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on Economic Design |
| By: | Dück, Alexander; Verona, Fabio |
| Abstract: | Optimal monetary policy studies typically rely on a single structural model and identification of model-specific rules that minimize the unconditional volatilities of inflation and real activity. In our proposed approach, we take a large set of structural models and look for the model-robust rules that minimize the volatilities at those frequencies that policymakers are most interested in stabilizing. Compared to the status quo approach, our results suggest that policymakers should be more restrained in their inflation responses when their aim is to stabilize inflation and output growth at specific frequencies. Additional caution is called for due to model uncertainty. |
| Keywords: | monetary policy rules, policy evaluation, model comparison, model uncertainty, frequency domain, design limits, DSGE models |
| JEL: | C49 E32 E37 E52 E58 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:bofrdp:122023&r=des |
| By: | Takahara, Tsuyoshi; Kanda, Yutaka |
| Abstract: | This study analyzes the effect of the content of report cards on the optimal incentivized payment for physicians. Our analysis assumes that report card disclosure builds a reputation regarding physicians' ability among patients who do not have the expertise to know better. Furthermore, we assume that the insurer designs a payment scheme that designates high-ability physicians to provide advanced treatment and low-ability physicians to provide a conventional treatment. We compare the benchmark (no disclosure) with two disclosure policies: detailed, where patients can recognize what service was provided and the outcome of the advanced treatment for all physicians, and limited, where patients can distinguish only physicians who provided the advanced treatment successfully. Our analysis shows that detailed disclosure requires a higher expected payment than the benchmark, and the insurer can save it by limiting the informativeness of the report. Intuitively, detailed disclosure conveys physician type more precisely, and the insurer must pay an additional wage for the conventional treatment provided by low-ability physicians. Our result implies that incentivization by non-monetary method (report card) and monetary method (pay-for-performance) may work in both complement and substitute. |
| Keywords: | Principal-agent model, Reputation concern, Asymmetric information |
| JEL: | D23 D86 I18 |
| Date: | 2023–09–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:118529&r=des |
| By: | Daniel Kirste; Niclas Kannengie{\ss}er; Ricky Lamberty; Ali Sunyaev |
| Abstract: | The proper design of automated market makers (AMMs) is crucial to enable the continuous trading of assets represented as digital tokens on markets of cryptoeconomic systems. Improperly designed AMMs can make such markets suffer from the thin market problem (TMP), which can cause cryptoeconomic systems to fail their purposes. We developed an AMM taxonomy that showcases AMM design characteristics. Based on the AMM taxonomy, we devised AMM archetypes implementing principal solution approaches for the TMP. The main purpose of this article is to support practitioners and researchers in tackling the TMP through proper AMM designs. |
| Date: | 2023–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2309.12818&r=des |