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on Economic Design |
| By: | Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch; Roland Strausz |
| Abstract: | We cast mechanism design with evidence in the framework of Myerson (1982), whereby his generalized revelation principle directly applies and yields standard notions of incentive compatible direct mechanisms. Their specific nature depends on whether the agent's (verifiable) presentation of evidence is contractually controllable, however. For deterministic implementation, we show that, in general, such control has value, and we offer two independent conditions under which this value vanishes, one on evidence (WET) and another on preferences (TIWO). Allowing for fully stochastic mechanisms, we also show how randomization generally has value and clarify to what extent this value vanishes under the common assumption of evidentiary normality (NOR). While, in general, the value of control extends to stochastic implementation, neither control nor randomization have any value if NOR holds together with WET or TIWO. |
| Keywords: | Mechanism Design, Revelation Principle, Evidence, Verifiable Information, Value of Control, Value of Randomization |
| JEL: | D82 |
| Date: | 2023–12–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdp:dpaper:0030&r=des |
| By: | Alvin E. Roth |
| Abstract: | Because no marketplace operates in isolation from the larger world, marketplace designs may need to adapt to changes in the larger environments. I discuss such changes in connection with the labor markets for new doctors, new Ph.D. economists, and for kidney exchange transplants. But while practical market design presents a host of challenges, it also offers many rewards. Among the rewards to market designers themselves is the opportunity to become intimately familiar with markets that shape the lives and careers of their participants. |
| JEL: | D47 |
| Date: | 2023–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:31947&r=des |
| By: | Rhode Ghislaine Nguewo Ngassam (MRM - Montpellier Research in Management - UPVD - Université de Perpignan Via Domitia - UM - Université de Montpellier); Linnea Ung (UM - Université de Montpellier); Roxana Ologeanu-Taddei (TBS - Toulouse Business School); Jorick Lartigau (Pikcio SAS); Pascal Demoly (IDESP - Institut Desbrest de santé publique - INSERM - Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale - UM - Université de Montpellier); Isabelle Bourdon (MRM - Montpellier Research in Management - UPVD - Université de Perpignan Via Domitia - UM - Université de Montpellier); Nicolas Molinari (IDESP - Institut Desbrest de santé publique - INSERM - Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale - UM - Université de Montpellier); Anca Mirela Chiriac (IDESP - Institut Desbrest de santé publique - INSERM - Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale - UM - Université de Montpellier) |
| Abstract: | Adoption and user perceptions are dominant on personal health records literature and have led to a better understanding of what individuals' behaviors and perceptions are about the adoption of personal health records. However, these insights are descriptive and are not actionable to allow creating personal health records that will overcome the adoption problems identified by users. This study uses action design research to provide actionable knowledge regarding user perceptions and adoption and their application in the case of the digital allergy card. To achieve this, we conducted interviews with patients and physicians as part of the evaluation of the digital allergy card mock-up and the first prototype. As results, we provided some research proposals regarding the benefits of, levers for, and barriers to adoption of the digital allergy card that can be tested for several other personal health records. |
| Keywords: | Action Design Research, Adoption, Business Process Model, Digital Allergy Card, Drug Allergy Infrmation, Mock-Ups, Personal Health Records |
| Date: | 2022–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03654736&r=des |
| By: | Spencer-Cotton, Alaya; Navarro, Matt; Hamre, Nicole |
| Abstract: | ● Effective design and planning of marine protected areas requires an understanding of the socioeconomic uses and values that exist for the proposed marine area. Inevitably, different stakeholders will have different preferences for the spatial design of the no-take sanctuary zones within a marine park. One key stakeholder group that is often missing from marine park planning is the broader community, or public. This group might currently visit and use the proposed marine park area, they might plan to visit in the future, and may also derive benefit from other non-use outcomes such as from marine ecosystem services. ● In 2023, Western Australia started consultation for the establishment of two new marine parks. The extension and rezoning of an existing marine park adjacent to metropolitan Perth, the Marmion Marine Park, and one new marine park on the south coast of the state, named here as the Proposed South Coast Marine Park. ● This working paper presents results from surveys of the Western Australian public that included two stated preference experiments, a single binary choice question and a multiple discrete choice experiment. ● Results demonstrate a strong public desire for world-class conservation outcomes for both the Marmion and the Proposed South Coast Marine Parks, with 75% of the general public supporting the creation of no-take sanctuary zones across at least 31% of both marine park areas. We estimate that Western Australian households are willing to pay more to achieve larger areas of no-take sanctuary zones - A$112 per household per year for 45% at Marmion Marine Park and A$123 per household per year for 45% at the Proposed South Coast Marine Park, for an aggregate value of A$84.3 million and A$92.3 million respectively. We also find that public valuation increases by between 19% and 57% when sanctuary zones include extensive shore protection enabling greater connection with the community. |
| Keywords: | Environmental Economics and Policy |
| Date: | 2023–12–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:uwauwp:339006&r=des |
| By: | Deniz Kattwinkel; Axel Niemeyer; Justus Preusser; Alexander Winter |
| Abstract: | A principal must decide between two options. Which one she prefers depends on the private information of two agents. One agent always prefers the first option; the other always prefers the second. Transfers are infeasible. One application of this setting is the efficient division of a fixed budget between two competing departments. We first characterize all implementable mechanisms under arbitrary correlation. Second, we study when there exists a mechanism that yields the principal a higher payoff than she could receive by choosing the ex-ante optimal decision without consulting the agents. In the budget example, such a profitable mechanism exists if and only if the information of one department is also relevant for the expected returns of the other department. We generalize this insight to derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a profitable mechanism in the n-agent allocation problem with independent types. |
| Keywords: | Mechanism design without transfers, correlation, zero-sum games |
| JEL: | D82 |
| Date: | 2023–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2023_485&r=des |