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on Demographic Economics |
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Issue of 2018‒08‒20
seven papers chosen by Héctor Pifarré i Arolas Max-Planck-Institut für demografische Forschung |
| By: | Michela Carlana (Harvard Kennedy School); Marco Tabellini (Harvard Business School, Business, Government and the International Economy Unit) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we study the effects of immigration on natives' marriage, fertility, and family formation across US cities between 1910 and 1930. Instrumenting immigrants' location decision by interacting pre-existing ethnic settlements with aggregate migration flows, we find that immigration raised marriage rates, the probability of having children, and the propensity to leave the parental house for young native men and women. We show that these effects were driven by the large and positive impact of immigration on native men's employment and occupational standing, which increased the supply of "marriageable men". We also explore alternative mechanisms - changes in sex ratios, natives' cultural responses, and displacement effects of immigrants on female employment - and provide evidence that none of them can account for a quantitatively relevant fraction of our results. |
| JEL: | J12 J13 J61 N32 |
| Date: | 2018–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hbs:wpaper:19-004&r=dem |
| By: | Alberto Alesina; Armando Miano; Stefanie Stantcheva |
| Abstract: | We design and conduct large-scale surveys and experiments in six countries to investigate how natives' perceptions of immigrants influence their preferences for redistribution. We find strikingly large biases in natives' perceptions of the number and characteristics of immigrants: in all countries, respondents greatly overestimate the total number of immigrants, think immigrants are culturally and religiously more distant from them, and are economically weaker – less educated, more unemployed, poorer, and more reliant on government transfers – than is the case. While all respondents have misperceptions, those with the largest ones are systematically the right-wing, the non-college educated, and the low-skilled working in immigration-intensive sectors. Support for redistribution is strongly correlated with the perceived composition of immigrants – their origin and economic contribution – rather than with the perceived share of immigrants per se. Given the very negative baseline views that respondents have of immigrants, simply making them think about immigration in a randomized manner makes them support less redistribution, including actual donations to charities. We also experimentally show respondents information about the true i) number, ii) origin, and iii) “hard work” of immigrants in their country. On its own, information on the “hard work” of immigrants generates more support for redistribution. However, if people are also prompted to think in detail about immigrants' characteristics, then none of these favorable information treatments manages to counteract their negative priors that generate lower support for redistribution. |
| JEL: | D71 D72 H2 |
| Date: | 2018–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24733&r=dem |
| By: | Marco Tabellini (Harvard Business School, Business, Government and the International Economy Unit) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, I show that political opposition to immigration can arise even when immigrants bring significant economic prosperity to receiving areas. I exploit exogenous variation in European immigration to US cities between 1910 and 1930 induced by World War I and the Immigration Acts of the 1920s, and instrument immigrants' location decision relying on pre-existing settlement patterns. Immigration increased natives' employment and occupational standing, and fostered industrial production and capital utilization. However, despite these economic benefits, it triggered hostile political reactions, such as the election of more conservative legislators, higher support for anti-immigration legislation, and lower public goods provision. Stitching the economic and the political results together, I provide evidence that natives' backlash was, at least in part, due to cultural differences between immigrants and natives, suggesting that diversity might be economically beneficial but politically hard to manage. |
| Keywords: | Immigration; Political Backlash; Age of Mass Migration; Cultural Diversity |
| JEL: | J15 J24 N32 |
| Date: | 2018–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hbs:wpaper:19-005&r=dem |
| By: | Ilyana Kuziemko; Jessica Pan; Jenny Shen; Ebonya Washington |
| Abstract: | After decades of convergence, the gender gap in employment outcomes has recently plateaued in many rich countries, despite the fact that women have increased their investment in human capital over this period. We propose a hypothesis to reconcile these two trends: that when they are making key human capital decisions, women in modern cohorts underestimate the impact of motherhood on their future labor supply. Using an event-study framework, we show substantial and persistent employment effects of motherhood in U.K. and U.S. data. We then provide evidence that women do not anticipate these effects. Upon becoming parents, women (and especially more educated women) adopt more negative views toward female employment (e.g., they are more likely to say that women working hurts family life), suggesting that motherhood serves as an information shock to their beliefs. Women on average (and, again, more educated women in particular) report that parenthood is harder than they expected. We then look at longer horizons—are young women's expectations about future labor supply correct when they make their key educational decisions? In fact, female high school seniors are increasingly and substantially overestimating the likelihood they will be in the labor market in their thirties, a sharp reversal from previous cohorts who substantially underestimated their future labor supply. Finally, we specify a model of women's choice of educational investment in the face of uncertain employment costs of motherhood, which demonstrates that our results can be reconciled only if these costs increased unexpectedly across generations. We end by documenting a collage of empirical evidence consistent with such a trend. |
| JEL: | J13 J16 J22 |
| Date: | 2018–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24740&r=dem |
| By: | Hippolyte D'Albis (PSE - Paris School of Economics, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Angela Greulich (INED - Institut national d'études démographiques, PSE - Paris School of Economics, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Grégory Ponthière (PSE - Paris School of Economics, ERUDITE - Equipe de Recherche sur l’Utilisation des Données Individuelles en lien avec la Théorie Economique - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - UPEC UP12 - Université Paris-Est Créteil Val-de-Marne - Paris 12, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | This paper questions the demographic consequences of birth postponement in Europe. Starting from the fact that there is no obvious link between the timing of first births and fertility levels in Europe, we deliver some indication that under certain circumstances, birth postponement involves the potential of facilitating rather than impedes starting a family. We apply a synthetic cohort approach and distinguish between different socio-economic determinants of the timing of first births by using the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). Data is compiled specifically to reduce endogeneity and to eliminate structure effects. We find that the probability of becoming a mother is higher for those women who postpone first childbirth due to education and career investment in comparison to those who postpone due to unrealized labour market integration. Educated and economically active women certainly postpone first childbirth in comparison to women who are less educated and who are not working, but they end up with a higher probability of starting a family in comparison to women who are less educated and not working. The article contributes to the academic discussion of the circumstances that may lead birth postponement to result in higher fertility for younger cohorts in European countries. |
| Keywords: | female employment,family policies,fertility,birth postponement,female education,Europe |
| Date: | 2017–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01452823&r=dem |
| By: | Rachel Cassidy; Marije Groot Bruinderink; Wendy Janssens; Karlijn Morsink |
| Abstract: | Use of technologies such as condoms must be agreed upon by both partners. In contexts where women have low bargaining power, many women may struggle to convince their partners to adopt. Introducing a version of the technology that is second-best from a social planner’s perspective, but more acceptable to men, may therefore improve adoption and welfare. We evaluate a field experiment introducing female condoms in the slums of Maputo, Mozambique. Female condoms offer marginally lower protection and higher unit cost than male condoms — which are already widely available — but lower discomfort and stigma to men. As predicted by our model, we find strongest adoption among women with low household bargaining power. The main margin of adoption is therefore from women previously having unprotected sex, rather than women substituting away from male condoms. We also observe an increase in the number of sex acts. A cost-benefit analysis shows how free provision of female condoms could be cost-effective. The findings highlight how policy should take into account the distribution of the costs and benefits of technology adoption, and of bargaining power, within the household. |
| JEL: | C78 J16 I12 O15 O3 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:csa:wpaper:2018-08&r=dem |
| By: | David E. Bloom; Mathew McKenna; Klaus Prettner |
| Abstract: | Globally, an estimated 734 million jobs will be required between 2010 and 2030 to accommodate recent and ongoing demographic shifts, account for plausible changes in labour force participation rates, and achieve target unemployment rates of at or below 4 percent for adults and at or below 8 percent for youth. The facts that i) most new jobs will be required in countries where “decent” jobs are less prevalent and ii) workers in many occupations are increasingly subject to risks of automation further compound the challenge of job creation, which is already quite sizable in historical perspective. Failure to create the jobs that are needed through 2030 would put currently operative social security systems under pressure and undermine efforts to guarantee the national social protection floors enshrined in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). |
| JEL: | J1 J11 J2 J23 J89 |
| Date: | 2018–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24835&r=dem |