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on Economic Design |
| By: | Ayg?n, Orhan; Turhan, Bertan |
| Abstract: | Since 1950, India has instituted an intricate affirmative action program through a meticulously designed reservation system. This system incorporates vertical and horizontal reservations to address historically marginalized groups' socioeconomic imbalances. Vertical reservations designate specific quotas of available positions in publicly funded educational institutions and government employment for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward Classes, and Economically Weaker Sections.Concurrently, horizontal reservations are employed within each vertical category to allocate positions for additional subgroups, such as women and individuals with disabilities. In educational admissions, the legal framework recommended that unfilled positions reserved for the OBC category revert to unreserved status. Moreover, we document that individuals from vertically reserved categories have more complicated preferences over institution-vertical category position pairs, even though authorities only elicit their preferences over institutions. To address these challenges, the present paper proposes a novel class of choice rules, termed the Generalized Lexicographic (GL) choice rules. This class is comprehensive, subsuming the most salient priority structures discussed in the extant matching literature.Utilizing the GL choice rules and the deferred acceptance mechanism, we present a robust framework that generates equitable and effective solutions for resource allocation problems in the Indian context. |
| Date: | 2023–10–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:isu:genstf:202310041552400000&r=des |
| By: | Benmir, Ghassane; Jaccard, Ivan; Vermandel, Gauthier |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the design of Ramsey optimal monetary policy in a Health New Keynesian (HeNK) model with Susceptible, Infected and Recovered (SIR) agents. The nonlinear model is estimated with maximum likelihood techniques on Euro Area data. Our objective is to deconstruct the mechanism by which contagion risk affects the conduct of monetary policy. If monetary policy is the only game in town, we find that the optimal policy features significant deviations from price stability to mitigate the effect of the pandemic. The best outcome is obtained when the optimal Ramsey policy is combined with a lockdown strategy of medium intensity. In this case, monetary policy can concentrate on its price stabilization objective. JEL Classification: E52, E32 |
| Keywords: | Covid-19, HeNK, macroeconomic trade-offs, nonlinear inference, Tin-bergen principle |
| Date: | 2023–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20232847&r=des |
| By: | Elacqua, Gregory; Jacas, Isabel; Krussig, Thomas; Méndez, Carolina; Neilson, Christopher |
| Abstract: | We study the welfare produced by a coordinated school assignment system that is based exclusively on minimizing distance to schools, comparing the matches it produces to a system that includes household preferences using a deferred acceptance algorithm. We leverage administrative data and a mechanism change implemented in the city of Manta, Ecuador in 2021 to estimate household preferences and show that considering applicant preferences produces large welfare gains. Our counterfactual exercises show that differences across alternative assignment mechanisms are small. Survey data on household beliefs and satisfaction support these conclusions. The evidence indicates that coordinated school choice and assignment systems can have large welfare effects in developing country contexts. |
| Keywords: | Mechanism design;centralized student assignment;school choice;Ecuador |
| JEL: | I20 I21 I22 |
| Date: | 2022–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:idb:brikps:12625&r=des |