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on Economic Design |
| By: | Honorine Harlé (CGS i3 - Centre de Gestion Scientifique i3 - Mines Paris - PSL (École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris) - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - I3 - Institut interdisciplinaire de l’innovation - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Pascal Le Masson (CGS i3 - Centre de Gestion Scientifique i3 - Mines Paris - PSL (École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris) - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - I3 - Institut interdisciplinaire de l’innovation - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Benoit Weil (CGS i3 - Centre de Gestion Scientifique i3 - Mines Paris - PSL (École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris) - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - I3 - Institut interdisciplinaire de l’innovation - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Tony Bourlier (SNCF - SNCF); Yann Veslin (SNCF) |
| Abstract: | Suggestion boxes have been used in factories to improve processes through a continuous improvement approach. From this perspective, the ideas with direct and quick implementation and visible results are favoured. This paper investigates the nature of design activities hidden behind the ideas suggested. The authors sort 132 ideas from a suggestion box of a French train maintenance center and highlight differences in the processing of the ideas through the suggestion box. The paper shows that a part of the ideas should have been rejected, as they present a gap in the design to be directly implemented. However, they are kept and collectively re-worked to be well adapted to the factory. This enriches literature on creativity and crowd sourcing for and by manufacturing. In particular, it gives a design perspective to innovation and continuous improvement in factory by revealing different design types in the box to fit the production system. |
| Keywords: | factory, design, suggestion box |
| Date: | 2023–05–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03807883&r=des |
| By: | Shixin Wang |
| Abstract: | We study a robust selling problem where a seller attempts to sell one item to a buyer but is uncertain about the buyer's valuation distribution. Existing literature indicates that robust mechanism design provides a stronger theoretical guarantee than robust deterministic pricing. Meanwhile, the superior performance of robust mechanism design comes at the expense of implementation complexity given that the seller offers a menu with an infinite number of options, each coupled with a lottery and a payment for the buyer's selection. In view of this, the primary focus of our research is to find simple selling mechanisms that can effectively hedge against market ambiguity. We show that a selling mechanism with a small menu size (or limited randomization across a finite number of prices) is already capable of deriving significant benefits achieved by the optimal robust mechanism with infinite options. In particular, we develop a general framework to study the robust selling mechanism problem where the seller only offers a finite number of options in the menu. Then we propose a tractable reformulation that addresses a variety of ambiguity sets of the buyer's valuation distribution. Our formulation further enables us to characterize the optimal selling mechanisms and the corresponding competitive ratio for different menu sizes and various ambiguity sets, including support, mean, and quantile information. In light of the closed-form competitive ratios associated with different menu sizes, we provide managerial implications that incorporating a modest menu size already yields a competitive ratio comparable to the optimal robust mechanism with infinite options, which establishes a favorable trade-off between theoretical performance and implementation simplicity. Remarkably, a menu size of merely two can significantly enhance the competitive ratio, compared to the deterministic pricing scheme. |
| Date: | 2023–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2310.17392&r=des |
| By: | Andersson, Tommy (Department of Economics, Lund University); Dur, Umut (Department of Economics, North Carolina State University); Ertemel, Sinan (Department of Economics, Istanbul Technical University); Kesten, Onur (School of Economics, University of Sydney) |
| Abstract: | Motivated by school admissions in Turkey and Sweden, we investigate a sequential two-stage admission system with public and private schools. A sequential notion of truthfulness, called straightforwardness, is introduced. Contrary to one-stage systems, sequentiality leads to a trade-off between the existence of a straightforward equilibrium and non-wastefulness. We identify the unique set of rules for two-stage systems that guarantees the existence of a straightforward equilibrium and reduces waste. Existing admission systems are analyzed within our general framework. |
| Keywords: | market design; sequential school choice; private schools; public schools; straight- forward SPNE; non-wastefulness |
| JEL: | C71 C78 D47 D71 D78 D82 |
| Date: | 2023–10–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2023_012&r=des |
| By: | Artur Swistak; Nate Vernon |
| Abstract: | Lower capacity countries often struggle to administer the Value Added Tax (VAT) in the extractive industries, partly due to the large VAT refunds needs of this capital and export-intensive sector. Assuming that the first-best policy (apply the standard VAT to the extractive industry) is not possible in the medium-term, what should countries do? This paper systemically analyzes second-best VAT policy designs considering the impact of the VAT on three key stakeholders: the investor, domestic suppliers, and the tax administration. The analysis concludes that the generally preferred policy is to provide a VAT exemption for imports and either fully tax or exempt domestic supplies, although country characteristics (and, specifically the relative weighting of stakeholders) matter. Moreover, governments should make efforts to shorten refund delays and transition to a standard VAT over the longer-term. |
| Keywords: | value added tax; tax policy; extractive industries; fiscal regime design; mining; hydrocarbons |
| Date: | 2023–10–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2023/221&r=des |