| Abstract: |
We propose a general model of repeated elections. In each period, a challenger
is chosen from the electorate to run against an incumbent politician in a
majority-rule election, and the winner then selects a policy from a
multidimensional policy space. Individual policy preferences are private
information, whereas policy choices are publicly observable. We prove
existence and continuity of equilibria in “simple” voting and policy
strategies; we provide examples to show the variety of possible equilibrium
patterns in multiple dimensions; we analyze the effects of patience and
office-holding benefits on the persistence of policies over time; and we
identify relationships between equilibrium policies and the core of the
underlying voting game. As a byproduct of our analysis, we show how
equilibrium incentives may lead elected representatives to make policy
compromises, even when binding commitments are unavailable. We provide an
informational story for incumbency advantage. Finally, we give an asymptotic
version of the median voter theorem for the one-dimensional model as voters
becomes arbitrarily patient. |