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on Central and Western Asia |
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Issue of 2022‒08‒08
three papers chosen by |
| By: | Brauweiler, Hans-Christian; Yerimpasheva, Aida |
| Abstract: | The BRI initiative presents a colossal opportunity for landlocked Kazakhstan to become a central logistics hub. However, this prospect is overshadowed by geopolitical risks that have escalated since the beginning of 2022. The Ukrainian crisis increased geopolitical tensions on the Eurasian continent and worldwide. Furthermore, it disrupted respectively delayed logistics, as the borders both between Russian Federation and Belarussia on one side and many nations in Europe were practically closed, air traffic has to take huge diversions, increasing time and costs for the freight. A full-scale crisis has global consequences for states and people. Western companies have stopped their activities in Russia. Western countries have imposed unprecedentedly harsh sanctions on Russia. Supply chains can be broken. Chinese companies are concerned that their goods may be stopped at the border between Russia and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Because of close economic and political ties with the Russian Federation and membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), Kazakhstan is concerned with secondary sanctions. Actually, there is already some impact, as Russian Banks in Kazakhstan have to cope with difficulties in international payments, which rebounds to their (innocent, kazakh and international expatriate) customers. Companies face a particular business risk that can be referred to as "geopolitical risk." Geopolitical risks are becoming the main problem for the further development of the Eurasian region. |
| Keywords: | logistics,hub,geopolitical risks,projects,EAEU,BRI,SREB,cooperation,transport logistics complex |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:opodis:20222&r= |
| By: | Laura Courchesne (Princeton University; University of Oxford,); Brian McQuinn (University of Regina); Cody Buntain (University of Maryland) |
| Abstract: | On August 15, 2021, a spokesperson of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the Taliban’s self- proclaimed state, declared on Twitter: “With the help of God, and the support of the nation, we are now in control of all parts of the country. We would like to congratulate our nation on this big achievement.†After 20 years of conflict with U.S. and NATO coalition forces, no one predicted the speed with which the Taliban would consolidate power and precipitate the collapse of the Afghan government and military. Presenting research conducted by the newly established Centre for Artificial Intelligence, Data, and Conflict (CAIDAC), this report explores social media’s central role in the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan and the strategies used by the group to manipulate international and domestic audiences. It examines the Taliban’s social media strategy on Twitter throughout their takeover of Afghanistan, which culminated in the storming of Kabul on August 15, 2021. Specifically, we studied the activity of 63 accounts claimed by the Taliban leadership, spokespersons, and avowed members from April 1 to September 16, 2021. These accounts had more than 2 million followers on Twitter in September 2021. As of May 8, 2022, Taliban content reaches more than 3.3 million accounts. We also examined the broader Taliban ecosystem, which included more than 126,000 Twitter accounts that either retweeted Taliban content or posted content subsequently shared by the Taliban’s core network. We found clear patterns in the group’s communication strategies, visual imagery deployed, and the timing and content of social media activity and events on the ground. |
| Keywords: | Afghanistan, Civil War, Insurgency, Terrorism Politics, Public Opinion, Violence; Twitter |
| JEL: | D83 F51 |
| Date: | 2022–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pri:esocpu:30&r= |
| By: | Arzu Kibris (University of Warwick); Lena Gerling (University of Muenster) |
| Abstract: | We study the individual-level effects of exposure to internal armed conflict on social capital, focusing on trust in institutions and in social relations. We introduce new data from a large-N field survey we conducted in Turkey in 2019, exploiting a natural experimental setting that is created by the military institutions and the geography of the long running civil conflict in the country. This setting allows us to identify and analyze the causal impacts of conflict exposure on trust assessments of our respondents in isolation from possible confoundment by conflict-related changes in the socio-economic environment. Results indicate heterogenous effects depending on the type of exposure. We find that while exposure to the conflict environment increases trust, those who directly experience violent events in that environment exhibit lower levels of trust. We document that the results are comparable for two different dimensions of trust, namely institutional trust and social trust. We then show that the effects transmit through exposure-induced changes in an individual’s worldviews. Our results highlight the legacies of internal conflicts on beliefs and behavior. |
| Date: | 2022–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hic:wpaper:363&r= |