nep-des New Economics Papers
on Economic Design
Issue of 2024‒01‒01
three papers chosen by
Guillaume Haeringer, Baruch College and

  1. The Optimal Design Of Elimination Tournaments With A Superstar By Daria Tabashnikova; Marina Sandomirskaia
  2. Circular Business Models: Product Design and Consumer Participation By Bühler, Stefan; Chen, Rachel; Halbheer, Daniel
  3. Organizing data analytics By Alonso, Ricardo; Câmara, Odilon
  1. By: Daria Tabashnikova (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Marina Sandomirskaia (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
    Abstract: We study single- and double-elimination tournaments with heterogeneous players of two types: regular players and a superstar. Players choose efforts in each match with linear costs, winning with a probability calculated with the Tullock success function. We consider several designer maximization problems: total efforts, probability of winning the strongest player, and a weighted composed function. We show that a double-elimination tournament is less profitable in most cases, except when the tournament organizer is concerned about the probability that the superstar wins the tournament.
    Keywords: single-elimination tournament, double-elimination tournament, tournament design, heterogeneous players, superstar
    JEL: C72 D47 Z20
    Date: 2023
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hig:wpaper:263/ec/2023&r=des
  2. By: Bühler, Stefan; Chen, Rachel; Halbheer, Daniel
    JEL: L12 L21 M3
    Date: 2023
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc23:277576&r=des
  3. By: Alonso, Ricardo; Câmara, Odilon
    Abstract: We develop a theory of credible skepticism in organizations to explain the main tradeoffs in organizing data generation, analysis, and reporting. In our designer-agent-principal game, the designer selects the information privately observed by the agent who can misreport it at a cost, whereas the principal can audit the report. We study three organizational levers: tampering prevention, tampering detection, and the allocation of the experimental-design task. We show that motivating informative experimentation while discouraging misreporting are often conflicting organizational goals. To incentivize experimentation, the principal foregoes a flawless tampering detection/prevention system and separates the tasks of experimental design and analysis.
    Keywords: strategic experimentation; Bayesian persuasion; tampering; organizational design; information technology; audit
    JEL: D80 D83 M10
    Date: 2023–07–18
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:120780&r=des
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