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on Discrete Choice Models |
| By: | Vito Peragine (Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche - Università di Bari (Italy)); Antonio Romero-Medina (University Carlos III de Madrid (Spain)) |
| Abstract: | We study the problem of ranking sets of options in terms of freedom of choice. We propose a framework in which both the diversity of the options and the preferences of the agent over the options do play a role. We formulate some axioms that re°ect these two aspects of freedom and we study their logical implications. Two di®erent criteria for ranking sets are characterized, which generalize some of the rankings proposed so far in the literature. |
| Keywords: | Ranking Sets; Freedom of Choice; Diversity relations |
| JEL: | D71 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bai:series:wp0003&r=dcm |
| By: | Alois Stutzer; Bruno S. Frey |
| Abstract: | Neoclassical economic theory rules out systematic errors in consumption choice. According to the basic view, individuals know what they choose. They are able to predict how much utility an activity or a good produces for them now and in the future and they can maximize their utility. This implies that behavior reveals consistent preferences. This approach makes it impossible to detect and understand sub-optimal consumption decisions, due to problems of self-control and the misprediction of utility. We propose the economics of happiness as a methodological approach to study these phenomena. Based on proxy measures for experienced utility, it is, in principle, possible to directly address whether some observed behavior is sub-optimal and is therefore reducing a person’s well-being. We discuss recent evidence on smoking and eating habits, TV viewing and commuting choice. |
| Keywords: | adaptation, individual decision-making, revealed preference, self-control, subjective well-being, utility misprediction |
| JEL: | D00 D11 D12 D84 D91 I12 I31 |
| Date: | 2006–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:iewwpx:267&r=dcm |
| By: | Miguel Angel Ballester; Guillaume Haeringer |
| Abstract: | We identify in this paper two conditions that characterize the domain of single-peaked preferences on the line in the following sense: a preference profile satisfies these two properties if and only if there exists a linear order $L$ over the set of alternatives such that these preferences are single-peaked with respect L. The first property states that for any subset of alternatives the set of alternatives considered as the worst by all agents cannot contains more than 2 elements. The second property states that two agents cannot disagree on the relative ranking of two alternatives with respect to a third alternative but agree on the (relative) ranking of a fourth one. |
| Keywords: | Single-peaked preferences, linear order. |
| JEL: | D71 C78 |
| Date: | 2006–01–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aub:autbar:656.06&r=dcm |