nep-des New Economics Papers
on Economic Design
Issue of 2019‒02‒11
two papers chosen by
Guillaume Haeringer, Baruch College and Alex Teytelboym, University of Oxford
  1. New electoral systems and old referendums By Gabrielle Demange
  2. Individually Rational Rules for the Division Problem when the Number of Units to be Allotted is Endogenous By Bergantiños, Gustavo; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro
  1. By: Gabrielle Demange (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris)
    Abstract: I discuss the future of electoral systems' design. Two routes are worth investigating. First, new voting procedures can be designed and implemented due to new computing and communication facilities. I illustrate with two positive recent experiments in France and Switzerland. Second, the well-known old referendum needs to be investigated more thoroughly, especially because it is being increasingly popular in a variety of situations. I discuss some issues and directions for its improvement.
    Keywords: Approval voting,New Apportionment Procedure,bi-apportionment,referendum
    Date: 2018–08–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01852206&r=all
  2. By: Bergantiños, Gustavo; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro
    Abstract: We study individually rational rules to be used to allot, among a group of agents, a perfectly divisible good that is freely available only in whole units. A rule is individually rational if, at each preference profile, each agent finds that her allotment is at least as good as any whole unit of the good. We study and characterize two individually rational and efficient rules, whenever agents' preferences are symmetric single-peaked on the set of possible allotments. The two rules are in addition envy-free, but they differ on wether envy-freeness is considered on losses or on awards. Our main result states that (i) the constrained equal losses rule is the unique individually rational and efficient rule that satisfies justified envy-freeness on losses and (ii) the constrained equal awards rule is the unique individually rational and efficient rule that satisfies envy-freeness on awards.
    Keywords: Division problem; Single-peaked preferences; Individual rationality; Efficiency; Strategy-proofness; Envy-freeness
    JEL: C78
    Date: 2019–01–25
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:91721&r=all
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