nep-dem New Economics Papers
on Demographic Economics
Issue of 2018‒07‒23
four papers chosen by
Héctor Pifarré i Arolas
Max-Planck-Institut für demografische Forschung

  1. Who pays for the consumption of young and old? By Hippolyte D'Albis; Carole Bonnet; Xavier Chojnicki; Najat El Mekkaouide Freitas; Angela Greulich; Jérôme Hubert; Julien Navaux
  2. Validating the Collective Model of Household Consumption Using Direct Evidence on Sharing By Olivier Bargain; Guy Lacroix; Luca Tiberti
  3. Fertility and Parental Labor-Force Participation: New Evidence from a Developing Country in the Balkans By Iva Trako
  4. Access to Justice, Gender Violence and Children: Evidence from Women’s Justice Centers in Peru By Iva Trako; Maria Micaela Sviatschi; Guadalupe Kavanaugh

  1. By: Hippolyte D'Albis (PSE - Paris School of Economics, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Carole Bonnet (INED - Institut national d'études démographiques); Xavier Chojnicki (LEM - Lille - Economie et Management - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UCL - Université catholique de Lille - Université de Lille); Najat El Mekkaouide Freitas (LEDa - Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine - Université Paris-Dauphine); Angela Greulich (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, INED - Institut national d'études démographiques); Jérôme Hubert (LEM - Lille - Economie et Management - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UCL - Université catholique de Lille - Université de Lille); Julien Navaux (University of Ottawa [Ottawa])
    Abstract: This article provides a comprehensive overview of how the funding of consumption at different ages is shared between the State, the individual and the family. By applying the National Transfer Accounts method for France, we developed a unique database to analyze how the funding of consumption is secured at each age, how its structure has changed over time, and how the consumption is financed in France compared to that of a set of other developed countries. We find that the elderly in France finance themselves increasingly by their own means, even though public funding of this age group remains significant in France in comparison to other countries. Conversely, the young rely more and more on the State to finance their consumption. Within our sample, France is the country where the young benefited most from public transfers.
    Keywords: Generational Economy,National Transfer Accounts,Inter- Generational Equity,Private and Public Consumption
    Date: 2018–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01799724&r=dem
  2. By: Olivier Bargain; Guy Lacroix; Luca Tiberti
    Abstract: Recent advances in the collective model literature suggest ways to estimate the complete allocation of resources within households, using assignable goods and assuming adult preference similarity across demographic groups (or across spouses). While it makes welfare analysis at the individual level possible, the predictive power of the model is unknown. We propose the first validation of this approach, exploiting a unique dataset from Bangladesh in which the detailed expenditure on private goods by each family member is collected. Individualized expenditure allows us to test the identifying assumptions and to derive 'observed' resource sharing within families, which can be compared to the resource allocation predicted by the model. Sharing between parents and children is well predicted on average while the model detects key aspects like the extent of pro-boy discrimination. Results overall depend on the identifying good: clothing provides the best fit compared to other goods as it best validates the preference-similarity assumption. The model leads to accurate measures of child and adult poverty, indicating the size and direction of the mistakes made when using the traditional approach based on per adult equivalent expenditure (i.e. ignoring within-household inequality). This assessment of existing approaches to measure individual inequality and poverty is crucial for both academic and policy circles and militates in favor of a systematic use of collective models for welfare analyses.
    Keywords: Collective Model, Engel Curves, Rothbarth Method, Sharing rule.
    JEL: D11 D12 I31 J12
    Date: 2018
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lvl:crrecr:1810&r=dem
  3. By: Iva Trako (PSE - Paris School of Economics, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: This paper examines the effect of fertility on parental labor-force participation in a developing country in the Balkans, with particular attention to the intervening role of childcare provided by grandparents in extended families. In order to address the potential endogeneity in the fertility decision, I exploit Albanian parental preference for having sons combined with the siblings sex-composition instrument as an exogenous source of variation. Using a repeated cross-section of parents with at least two children, I find a positive and statistically significant effect of fertility on parental labor supply for those parents who are more likely to be younger, less educated or live in extended families. In particular, IV estimates for mothers show that they increase labor supply, especially in terms of hours worked per week and the likelihood of working off-farm. Similarly, father's likelihood of working off-farm and having a second occupation increase as a consequence of further childbearing. The heterogeneity analysis suggests that this positive effect might be the result of two plausible mechanisms: childcare provided by non-parental adults in extended families and greater financial costs of maintaining more children.
    Keywords: fertility,parental labor-force participation,instrumental variables
    Date: 2018–07–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-01828471&r=dem
  4. By: Iva Trako (Paris School of Economics and World Bank); Maria Micaela Sviatschi (Princeton University); Guadalupe Kavanaugh (Rutgers University)
    Abstract: Many developing countries have unequal access to justice, especially for women. What are the implications for gender-based violence, intra-household bargaining and investments in children? This paper provides quasi-experimental evidence on women’s justice centers (WJCs) a community based approach to reduce violence against women that has been gradually rolled out across Peru. Using administrative data from health providers and district attorney offices, we find that after the opening of these centers, there is a reduction in domestic violence, female mortality due to aggression, femicides and mental health problems. More over, we find that the WJCs substantially increase human capital investments for children, increasing enrollment, attendance, test scores, while decreasing child labor. These results are consistent with a bargaining model in which the threat point is determined by access to justice. In sum, the evidence in this paper shows that providing access to justice for women can be a powerful tool to reduce gender-based violence and increase the human capital of children, implying a positive intergenerational benefit.
    Keywords: Peru; gender-based violence, access to justice, children, household bargaining
    JEL: J12 J16 I25
    Date: 2018–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pri:rpdevs:2018-03&r=dem

This nep-dem issue is ©2018 by Héctor Pifarré i Arolas. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at http://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.