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on Discrete Choice Models |
By: | Boter, Jaap (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Faculteit der Economische Wetenschappen en Econometrie (Free University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics Sciences, Business Administration and Economitrics); Rouwendal, Jan; Wedel, Michel |
Abstract: | Since recently, a number of studies have applied non-market valuation techniques to measure the value of cultural goods. All studies are single case applications and rely mostly on stated preferences, such as contingent valuation techniques. We compare the relative value of multiple, competing goods and show how revealed preferences, in particular travel costs, may be used for this. In addition, we account for heterogeneity. Using a unique transaction database with the visiting behavior of 80,821 Museum Cardholders to 108 Dutch museums, we propose a latent class application of a logit model to account for the different distances of museums to the population and for differences in willingness-to-travel. |
Keywords: | museums; non-market valuation; revealed preferences; travel cost method |
Date: | 2004 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:vuarem:2004-11&r=dcm |
By: | Kruse, Agneta (Department of Economics, Lund University) |
Abstract: | Ageing puts a strain on most countries’ pension systems; forecasts show them to be more or less unsustainable. Evidence from social choice research, theoretical as well as empirical, does not seem to offer a way out of the dilemma, as the median voter will resist a reform. Despite this, Sweden has implemented a major reform, supposedly making the system sustainable. The question in this paper is thus: how was it possible to launch such a reform in Sweden? The analysis is based on majority voting models. Important explanatory factors are age structure as well as the age of the median voter; both of these go against the probability of a reform. A focus on age structure in combination with transitional rules and specific features of the reform may provide an explanation. |
Keywords: | political economy; pension reform; median voter; age structure |
JEL: | D72 H55 J26 |
Date: | 2005–06–07 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2005_035&r=dcm |
By: | Naohito Abe; Satoshi Shimizutani |
Abstract: | Japan's economic problems over the past decade and a half have triggered far reaching changes in the country's corporate governance system and there have been significant changes in both companiesf ownership structures and composition of board members. This paper examines how board and ownership structures affect firms' decision as to how to reduce labor costs when firms face excess employment. Our findings confirm that outside directors are more inclined to implement layoffs and voluntary or early retirement, while insiders are more likely to decrease new hiring and protect incumbent employees. These findings are consistent with the stakeholder view of the firm rather than the neoclassical view of firms as profit-maximizers. |
Keywords: | corporate governance, employment downsizing, multivariate probit model |
JEL: | G30 J23 |
Date: | 2005–06 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hst:hstdps:d05-92&r=dcm |
By: | BOSSERT, Walter; SUZUMURA, Kotaro |
Abstract: | The rationalizability of a choice function on arbitrary domains by means of a transitive relation has been analyzed thoroughly in the literature. Moreover, characterizations of various versions of consistent rationalizability have appeared in recent contributions. However, not much seems to be known when the coherence property of quasi-transitivity or that of P-acyclicity is imposed on a rationalization. The purpose of this paper is to fill this significant gap. We provide characterizations of all forms of rationalizability involving quasi-transitive or P-acyclical rationalizations on arbitrary domains. |
Keywords: | Rational Choice, Quasi-Transitivity, P-Acyclicity |
JEL: | D11 |
Date: | 2005 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mtl:montde:2005-13&r=dcm |
By: | Yasuhito Tanaka (Doshisha University) |
Abstract: | We will present a topological approach to the Arrow impossibility theorem of social choice theory that there exists no binary social choice rule (which we will call a social welfare function) which satisfies the conditions of transitivity, independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), Pareto principle and non-existence of dictator. |
JEL: | D6 D7 H |
Date: | 2005–06–16 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0506013&r=dcm |