nep-dcm New Economics Papers
on Discrete Choice Models
Issue of 2005‒03‒20
two papers chosen by
Philip Yu
Hong Kong University

  1. Individual Powers and Social Consent: An Axiomatic Approach By Biung-Ghi Ju
  2. A Characterization of Plurality-Like Rules Based on Non-Manipulability, Restricted Efficiency, and Anonymity By Biung-Ghi Ju

  1. By: Biung-Ghi Ju (Department of Economics, The University of Kansas)
    Abstract: We formalize a notion of conditionally decisive powers of which the exercise depends on social consent. Decisive powers, or the so-called libertarian rights, are examples and much weaker forms of powers are covered by our notion. Main results provide an axiomatic characterization for existence of a system of powers and its uniqueness as well as characterizations of various families of rules represented by systems of powers. In particular, we show that a rule satisfies monotonicity, independence, and symmetric linkage (person i and i¡¯s issues should be treated symmetrically to person j and j¡¯s issues for at least one linkage between issues and persons) if and only if there is a system of powers representing the rule and that the system is unique up to a natural equivalence relation. Considering a domain of simple preference relations (trichotomous or dichotomous preferences), we show that a rule satisfies Pareto efficiency, independence, and symmetry (the symmetric treatment condition in a model with an exogenous linkage between issues and persons) if and only if it is represented by a ¡°quasi-plurality system of powers¡±. For the exercise of a power under a quasi-plurality system, at least either a majority (or (n + 1)/2) consent or a 50% (or (n ? 1)/2) consent is needed.
    Keywords: Powers; Consent; Libertarian Rights; Monotonicity; Independence; Symmetric linkage; Symmetry; Pareto efficiency; Plurality
    JEL: D70 D71 D72
    Date: 2005–03
  2. By: Biung-Ghi Ju (Department of Economics, The University of Kansas)
    Abstract: A society needs to decide which issues (laws, public projects, public facilities, etc.) in an agenda to accept. The decision can be any subset of the agenda but must reflect the preferences of its members, which are assumed to be ¡°separable weak orderings¡±. We characterize a family of ¡°plurality-like¡± rules based on strategy-proofness, restricted efficiency, anonymity, and two weak axioms pertaining to the variable agenda feature of our model, called dummy independence and division indifference. We also characterize a wide spectrum of rules dropping anonymity or restricted efficiency.
    Keywords: Plurality, Strategy-proofness, Efficiency, Restricted efficiency, Anonymity, Division indifference, Separable preferences
    JEL: D70 D71
    Date: 2005–03

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