nep-dcm New Economics Papers
on Discrete Choice Models
Issue of 2019‒09‒02
eleven papers chosen by
Edoardo Marcucci
Università degli studi Roma Tre

  1. The role of heterogeneity of patients’ preferences in kidney transplantation By Mesfin G. Genie; Antonio Nicolò; Giacomo Pasini
  2. Identification with Latent Choice Sets By Kamat, Vishal
  3. Consumer Willingness-to-Pay for Foods with Labels Proposed by USDA’s Agricultural Marketing Service to Meet the National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard By McFadden, Jonathan
  4. German consumers’ preference and planned behavior for animal welfare labelled cured ham: An integrated latent choice model By Yeh, Ching-Hua; Hartmann, Monika
  5. Value Estimates for Natural Springs in Florida: A Joint Estimation of Revealed and Stated Preference Data By Wu, Qianyan; Bi, Xiang
  6. A Framing Effect of Sugar Content Labeling on Sugar Intake: Evidence from Online Choice Experiment By Kim, Sanghyo; Heo, Seong-Yoon
  7. Achieving spatial connectivity for threshold public goods through payments for ecosystem services – Evidence from a framed field experiment with oil palm farmers in Indonesia. By Rudolf, Katrin
  8. An Experiment in Candidate Selection By Katherine Casey; Abou Bakarr Kamara; Niccoló Meriggi
  9. Choice Uncertainty and the Endowment Effect By Korting, Christina; Otto, Steven G.
  10. A new approach to estimating state dependence in consumers’ brand choices applied to 762 pharmaceutical markets By Granlund, David
  11. Do People Bundle Sequences of Choices? An Experimental Investigation By George Ainslie; Glenn W. Harrison; Morten I. Lau; Don Ross; Alexander Schuhr; J. Todd Swarthout

  1. By: Mesfin G. Genie (Department of Economics, University Of Venice Cà Foscari); Antonio Nicolò (Dipartamento di Scienze Economiche “Marco Fanno”, Università degli Studi di Padova; School of Social Sciences, The University of Manchester); Giacomo Pasini (Ca’ Foscari University of Venice; NETSPAR, Network for Studies on Pensions, Ageing and Retirement, Tilburg)
    Abstract: We elicit time and risk preferences for kidney transplantation from the entire population of patients of the largest Italian transplant centre using a discrete choice experiment (DCE). We measure patients’ willingness-to-wait (WTW), expressed in months, for receiving a kidney with one-year longer expected graft survival, or low risk of complication. Using a mixed logit in WTW-space model, we find heterogeneity in patients’ preferences. Our model allows WTW to vary with the patient’s age and duration of dialysis. The results suggest that WTW correlates with age and duration of dialysis. The implication for transplant practice is that including individual preferences in kidney allocation protocols that assign “non-ideal” (expanded donor criteria) organs may not only increase the expected survival rates of patients with transplanted organs but also improve patients’ satisfaction.
    Keywords: Stated preferences, Mixed logit, Willingness to wait, Marginal kidney
    JEL: I18 I14 C90 D61
    Date: 2019
  2. By: Kamat, Vishal
    Abstract: In a common experimental format, individuals are randomly assigned to either a treatment group with access to a program or a control group without access. In such experiments, analyzing the average effects of the treatment of program access may be hindered by the problem that some control individuals do not comply with their assigned status and receive program access from outside the experiment. Available tools to account for such a problem typically require the researcher to observe the receipt of program access for every individual. However, in many experiments, this is not the case as data is not collected on where any individual received access. In this paper, I develop a framework to show how data on only each individual's treatment assignment status, program participation decision and outcome can be exploited to learn about the average effects of program access. I propose a nonparametric selection model with latent choice sets to relate where access was received to the treatment assignment status, participation decision and outcome, and a linear programming procedure to compute the identified set for parameters evaluating the average effects of program access in this model. I illustrate the framework by analyzing the average effects of Head Start preschool access using the Head Start Impact Study. I nd that the provision of Head Start access induces parents to enroll their child into Head Start and also positively impacts test scores, and that these effects heterogeneously depend on the availability of access to an alternative preschool.
    Keywords: Program evaluation, latent choice sets, unobserved treatment, program access, multiple treatments, average treatment effect, noncompliance, discrete choice, partial identification, social experiments, head start impact study.
    JEL: C31 C14
    Date: 2019–08
  3. By: McFadden, Jonathan
    Keywords: Agricultural and Food Policy
    Date: 2019–06–25
  4. By: Yeh, Ching-Hua; Hartmann, Monika
    Keywords: Marketing
    Date: 2019–06–25
  5. By: Wu, Qianyan; Bi, Xiang
    Keywords: Environmental Economics and Policy
    Date: 2019–06–25
  6. By: Kim, Sanghyo; Heo, Seong-Yoon
    Keywords: Institutional and Behavioral Economics
    Date: 2019–06–25
  7. By: Rudolf, Katrin
    Keywords: Resource/ Energy Economics and Policy
    Date: 2019–06–25
  8. By: Katherine Casey; Abou Bakarr Kamara; Niccoló Meriggi
    Abstract: Are ordinary citizens or political party leaders better positioned to select candidates? While the direct vote primary system in the United States lets citizens choose, it is exceptional, as the vast majority of democracies rely instead on party officials to appoint or nominate candidates. Theoretically, the consequences of these distinct design choices on the selectivity of the overall electoral system are unclear: while party leaders may be better informed about candidate qualifications, they may value traits—like party loyalty or willingness to pay for the nomination—at odds with identifying the best performer. To make progress on this question, we partnered with both major political parties in Sierra Leone to experimentally vary how much say ordinary voters, as opposed to party officials, have in selecting Parliamentary candidates. We find evidence that more democratic selection procedures increase the likelihood that parties select the candidate most preferred by voters, favor candidates with stronger records of local public goods provision, and alter the allocation of payments from potential candidates to party officials.
    JEL: D72 H1 P16
    Date: 2019–08
  9. By: Korting, Christina; Otto, Steven G.
    Keywords: Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies
    Date: 2019–06–25
  10. By: Granlund, David (Department of Economics, Umeå University)
    Abstract: This article shows how state dependence effects can be estimated for many markets and with few assumptions by using data on how the shares buying specific products differ between those who bought the same product on their latest purchase occasion and other consumers. Using as instrument information regarding which product was cheapest when consumers made their last purchase, I estimate that state dependence increases the probability that consumers will buy the product they bought the last time by 8 percentage points. This effect is larger for women and the elderly than for men and younger consumers. The state dependence effect is also larger for brand-names than for generic products, but not significantly related to number of previous purchases.
    Keywords: Brand choice; Consumer dynamics; Drugs; Quasi-experiment econometrics; State dependence
    JEL: D12 D90 I11 L65
    Date: 2019–08–22
  11. By: George Ainslie; Glenn W. Harrison; Morten I. Lau; Don Ross; Alexander Schuhr; J. Todd Swarthout
    Abstract: Economists and psychologists have sought to model and explain both impulsive behavior and the costly but often successful mechanisms by which people control it. Ainslie [1975][1992][2001] suggests that self-control is often achieved on account of a phenomenon he calls "choice bundling." This refers to re-framing of series of discrete choices as single choices over whole series. Whereas other core elements of Ainslie's account of self-regulation, such as hyperbolic discounting and intrapersonal bargaining among temporally distinguished selves have been subject to extensive modeling by economists, choice bundling has been absent from the economic literature because it has never been empirically isolated in a controlled setting that meets the methodological requirements of the discipline. We report a laboratory experiment that fills this gap. Subjects made choices between smaller, sooner and larger, later real monetary rewards under experimental treatments that allowed us to discriminate between choice bundling, reliance on pre-commitment, and possible magnitude effects on intertemporal discounting. Risk preference measures were used to obtain accurate discounting estimates, based on estimation of mixture models that incorporate exponential, hyperbolic and quasi-hyperbolic discounting functions. We use structural econometric procedures which are well established in the literature on binary choice and find strong support for the hypothesis that subjects bundled choices when conditions allowed them to do so, and consequently exhibited different discounting behavior in these conditions.
    JEL: D03 D83 D90
    Date: 2018–12

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