|
on Demographic Economics |
|
Issue of 2018‒04‒23
seven papers chosen by Héctor Pifarré i Arolas Max-Planck-Institut für demografische Forschung |
| By: | Sarah Bana; Kelly Bedard; Maya Rossin-Slater |
| Abstract: | Although the United States provides unpaid maternity and family leave to qualifying workers, it is the only OECD country without a national paid leave policy, making wage replacement a pivotal issue under debate. We use ten years of linked administrative data from California together with a regression kink (RK) design to estimate the causal impacts of benefits in the first state-level paid family leave program for women with earnings near the maximum benefit threshold. We find no evidence that a higher weekly benefit amount (WBA) increases leave duration or leads to adverse future labor market outcomes for mothers in this group. In contrast, we document consistent evidence that an increase in the WBA leads to a small increase in the share of quarters worked one to two years after the leave and a sizeable increase in the likelihood of making a future paid family leave claim across a variety of specifications. |
| JEL: | I18 J13 J16 J18 |
| Date: | 2018–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24438&r=dem |
| By: | Marion Goussé (Département d'Economique, Université Laval - Université Laval); Nicolas Jacquemet (PSE - Paris School of Economics); Jean-Marc Robin (Sciences Po Paris, Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | We develop a search model of marriage where men and women draw utility from private consumption and leisure, and from a non-market good that is produced in the home using time resources. We condition individual decisions on wages, education, and an index of family attitudes. A match-specific, stochastic bliss shock induces variation in matching given wages, education, and family values, and triggers renegotiation and divorce. Using BHPS (1991–2008) data, we take as given changes in wages, education, and family values by gender, and study their impact on marriage decisions and intra-household resource allocation. The model allows to evaluate how much of the observed gender differences in labor supply results from wages, education, and family attitudes. We find that family attitudes are a strong determinant of comparative advantages in home production of men and women, whereas education complementarities induce assortative mating through preferences. |
| Keywords: | Search-matching,bargaining,assortative mating,collective models,time uses,social norms,gender identity,structural estimation |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01689155&r=dem |
| By: | Alessandro Tampieri; Elena Parilina |
| Abstract: | We investigate divorce choice when the population distribution is non stationary and divorce entails an explicit cost. We consider a nontransferable utility, three period model where heterogeneous individuals may divorce the partner and re-enter the marriage market. Individuals choices are based on the change in the distribution of singles, the cost of waiting and divorcing, and take into account the individual own's eligibility in the marriage market. We show the existence of "divorce" and "no divorce" equilibria. Divorce emerges in the presence of asymmetry among spouses's types or in case of symmetry among medium-types spouses. Interestingly, lower divorce costs do not necessarily increase the probability of divorce. We provide some supporting evidence of our results and we discuss how this framework can help interpreting the effects of divorce reforms on divorce rates. |
| Keywords: | non-stationary distribution, divorce cost, waiting cost. |
| JEL: | J12 C78 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:frz:wpaper:wp2018_07.rdf&r=dem |
| By: | Boxell, Levi |
| Abstract: | I construct an index of political polarization using seven previously proposed measures. I estimate the relative propensity for polarization across demographic groups in a regression framework and examine the extent to which demographic change can explain recent trends in polarization. Assuming fixed propensities for polarization, I estimate that 25 to 59 percent of the change in polarization between 1984 and 2016 can be attributed to demographic change in the United States. |
| Keywords: | political polarization, demographic change, affect polarization, ideological polarization |
| JEL: | D72 H89 J10 J11 Z0 |
| Date: | 2018–03–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:85589&r=dem |
| By: | Kufenko, Vadim; Geloso, Vincent; Prettner, Klaus |
| Abstract: | We assess the effects of changes in household size on the long-run evolution of living standards and on cross-country convergence. When the observed changes in average household size across countries are taken into consideration, growth in living standards is slower throughout the 20th century as compared to a measure based on per capita GDP. Furthermore, the speed of divergence between different countries before 1950 is faster and the speed of convergence after 1950 is slower after adjusting for the evolution in household size. |
| Keywords: | divergence,convergence,long-run growth,changing household size,demography |
| JEL: | J11 O11 O47 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:hohdps:052018&r=dem |
| By: | Juselius, Mikael; Takáts, Előd |
| Abstract: | Demographic shifts, such as population ageing, have been suggested as possible explanations for the recent decade-long spell of low inflation. We identify age structure effects on inflation from cross-country variation in a panel of 22 countries from 1870 to 2016 that includes standard monetary factors. We document a robust relationship that is in line with the lifecycle hypothesis: a larger share of dependent population is inflationary, whereas a larger share of working age population is disinflationary. This relationship accounts for the bulk of trend inflation, for instance, about 7 percentage points of US disinflation since the 1980s. It predicts rising inflation over the coming decades. |
| JEL: | E31 E52 J11 |
| Date: | 2018–04–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bof:bofrdp:2018_008&r=dem |
| By: | Raj Chetty; Nathaniel Hendren; Maggie R. Jones; Sonya R. Porter |
| Abstract: | We study the sources of racial and ethnic disparities in income using de-identified longitudinal data covering nearly the entire U.S. population from 1989-2015. We document three sets of results. First, the intergenerational persistence of disparities varies substantially across racial groups. For example, Hispanic Americans are moving up significantly in the income distribution across generations because they have relatively high rates of intergenerational income mobility. In contrast, black Americans have substantially lower rates of upward mobility and higher rates of downward mobility than whites, leading to large income disparities that persist across generations. Conditional on parent income, the black-white income gap is driven entirely by large differences in wages and employment rates between black and white men; there are no such differences between black and white women. Second, differences in family characteristics such as parental marital status, education, and wealth explain very little of the black-white income gap conditional on parent income. Differences in ability also do not explain the patterns of intergenerational mobility we document. Third, the black-white gap persists even among boys who grow up in the same neighborhood. Controlling for parental income, black boys have lower incomes in adulthood than white boys in 99% of Census tracts. Both black and white boys have better outcomes in low-poverty areas, but black-white gaps are larger on average for boys who grow up in such neighborhoods. The few areas in which black-white gaps are relatively small tend to be low-poverty neighborhoods with low levels of racial bias among whites and high rates of father presence among blacks. Black males who move to such neighborhoods earlier in childhood earn more and are less likely to be incarcerated. However, fewer than 5% of black children grow up in such environments. These findings suggest that reducing the black-white income gap will require efforts whose impacts cross neighborhood and class lines and increase upward mobility specifically for black men. |
| JEL: | H0 J0 |
| Date: | 2018–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24441&r=dem |