nep-des New Economics Papers
on Economic Design
Issue of 2024‒02‒19
four papers chosen by
Guillaume Haeringer, Baruch College and


  1. A Note on an Alternative Approach to Experimental Design of Lottery Prospects By Balcombe, Kelvin; Fraser, Iain
  2. Market Design for the Environment By Estelle Cantillon; Aurelie Slechten
  3. Market design for the procurement of reactive power: the current state in Germany By Anna Pechan; Marius Buchmann
  4. Gender wage and longevity gaps and the design of retirement systems By Francesca Barigozzi; Helmuth Cremer; Jean-Marie Lozachmeur

  1. By: Balcombe, Kelvin; Fraser, Iain
    Abstract: e introduce an alternative approach to lottery prospects experimental design aimed at collecting experimental data for parametric estimation of the cumulative form of Prospect Theory (PT). Our approach incorporates two fundamental principles: ensuring that all tasks provide valuable information and avoiding redundancy among tasks. These principles mean that we avoid the construction of lottery prospects that duplicate information within the set of tasks generated. The methodological approach that we have designed ensures that each lottery pair is non-redundant in an informational sense. This means that the set of lottery tasks generated can help to improve the effectiveness of data collection when estimation of preference parameters is the main research objective. In this note, we describe our approach to experimental design in detail.
    Keywords: Experimental Design; Lotteries; Risk and Uncertainty; Prospect Theory.
    JEL: C52 C90 D81
    Date: 2024–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:119743&r=des
  2. By: Estelle Cantillon; Aurelie Slechten
    Abstract: The main argument in favor of markets in environmental contexts is the same as in other contexts: their ability to promote efficient allocations and production. But environmental problems bring their own challenges: their underlying bio-physical processes - and the technologies to monitor them - constrain what is feasible or even desirable. This chapter illustrates the main design dimensions in environmental markets, the trade-offs involved and their impact on performance, through the lens of a regulated market for pollution rights (the EU emissions trading scheme) and a voluntary market for the provision of environmental services (the global market for carbon credits). While both markets eventually contribute to climate change mitigation, their organisation as a “pollution market”, for the former, and as a “provision market”, for second, means that different design considerations take precedence. Both markets also face challenges: volatile prices in the EU emissions scheme and low trust for voluntary carbon markets. We discuss how alternative design options could address those.Keywords: Natural
    Keywords: Natural capital, ecosystem services, tradable quotas, property rights, pollution, carbon markets, voluntary markets, externalities, asset design
    Date: 2024–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/368381&r=des
  3. By: Anna Pechan; Marius Buchmann
    Abstract: The market-based procurement of system services for network operators is gaining momentum in the current debate about the future market design in the energy sector. Since current sources of reactive power are primarily fossil-fuel power plants which will not be available in a carbon neutral energy system, reactive power will be sources from distributed assets in the electricity networks. The German regulator has proposed new rules for reactive power procurement, which are based on three pillars: The technical connection agreements, fully integrated network components owned by the network operators and market-based procurement. While this approach is primarily aiming at the reactive power demand on the transmission grid level, assets from the medium voltage grid can participate in this process as well. We evaluate this approach from an economic perspective and conclude that while such a three-pillar system can secure an effective provision of reactive power, the efficiency heavily depends on the regulatory system and that it provides the correct incentives for the network operator.
    Keywords: resilience, reactive power, electricity, network, market design
    JEL: D47 L51 L94
    Date: 2023–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bei:00bewp:0046&r=des
  4. By: Francesca Barigozzi (UNIBO - Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna = University of Bologna); Helmuth Cremer (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Jean-Marie Lozachmeur (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: We study the design of pension benets for male and female workers. Women live longer than men but have a lower wage. Individuals can be single or live in couples who pool their incomes. Social welfare is utilitarian but an increasing concave transformation of individuals lifetime utilities introduces the concern for redistribution between individuals with di¤erent life-spans. We derive the optimal direction of redistribution and show how it is a¤ected by a gender neutrality rule. With singles only, a simple utilitarian solution implies re- distribution from males to females. When the transformation is su¢ ciently concave redistribution may or may not be reversed. With couples only, the ranking of gender retirement ages is always reversed when the transformation is su¢ ciently concave. Under gender neutrality pension schemes must be self-selecting. With singles only this implies distortions of retirement decision and restricts redistribution across genders. With couples, a rst best that implies a lower retirement age for females can be implemented by a gender-neutral system. Otherwise, gender neutrality implies equal retirement ages and restricts the possibility to compensate the shorter-lived individuals. Calibrated simulations show that when singles and couples coexist, gender neutrality substantially limits redistribution in favor of single women and fully prevents redistribution in favor of male spouses.
    Keywords: Gender wage gap, Gender gap in longevity, Retirement systems
    Date: 2023–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03629490&r=des

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