nep-dcm New Economics Papers
on Discrete Choice Models
Issue of 2016‒10‒30
four papers chosen by
Edoardo Marcucci
Università degli studi Roma Tre

  1. Towards a cost-benefit assessment of farm structural change in European mountain regions By Huber, Robert
  2. Eco-certified contract choice among coffee farmersin Brazil By Sylvaine Lemeilleur; Julie Subervie; Anderson Edilson Presoto; Roberta de Castro Souza; Maria Sylvia Macchione Saes
  3. Do you trust me? – Go Fish! A Study on Trust and Fisheries Management By Eggert, Håkan; Kataria, Mitesh; Lampi, Elina
  4. Strategic use of external benefits for entry deterrence: the case of a mobile telephony market By Mikołaj Czajkowski; Maciej Sobolewski

  1. By: Huber, Robert
    Abstract: Farm structural change increases the productivity and efficiency of farming. In the policy debate, however, there is still a strong attachment to a highly fragmented structure of family farms, especially in countries with high support for the agricultural sector. In these regions, the somewhat “romantic” attachment to small family farms in the policy debate may also be interpreted as a public preference for concomitant non-use values of agricultural production. As a consequence, a cost-benefit analysis including the economic gains from farm structural change as well as the non-use values of small-scale, traditional agriculture may give a new perspective on this policy debate. We here combine results from a discrete choice experiment in a Swiss mountain region with simulation results from an agent-based farm model in the same case study region. We compare the willingness to pay of local people for farm survival with the reduced average income that results from impeded structural change. Results imply that on average WTP is higher than the opportunity costs. However, the differentiation into farm types shows that productive full-time farmers would have to bear the highest opportunity costs that exceed the average WTP by far. We discuss this result with respect to the policy debate and further research.
    Keywords: Agricultural and Food Policy, Farm Management,
    Date: 2016
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:eaa149:244785&r=dcm
  2. By: Sylvaine Lemeilleur; Julie Subervie; Anderson Edilson Presoto; Roberta de Castro Souza; Maria Sylvia Macchione Saes
    Abstract: We survey Brazilian coffee farmers’ preferences for attributes of voluntary sustainability standards using a choice experiment. We collected original data from 250 coffee farmers who live in the state of Minas Gerais who were asked to choose from several hypothetical buying contracts for eco-certified coffee. Our results suggest that both cash and non-cash payments may motivate farmers to participate in sustainability standard certification schemes that require improved agricultural practices. Preferences for non-cash rewards such as long-term formal contracts or technical assistance, however, appear highly heterogeneous. Results moreover show that the minimum willingness-to-accept for the adoption of composting is twice as high as the average price premium for certified coffee in the current context, which may partly explain why most coffee farmers continue to be reluctant to enter the most stringent eco-certification schemes such as the organic standard
    Date: 2016–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lam:wpaper:16-09&r=dcm
  3. By: Eggert, Håkan (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University); Kataria, Mitesh (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University); Lampi, Elina (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University)
    Abstract: This paper investigates trust among stakeholders in fisheries management. We asked the general public, environmental bureaucrats, and recreational and commercial fishers whether they believed various stakeholders have sufficient knowledge to take a stance regarding fisheries management issues in a choice experiment they themselves had just been exposed to. We found that the general public and recreational fishers tend to trust bureaucrats to have sufficient knowledge, while bureaucrats distrust the general public. The commercial fishers in our sample deviate from the other respondents with high self-trust and low trust in both the general public and bureaucrats. In addition, bureaucrats tend to think that their colleagues are more knowledgeable than them. When looking at observable characteristics, we find that, regardless of comparison group, males show higher trust in their own knowledge than do females, and those with higher education believe they are more knowledgeable than people in general.
    Keywords: Trust; Fisheries Management; Overconfidence; Choice experiment
    JEL: Q22
    Date: 2016–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0675&r=dcm
  4. By: Mikołaj Czajkowski (Faculty of Economi Sciences, University of Warsaw); Maciej Sobolewski (Faculty of Economi Sciences, University of Warsaw)
    Abstract: Recent models of network competition demonstrate the incentives of incumbents to reduce receiver benefits in rival networks through excessive off-net pricing. Theoretical reasoning behind strategic use of call externalities assumes that receiving calls contributes to consumer utility. This paper tests this critical assumption with choice data elicited from users of mobile telephones. We find that receiver benefits are a significant driver of subscription choices and assess customer base stealing effect encountered by the late entrant. Our findings confirm that call externalities can be used to limit late entrants’ growth as has been observed in many European mobile telephony markets.
    Keywords: call externalities, personal network effects, entry deterrence, mobile telephony, stated preferences, discrete choice experiment
    JEL: L1 L86 D62
    Date: 2016
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:war:wpaper:2016-27&r=dcm

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