nep-dcm New Economics Papers
on Discrete Choice Models
Issue of 2005‒05‒23
six papers chosen by
Philip Yu
Hong Kong University

  1. Trabalho Infantil-Aplicação do Modelo Multinomial By Manuela Magalhaes
  2. Patent Application Outcomes across the Trilateral Patent Offices By Paul H. Jensen; Alfons Palangkaraya; Elizabeth Webster
  3. ON ASYMMETRIC BEHAVIORS IF VOTING IS COSTLY By Francesco De Sinopoli; Giovanna Iannantuoni
  4. EXTREME VOTING UNDER PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION:THE MULTIDIMENSIONAL CASE By Francesco De Sinopoli; Giovanna Iannantuoni
  5. Opening the Black Box of Intra-Household Decision-Making: Theory and Non-Parametric Empirical Tests of General Collective Consumption Models By Laurens Cherchye; Bram De Rock; Frederic Vermeulen
  6. A Proposed Method for Monitoring U.S. Population Health: Linking Symptoms, Impairments, Chronic Conditions, and Health Ratings By Susan T. Stewart; Rebecca M. Woodward; David M. Cutler

  1. By: Manuela Magalhaes
    Abstract: As crianças fazem parte da vida económica das sociedades. A evidência histórica mostra que o contributo das crianças para o rendimento das famílias é consistentemente significativo. O trabalho infantil é, ainda nos dias de hoje, um fenómeno expressivo, quer nas sociedades menos desenvolvidas, quer nas mais desenvolvidas. Este estudo analisa os factores determinantes na decisão das famílias, relativamente á afectação do tempo das crianças entre a escola; a escola e o trabalho, o trabalho ou o lazer. O modelo logit multinomial é o modelo utilizado para identificar as características pessoais, familiares, locais e sazonais que influenciam a decisão das famílias Ukranianas. Os resultados mostram que todos estes factores são considerados pelas famílias nas suas decisões. Assim, políticas que promovam o desenvolvimento económico, a redução do agregado familiar e alternativas à escola no terceiro trimestre, podem contribuir significativamente para a redução do trabalho infantil na Ukrania
    Keywords: Trabalho Infantil, Logit Multinomial
    JEL: J
    Date: 2005–05–14
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwpla:0505013&r=dcm
  2. By: Paul H. Jensen (Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, and Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia, The University of Melbourne); Alfons Palangkaraya (Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, and Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia, The University of Melbourne); Elizabeth Webster (Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, and Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia, The University of Melbourne)
    Abstract: While most developed countries apply the same criteria to determine whether an invention is eligible to be protected by a patent, there are substantial procedural differences in the way in which different patent offices examine a patent application. This means that a patent application may be granted in one jurisdiction but rejected in others, which raises welfare concerns about the ability of patents to provide an ex ante incentive for investment. In this article, we analyze whether there are systematic differences in patent application outcomes across the trilateral patent offices. In order to determine how much “disharmony” exists, we examine whether the patent offices make consistent decisions for a given invention using a dataset of 70,000 patent applications that have been granted in the US and submitted in Japan and Europe and have a single, common priority application. Specifically, we model the patent application outcomes using a multinomial logit to see how the decisions made by the patent offices vary across different patent characteristics such as technology area, non-obviousness of the invention and priority country.
    Date: 2005–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iae:iaewps:wp2005n05&r=dcm
  3. By: Francesco De Sinopoli; Giovanna Iannantuoni
    Abstract: Most of the voting models restrict themselves to the analysis of symmetric equilibria, i.e. equilibria in which "similar" voters make "similar" voting decisions. In this paper we investigate this assumption under costly plurality voting. In any pure strategy equilibrium, if two active voters have the same preference order over candidates, they do vote for the same candidate. However, as an example shows, this type of result cannot be hoped for mixed strategies equilibria.
    Date: 2005–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cte:werepe:we053320&r=dcm
  4. By: Francesco De Sinopoli; Giovanna Iannantuoni
    Abstract: We study the strategic behavior of voters in a model of proportional representation, in which the policy space is multidimensional. Our main finding is that in large electorate, under some assumptions on voters' preferences, voters essentially vote, in any equilibrium, only for the extreme parties.
    Date: 2005–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cte:werepe:we053421&r=dcm
  5. By: Laurens Cherchye (University of Leuven and FWO-Vlaanderen); Bram De Rock (University of Leuven); Frederic Vermeulen (Tilburg University, CentER and IZA Bonn)
    Abstract: We non-parametrically test a general collective consumption model with public consumption and externalities inside the household. We further propose a novel approach to model special cases of the general collective model. These special cases include alternative restrictions on the 'sharing rule' that applies to each household, and which defines the distribution of the household budget over the household members. A limiting case is the unitary model. Our application uses data from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS); the panel structure of this data set allows non-parametric testing of the behavioral models without relying on preference homogeneity assumptions across similar individuals. This application includes test results but also a power analysis for different specifications of the collective consumption model. Our main findings are that the most general collective model, together with a large class of special but still fairly general cases, cannot be rejected by the data, while other, restricted, versions of the general model, including the unitary alternative, are rejected. Since these tests are entirely nonparametric, this provides strong evidence in favor of models focusing on intra-household decision-making.
    Keywords: collective household models, intra-household allocation, revealed preferences, non-parametric analysis
    JEL: D11 D12 C14
    Date: 2005–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1603&r=dcm
  6. By: Susan T. Stewart; Rebecca M. Woodward; David M. Cutler
    Abstract: We propose a method of quantifying non-fatal health that details the mechanisms through which chronic conditions affect health. Self-rated health status and time-tradeoff ratings of current health are regressed on impairments and symptoms from the Quality of Well-Being Scale, using OLS regression and ordered probit. This yields estimates of their effects analogous to disutility weights but not based on counterfactual scenarios, and accounts for complex non-additive relationships. Data are from 1420 adults age 45-89 in the Beaver Dam Health Outcomes Study. Chronic condition weights and summary measures of health are derived, laying the groundwork for a detailed national summary measure of health.
    JEL: I10 I12
    Date: 2005–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11358&r=dcm

This nep-dcm issue is ©2005 by Philip Yu. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at http://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.