiu:wpaper:0508&r=dev |