nep-dcm New Economics Papers
on Discrete Choice Models
Issue of 2005‒09‒02
one paper chosen by
Philip Yu
Hong Kong University

  1. Iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies in binary voting agendas with sequential voting By Hummel, Patrick

  1. By: Hummel, Patrick
    Keywords: perfect information games, extensive games, backward induction, weakly dominated strategies, iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies, binary voting agendas, sequential voting
    Date: 2005–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:clt:sswopa:1236&r=dcm

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