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on Discrete Choice Models |
| By: | Machado, Matilde Pinto; Mora, Ricardo; Romero-Medina, Antonio |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we propose an alternative methodology for ranking hospitals based on the choices of Medical School graduates over hospital training vacancies. Our methodology is therefore a revealed preference approach. Our methodology for measuring relative hospital quality has the following desirable properties: a) robust to manipulation from hospital administrators; b) conditional on having enough observations, it allows for differences in quality across specialties within a hospital; c) inexpensive in terms of data requirements, d) not subject to selection bias from patients nor hospital screening of patients; and e) unlike other rankings based on experts' evaluations, it does not require physicians to provide a complete ranking of all hospitals. We apply our methodology to the Spanish case and find, among other results, the following: First, the probability of choosing the best hospital relative to the worst hospital is statistically significantly different from zero. Second, physicians value proximity and nearby hospitals are seen as more substitutable. Third, observable time-invariant city characteristics are unrelated to results. Finally, our estimates for physicians' hospital valuations are significantly correlated to more traditional hospital quality measures. |
| Keywords: | Hospital Quality; Hospital Rankings; Nested Logit; Physicians' Labour Market; Revealed Preference |
| JEL: | I11 I12 J24 J44 |
| Date: | 2008–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6850&r=dcm |
| By: | Alessandra Casella; Shuky Ehrenberg; Andrew Gelman; Jie Shen |
| Abstract: | Democratic systems are built, with good reason, on majoritarian principles, but their legitimacy requires the protection of strongly held minority preferences. The challenge is to do so while treating every voter equally and preserving aggregate welfare. One possible solution is <i>Storable Votes</i>: granting each voter a budget of votes to cast as desired over multiple decisions. During the 2006 student elections at Columbia University, we tested a simple version of this idea: voters were asked to rank the importance of the different contests and to choose where to cast a single extra "bonus vote," had one been available. We used these responses to construct distributions of intensities and electoral outcomes, both without and with the bonus vote. Bootstrapping techniques provided estimates of the probable impact of the bonus vote. The bonus vote performs well: when minority preferences are particularly intense, the minority wins at least one of the contests with 15--30 percent probability; and, when the minority wins, aggregate welfare increases with 85--95 percent probability. When majority and minority preferences are equally intense, the effect of the bonus vote is smaller and more variable but on balance still positive. |
| JEL: | C9 D7 H1 |
| Date: | 2008–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14103&r=dcm |