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on Economic Design |
| By: | Vladimir Danilov |
| Abstract: | A longer and more correct title is `a short and direct path to the theory of stable contract systems in a bipartite market'. There is no new meaningful results in the article. It is dedicated to the presentation of a short method for obtaining the main body of stability theory: existence, polarization, and latticing. The brevity and uniformity are achieved through the use of the desirability operator (Section 1) and, most importantly, the successful notion of an ample system of contracts (Section 3). The use of the latter radically simplifies the problem of the existence of fixed points. The general bipartite problem (with many agents using Plott choice functions) is reduced easily by the aggregation to the case of two agents (see [2, 5]). Therefore, further, we restrict ourselves to the case of two agents (the Worker and the Firm) and a large set E of contracts between them. |
| Date: | 2025–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2511.16104 |
| By: | Silvio Sorbera |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we analyze a model of competing sealed-bid first-price and second-price auctions where bidders have unit demand and can bid on multiple auctions simultaneously. We show that there is no symmetric pure equilibrium with strategies that are increasing in the lowest type, unlike in standard auction games. However, for a two-player game a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium exists, and bidders place bids on all available auctions with probability one. This holds true for any mixed equilibrium and for any number of bidders. We then solve the case of two auctions and two bidders. Analyzing the case of binary type space, we are able to identify mixed strategy equilibria and analyze the consequences of discrete bid spaces. |
| Keywords: | Simultaneous bidding, concurrent auctions, sealed-bid auctions, first-price auction, second-price auction |
| JEL: | C72 D44 |
| Date: | 2025–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2025_713 |
| By: | Alejandro Neme; R. Pablo Arribillaga; Jordi Massó |
| Abstract: | We introduce the concept of group obvious strategy-proofness, an extension of Li (2017)'s notion of obvious strategy-proofness, by requiring that truth-telling re- mains an obviously dominant strategy for any group of agents in the extensive game form implementing the social choice function. We show that this stronger condition is no more restrictive: the set of all group obviously strategy-proof social choice functions coincides with the set of all obviously strategy-proof social choice functions. Building on this equivalence result and on existing results on obvious strategy-proofness via extensive game forms with perfect information, we derive additional equivalences concerning the implementability of social choice functions: in this class of games, strategy-proofness, group strategy-proofness, obvious strategy-proofness, and group obvious strategy-proofness are all equivalent. |
| Keywords: | (group) strategy-proofness, obvious strategy-proofness |
| JEL: | D71 |
| Date: | 2025–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:1533 |
| By: | Abheek Ghosh; Tzeh Yuan Neoh; Nicholas Teh; Giannis Tyrovolas |
| Abstract: | We study a model of subscription-based platforms where users pay a fixed fee for unlimited access to content, and creators receive a share of the revenue. Existing approaches to detecting fraud predominantly rely on machine learning methods, engaging in an ongoing arms race with bad actors. We explore revenue division mechanisms that inherently disincentivize manipulation. We formalize three types of manipulation-resistance axioms and examine which existing rules satisfy these. We show that a mechanism widely used by streaming platforms, not only fails to prevent fraud, but also makes detecting manipulation computationally intractable. We also introduce a novel rule, ScaledUserProp, that satisfies all three manipulation-resistance axioms. Finally, experiments with both real-world and synthetic streaming data support ScaledUserProp as a fairer alternative compared to existing rules. |
| Date: | 2025–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2511.04465 |
| By: | Chengqi Zang; Gabriel P. Andrade; O\u{g}uzhan Ersoy |
| Abstract: | We study decentralized markets for goods whose utility perishes in time, with compute as a primary motivation. Recent advances in reproducible and verifiable execution allow jobs to pause, verify, and resume across heterogeneous hardware, which allow us to treat compute as time indexed capacity rather than bespoke bundles. We design an automated market maker (AMM) that posts an hourly price as a concave function of load--the ratio of current demand to a "floor supply" (providers willing to work at a preset floor). This mechanism decouples price discovery from allocation and yields transparent, low latency trading. We establish existence and uniqueness of equilibrium quotes and give conditions under which the equilibrium is admissible (i.e. active supply weakly exceeds demand). To align incentives, we pair a premium sharing pool (base cost plus a pro rata share of contemporaneous surplus) with a Cheapest Feasible Matching (CFM) rule; under mild assumptions, providers optimally stake early and fully while truthfully report costs. Despite being simple and computationally efficient, we show that CFM attains bounded worst case regret relative to an optimal benchmark. |
| Date: | 2025–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2511.16357 |
| By: | Humphreys, David; O'Donovan, David |
| Abstract: | The consignment of European bloodstock assets involves commercial breeders consigning bloodstock assets for public auction through one of a small number of auction houses that dominate the market. Vendors typically consign such assets to the auction house and individual auctions they believe give the best chance of maximising the attainable price. The market is characterised by a perception that there is a premium pricing effect in consigning to certain auction houses and select sales. This paper seeks to determine if evidence exists to uphold that perception. Specifically, the paper examines the pricing dynamics and variables that exist in the UK and Ireland market for thoroughbred yearlings and tests the hypothesis that a pricing premium can be achieved by specific consignment strategies. The paper uses a unique modelling approach to capture the above dynamics. The paper seeks to identify the variables that influence auction prices achieved and control for these in determining the price effect of consigning through certain auction houses. The influence of sires has typically been viewed as the dominant effect on realised auction prices achieved in the market for thoroughbred yearlings. The market is characterised by a perception of a generally linear relationship between sire price and realised auction prices for thoroughbred yearlings. However, this paper seeks to more effectively model for the impact of dam on auction price outcomes. By using a unique modelling approach to measure the quality of dam, the paper seeks to more accurately capture the influential effect of maternal lineage on realised auction prices. Having isolated the dam effect, the findings of the paper will allow a more accurate assessment of the correlation between yearling auction price and auction consignment strategy and allow breeders a greater ability to select sales that maximise investment return. |
| Keywords: | Agribusiness, Livestock Production/Industries, Demand and Price Analysis, Livestock Production/Industries |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aes025:356759 |