nep-dem New Economics Papers
on Demographic Economics
Issue of 2021‒06‒14
seven papers chosen by
Héctor Pifarré i Arolas
Universitat Pompeu Fabra

  1. Simulating Family Life Courses: An Application for Italy, Great Britain, and Scandinavia By Maria Winkler-Dworak; Eva Beaujouan; Paola Di Giulio; Martin Spielauer
  2. DEMOGRAPHIC SHOCKS AND WOMEN'S LABOR MARKET PARTICIPATION: EVIDENCE FROM THE 1918 INFLUENZA PANDEMIC IN INDIA By Fenske, James; Gupta, Bishnupriya; Yuan, Song
  3. Forecasting of cohort fertility by educational level in countries with limited data availability: the case of Brazil By Ewa Batyra; Tiziana Leone; Mikko Myrskylä
  4. Where is the middle class? Evidence from 60 million English death and probate records, 1892–1992 By Cummins, Neil
  5. One-Child Policy and Marriage Market in China By Jun Han; Zhong Zhao
  6. The trade effects of skilled versus unskilled migration By Peter H. Egger, Maximilian v. Ehrlich, Douglas R. Nelson
  7. Immigrant Inventors and Diversity in the Age of Mass Migration By Campo, Francesco; Mendola, Mariapia; Morrison, Andrea; Ottaviano, Gianmarco

  1. By: Maria Winkler-Dworak; Eva Beaujouan; Paola Di Giulio; Martin Spielauer
    Abstract: Family patterns in Western countries have substantially changed across the 1940 to 1990 birth cohorts. Adults born more recently enter more often unmarried cohabitations and marry later, if at all. They have children later and fewer of them; births take place in a non-marital union more often and, due to the declining stability of couple relationships, in more than one partnership. These changes have led to an increasing diversity in family life courses. In this paper, we present a microsimulation model of family life trajectories, which models the changing family patterns taking into account the complex interrelationships between childbearing and partnership processes. The microsimulation model is parameterized to retrospective data for women born since 1940 in Italy, Great Britain and two Nordic countries (Norway and Sweden), representing three significantly different cultural and institutional contexts of partnering and childbearing in Europe. Validation of the simulated family life courses against their real-world equivalents shows that the simulations not only closely replicate observed childbearing and partnership processes, but also give good predictions when compared to more recent fertility indicators. We conclude that the presented microsimulation model is suitable for exploring changing family dynamics and outline potential research questions and further applications.
    Keywords: Family life course, fertility, partnerships, microsimulation, Italy, Great Britain, Norway, Sweden
    Date: 2019–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vid:wpaper:1908&r=
  2. By: Fenske, James; Gupta, Bishnupriya; Yuan, Song
    Abstract: How did the 1918 influenza pandemic affect female labor force participation in India over the short run and the medium run? We use an event-study approach at the district level and four waves of decadal census data in order to answer this question. We find that districts most adversely affected by influenza mortality saw a temporary increase in female labor force participation in 1921, an increase that was concentrated in the service sector. By 1931, this increase had been reversed. We find suggestive evidence that distress labor supply by widows and rising wages help account for these results.
    Keywords: Cultural norms; Demographic shocks; Female Labour Force Participation
    JEL: J11 J21
    Date: 2020–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15077&r=
  3. By: Ewa Batyra (Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, Rostock, Germany); Tiziana Leone; Mikko Myrskylä (Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, Rostock, Germany)
    Abstract: The Brazilian period fertility rate (PTFR) dropped from six to 1.8 between 1950 and 2010. Due to the shifts in the timing of fertility, the PTFR might be providing a misleading picture of fertility levels. Moreover, the national average hides important educational differences, as in 2010, the PTFR was 2.3 among the lower educated, whereas it had fallen to 1.5 among the higher educated. The consequences of these changes for the cohort total fertility rate (CTFR) – a measure that is free from tempo distortions – and for the educational differences in completed fertility have not been previously studied. Due to the scarcity of time series of fertility rates, the application of CTFR forecasting methods outside of high-income countries (HICs) has been rare, and has been largely limited to population-level analysis. We use four Brazilian censuses to forecast the CTFR for the total population and by educational level using rates reconstructed with indirect techniques. The results of four forecasting methods indicate that the CTFR is likely to decline to 2.1 for the 1980 cohort, and to 1.9 for the 1984 cohort. Educational differences in the CTFR are likely to remain stark – at between 0.7 and 0.9 depending on the cohort and the method – and to be larger than they are in HICs with comparable CTFRs. We show how the CTFR can be forecasted, including by educational level, in settings with limited data. Finally, we call for more research on the educational differences in completed fertility in low- and middle-income countries.
    Keywords: Brazil, census data, cohort fertility, education, forecasts
    JEL: J1 Z0
    Date: 2021
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dem:wpaper:wp-2021-011&r=
  4. By: Cummins, Neil
    Abstract: This article analyzes a newly constructed individual level dataset of every English death and probate from 1892–1992. This analysis shows that the twentieth century’s “Great Equalization” of wealth stalled in mid-century. The probate rate, which captures the proportion of English holding any significant wealth at death rose from 10 percent in the 1890s to 40 percent by 1950 and has stagnated to 1992. Despite the large declines in the wealth share of the top 1 percent, from 73 to 20 percent, the median English individual died with almost nothing throughout. All changes in inequality after 1950 involve a reshuffling of wealth within the top 30 percent. I translate the individual level data to synthetic households; the majority have at least one member probated. Yet the bottom 60 percent of households hold only 12 percent of all wealth, at their peak wealth-holding level, in the early 1990s. I also compare the new wealth data with existing estimates of top wealth shares, home-ownership trends, wealth survey distributions, aggregate wealth, and the wealth Gini coefficient.
    JEL: N33 N34
    Date: 2021–04–16
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:110826&r=
  5. By: Jun Han (Renmin University of China); Zhong Zhao (Renmin University of China)
    Abstract: This study analyzes the effect of one-child policy on marriage market in China, and focuses on leftover situation, marriage age, and the age differential between husband and wife. Taking age of 30 as a cut-off point, the one-child policy has increased the leftover proportion about 1.2%, with 1.8% on men and 0.6% on women. Although the problem of urban leftover women has made eye-catching of the general public, the problem of the leftover men is much more serious than that of women: with the former arising from the true over-supply of men while the latter due to the matching process. The one-child policy on marriage age is positive and significant, no matter for urban, rural residents, or migrants, but the effect is smaller in the urban area, which is consistent with the fact that the sex ratio is more balanced in urban area. This policy also increases the age differential between husband and wife on the whole, however, it is positive and significant for the male-head families but negative for the female-headed families.
    Keywords: one-child policy, leftover situation, age of marriage, age differential between husband and wife
    JEL: J12 J13
    Date: 2021–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hka:wpaper:2021-024&r=
  6. By: Peter H. Egger, Maximilian v. Ehrlich, Douglas R. Nelson
    Abstract: In this paper, we assess the role of skilled versus unskilled migration for bilateral trade in a flexible econometric model. Using a large data-set on bilateral skill-specific migration and a flexible novel identification strategy, the functionally flexible impact of different levels of skilled and unskilled immigration on the volume and structure of bilateral imports is identified in a quasi-experimental design. We find evidence of a polarized impact of skillspecific immigration on imports: highly concentrated skilled or unskilled immigrants induce higher import volumes than a balanced composition of the immigrant base. This effect turns out particularly important when institutions are weak. Regarding the structure of imports, we observe that skilled immigrants specifically add to imports in differentiated goods. Both bits of evidence are consistent with a segregation of skill-specific immigrant networks and corresponding trade patterns.
    Keywords: Skilled vs. unskilled immigration, Migrant networks, Bilateral trade, Quasirandomized experiments, Generalized propensity score estimation
    JEL: C14 C21 F14 F22
    Date: 2020–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rdv:wpaper:credresearchpaper31&r=
  7. By: Campo, Francesco; Mendola, Mariapia; Morrison, Andrea; Ottaviano, Gianmarco
    Abstract: A possible unintended but damaging consequence of anti-immigrant rhetoric, and the policies it inspires, is that they may put high-skilled immigrants off more than low-skilled ones at times when countries and businesses intensify their competition for global talent. We investigate this argument following the location choices of thousands of immigrant inventors across US counties during the Age of Mass Migration. To do so we combine a unique USPTO historical patent dataset with Census data and exploit exogenous variation in both immigration flows and diversity induced by former settlements, WWI and the 1920s Immigration Acts. We find that co-ethnic networks play an important role in attracting immigrant inventors. However, we also find that immigrant diversity acts as an additional significant pull factor. This is mainly due to externalities that foster immigrant inventors' innovativeness. These findings are relevant for today's advanced economies that have become major receivers of migrant flows and, in a long-term perspective, have started thinking about immigration in terms of not only level but also composition.
    Keywords: Cultural diversity; Innovation; International Migration
    JEL: F22 J61 O31
    Date: 2020–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:14916&r=

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