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on Demographic Economics |
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Issue of 2018‒05‒14
three papers chosen by Héctor Pifarré i Arolas Max-Planck-Institut für demografische Forschung |
| By: | Dan Anderberg; Noemi Mantovan; Robert M. Sauer |
| Abstract: | We present a dynamic lifecycle model of women’s choices with respect to partnership status, labour supply and fertility when a male partner’s true tendency for abusive behaviour is unobserved. The model is estimated by the method of simulated moments using longitudinal data from the Avon Longitudinal Study of Parents and Children. The results indicate that uncertainty about a partner’s abusive type creates incentives for women to delay fertility, reduce fertility overall, divorce more often and increase labour supply. We also study the impact of higher female wages, income support to single mothers, and subsidized childcare when the mother is working. While higher wages reduce women’s overall exposure to abuse, both income support and subsidized childcare fail to do so because they encourage early fertility. Income support also leads to less accumulated labour market experience and hence higher abuse rates. |
| Keywords: | domestic violence, learning, fertility, ALSPAC |
| JEL: | J12 J13 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6983&r=dem |
| By: | Bütikofer, Aline (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration); Jensen, Sissel (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration); Salvanes, Kjell G. (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration) |
| Abstract: | Is the wage penalty due to motherhood larger among highly qualified women? In this paper, we study the effect of parenthood on the careers of high-achieving women relative to high-achieving men in a set of high-earning professions with either nonlinear or linear wage structures. Using Norwegian registry data, we find that the child earnings penalty for mothers in professions with a nonlinear wage structure, MBAs and lawyers, is substantially larger than for mothers in professions with a linear wage structure. The gender earnings gap for MBA and law graduates is around 30%, but substantially less for STEM and medicine graduates, 10 years after childbirth. In addition, we provide some descriptive statistics on the role of fertility timing on the child earnings penalty. |
| Keywords: | Parenthood on the careers; wage structure |
| JEL: | E24 J16 |
| Date: | 2018–04–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:nhheco:2018_009&r=dem |
| By: | Christina Felfe; Martin G. Kocher; Helmut Rainer; Judith Saurer; Thomas Siedler |
| Abstract: | Inequality of opportunity, particularly when overlaid with racial, ethnic, or cultural differences, increases the social distance between individuals, which is widely believed to limit the scope of cooperation. A central question, then, is how to bridge such divides. We study the effects of a major citizenship reform in Germany—the introduction of birthright citizenship on January 1, 2000—in terms of inter-group cooperation and social segregation between immigrant and native youth. We hypothesize that endowing immigrant children with citizenship rights levels the playing field between them and their native peers, with possible spill-overs into the domain of social interactions. Our unique setup connects a large-scale lab-in-the-field experiment based on the investment game with the citizenship reform by exploiting the quasi-random assignment of citizenship rights around its cut-off date. Immigrant youth born prior to the reform display high levels of cooperation toward other immigrants, but low levels of cooperation toward natives. The introduction of birthright citizenship caused male, but not female, immigrants to significantly increase their cooperativeness toward natives. This effect is accompanied by a near-closure of the educational achievement gap between young immigrant men and their native peers.. |
| JEL: | C93 D90 J15 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6991&r=dem |