nep-dcm New Economics Papers
on Discrete Choice Models
Issue of 2011‒07‒21
three papers chosen by
Philip Yu
Hong Kong University

  1. Whether to Hire Local Contract Teachers? Trade-off Between Skills and Preferences in India. By Sonja Fagernäs; Panu Pelkonen
  2. Advertising Effects in Presidential Elections By Gordon, Brett R.; Hartmann, Wesley R.
  3. The identification of a mixture of first order binary Markov Chains By Martin Browning; Jesús M. Carro

  1. By: Sonja Fagernäs (Department of Economics, University of Sussex); Panu Pelkonen (Department of Economics, University of Sussex)
    Abstract: Whether to hire teachers locally on a contract basis, or via competitive examinations and training as government officials, is a major policy question in developing countries. Recruitment practices can have implications for the competence, motivation and the cost of teachers. This study relies on a Discrete Choice Experiment to assess the job preferences of a sample of 700 future elementary school teachers in the state of Uttarakhand in India. The students have been selected using either district-wide competitive examination or from a pool of locally hired, experienced contract teachers (para-teachers). Skills in English, Arithmetic and Vocabulary are also tested. We find a trade-off between skills and preferences, as teacher students hired using competitive examination have higher skills, but prefer posts in less remote regions. Most of the differences in job preferences between the two groups can be explained by geographic origin of the teachers, skills, experience and education.
    Keywords: Education, Para-teachers, Discrete Choice Experiment, Skills, Preferences, India
    JEL: H75 I28 J24 J28 J41 J45
    Date: 2011–02
  2. By: Gordon, Brett R. (Columbia University); Hartmann, Wesley R. (Stanford University)
    Abstract: We estimate advertising effects in the context of presidential elections. This setting overcomes many data challenges in previous advertising studies, while arguably providing one of the most interesting empirical settings to study advertising's effects. The four-year presidential election cycle facilitates measurement in two ways. First, the gap between elections depreciates past advertising stocks such that large advertising investments are concentrated within relatively short periods. Second, the lack of political advertising between elections allows lagged advertising prices to serve as instruments that are safely independent of candidates' current advertising choices. To further aid estimation, the winner-take-all nature of the electoral college generates broad variation in advertising levels across states. We analyze the data using an aggregate discrete choice approach with extensive fixed effects at the party-market level to control for unobservable cross-sectional factors that might be correlated with advertising, outcomes, and instruments. The results indicate significant positive effects of advertising exposures for the 2000 and 2004 general elections. Advertising elasticities are smaller than are typical for branded goods, yet significant enough to shift election outcomes. For example, if advertising were set to zero and all other factors held constant, three states' electoral votes would have changed parties in 2000, leading to a different president.
    Date: 2011–06
  3. By: Martin Browning; Jesús M. Carro
    Abstract: Let S be the number of components in a finite discrete mixing distribution. We prove that the number of waves of panel being greater than or equal to 2S is a sufficient condition for global identification of a dynamic binary choice model in which all the parameters are heterogeneous. This model results in a mixture of S binary first order Markov Chains
    Keywords: Discrete choice, Markov processes, Global identification
    JEL: C23 C24 J64
    Date: 2011–01

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