nep-dem New Economics Papers
on Demographic Economics
Issue of 2022‒10‒24
five papers chosen by
Héctor Pifarré i Arolas
University of Wisconsin

  1. Labor Market Institutions and Fertility By Nezih Guner; Ezgi Kaya; Virginia Sánchez-Marcos
  2. Fertility and the Education of African Parents and Children By Tom Vogl
  3. Does Paternity Leave Promote Gender Equality within Households? By Libertad González; Hosny Zoabi
  4. Does gender equality bargaining reduce child penalty? Evidence from France By Pierre-Jean Messe; Jeremy Tanguy
  5. Forecasting of cohort fertility by educational level in countries with limited data availability: the case of Brazil By Batyra, Ewa; Leone, Tiziana; Myrskylä, Mikko

  1. By: Nezih Guner; Ezgi Kaya; Virginia Sánchez-Marcos
    Abstract: The total fertility rate is as low as 1.3 in some high-income countries, and factors behind such low levels are not well understood. We show that uncertainty created by dual labor markets, the coexistence of temporary and open-ended contracts, and the inflexibility of work schedules are crucial to understanding low fertility. We focus on college-educated women and document that temporary contracts are associated with a lower probability of first birth using rich administrative data from the Spanish Social Security records. With Time Use data, we also show that women with children are less likely to work in jobs with split-shift schedules, with a long break in the middle of the day. Split-shift schedules present a concrete example of inflexible work arrangements and fixed time cost of work. We then build a life-cycle model in which married women decide whether to work or not, how many children to have, and when to have them. Reforms that eliminate duality or split-shift schedules increase the completed fertility of college-educated from 1.54 to around 1.7. These reforms also increase women's labor force participation and eliminate the employment gap between mothers and non- mothers. Reforming these labor market institutions and providing childcare subsidies increase fertility to 1.86.
    Keywords: fertility, Labor market institutions, temporary contracts, split-shift schedules, childcare subsidies
    JEL: E24 J13 J21 J22
    Date: 2021–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:1297&r=
  2. By: Tom Vogl
    Abstract: Sub-Saharan Africa exhibits higher fertility and lower education than other world regions. Economic and demographic theory posit that these phenomena are linked, with slow fertility decline connected to slow education growth among both adults and children. Using microdata from 33 African countries, this paper documents the co-evolution of adult education, fertility, and child education in female birth cohorts surrounding the onset of the region's fertility transition. Fertility change displays a robust negative relationship with the educational outcomes of adult women but a more nuanced relationship with the educational outcomes of children. As fertility declines, children's grade attainment rises, but their school enrollment does not. The divergence is partly explained by a split in how women's education relates to fertility and child education. Rising women's education predicts declining fertility and rising children's grade attainment, but it is less systematically linked to enrollment change.
    JEL: I25 J13 O15
    Date: 2022–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:30474&r=
  3. By: Libertad González; Hosny Zoabi
    Abstract: We consider a non-cooperative model of the household, in which the husband and wife decide on parental leave and the allocation of time between child rearing and the labor market. They can choose the non-cooperative outside option or cooperate by reaching an agreement of specialization in which the wife specializes in raising kids (home production) while the husband works and transfers consumption to his wife. The model identifies three distinct groups of couples: Egalitarian couples (with a sufficiently low gender wage gap), Intermediate-gap couples (with an intermediate gender wage gap) and high-gap couples (with a sufficiently high gender wage gap). Our model predicts that while egalitarian couples never specialize and always share home production, those with intermediate and high gaps do have such an agreement. An expansion in paternity leave reduces the net benefits from the agreement and moves the intermediate-gap couples to their outside option where women work more and men do more home production. As a result, the cost of raising children increases and fertility declines. Assuming a loss of utility from children in the case of divorce, lower fertility increases the probability of divorce. Using Spanish data and RDD analysis, we confirm our model’s predictions. Specifically, while we don’t find systematic effects of paternity leave expansion on egalitarian and high-gap couples, we find that, among intermediate-gap couples, the two-week paternity leave introduced in 2007 led to a 5 percentage-point lower fraction of couples having another child, a 2 percentage-point increase in the proportion of couples getting divorced, and an increase in fathers’ housework and childcare time of more than an hour per day each.
    Keywords: gender equality, specialization, fertility, divorce, time allocation
    JEL: D13 J12 J13 J16
    Date: 2021–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:1302&r=
  4. By: Pierre-Jean Messe (LEMNA - Laboratoire d'économie et de management de Nantes Atlantique - Nantes Univ - IAE Nantes - Nantes Université - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises - Nantes - Nantes Université - pôle Sociétés - Nantes Univ - Nantes Université - IUML - FR 3473 Institut universitaire Mer et Littoral - UM - Le Mans Université - UA - Université d'Angers - UBS - Université de Bretagne Sud - IFREMER - Institut Français de Recherche pour l'Exploitation de la Mer - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Nantes Université - pôle Sciences et technologie - Nantes Univ - Nantes Université - Nantes Univ - ECN - Nantes Université - École Centrale de Nantes - Nantes Univ - Nantes Université, GAINS - Groupe d'Analyse des Itinéraires et des Niveaux Salariaux - UM - Le Mans Université, TEPP - Travail, Emploi et Politiques Publiques - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Jeremy Tanguy (IREGE - Institut de Recherche en Gestion et en Economie - USMB [Université de Savoie] [Université de Chambéry] - Université Savoie Mont Blanc)
    Abstract: This paper investigates the effects of firm-level gender equality bargaining on the motherhood penalty using French administrative data. To tackle the endogeneity issue, we exploit the 2010 reform that introduced financial penalties for firms with 50 employees or more not complying with their obligation of negotiating on gender equality. This change led to a strong acceleration of gender equality bargaining after 2010 but only for firms with 50 employees or more. As a consequence, women who had their first child in concerned firms after 2010 are more likely to be employed in firms covered by a text related to gender equality. Controlling for firms' size effect and time trends as well as a set of other individuals' and firms' characteristics, we identify the causal effect of gender equality bargaining on earnings impact of motherhood. Our estimates show that forcing firms to promote measures related to gender equality has reinforced the motherhood penalty. While the causal effect of this reform is close to zero just after the first child birth, it turns out to be significantly negative 5 years after. Our results suggest that some measures mentioned in GE texts, especially those favouring work-life balance, may act as an indirect discrimination towards mothers.
    Keywords: gender inequalities,motherhood penalty,collective bargaining
    Date: 2022–09–19
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03780958&r=
  5. By: Batyra, Ewa; Leone, Tiziana; Myrskylä, Mikko
    Abstract: The Brazilian period total fertility rate (PTFR) dropped to 1.8 in 2010 (1.5 among those with high education). Due to shifts in fertility timing, the PTFR may provide a misleading picture of fertility levels. The consequences of these changes for the cohort total fertility rate (CTFR)—a measure free from tempo distortions—and for educational differences in completed fertility remain unknown. Due to data limitations, CTFR forecasts in low- and middle-income countries are rare. We use Brazilian censuses to reconstruct fertility rates indirectly and forecast the CTFR for all women and by educational level. Four forecasting methods indicate that the CTFR is unlikely to fall to the level of the PTFR. Educational differences in the CTFR are likely to be stark, at 0.7–0.9, larger than in many high-income countries with comparable CTFRs. We show how the CTFR can be forecasted in settings with limited data and call for more research on educational differences in completed fertility in low- and middle-income countries.
    Keywords: cohort fertility; forecasting; Brazil; education; census data; IPUMS; UK’s Economic and Social Research Council Doctoral Studentship (ES/ J500070/1).; Mikko Myrskylä was supported by an ERC grant 336475 (COSTPOST) and by the Strategic Research Council (SRC); FLUX consortium: decision numbers 345130 and 345131; 1729185
    JEL: N0
    Date: 2022–09–15
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:116627&r=

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