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on Central and Western Asia |
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Issue of 2022‒06‒27
twenty-two papers chosen by |
| By: | Fischer, Sabine; Stanzel, Angela |
| Abstract: | Russia and China are seen as the main beneficiaries of the Western withdrawal from Afghanistan regarding their political influence and potential exertion of power. In both the Chinese and Russian debate, however, alongside triumphant comments about Western failure, serious concerns about the regional security situation are being voiced. Western actors should seek a more nuanced understanding of Beijing's and Moscow's perspectives. This could also lead to opportunities for cooperation that would serve to stabilise Central Asia and Afghanistan. In view of the intensifying global systemic rivalry, however, the scope for cooperation will remain limited. |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:502021&r= |
| By: | Schmitz, Andrea |
| Abstract: | Afghanistan's Central Asian neighbours have generally reacted pragmatically to the Taliban's seizure of power there. For the autocratically ruled, secular states on the periphery of the former Soviet empire, economic cooperation and the stabilisation of humanitarian and political conditions in Afghanistan are at the forefront of their interests in maintaining relations with their southern neighbour. According to official discourse, Central Asia's entrenched secularism is not challenged by the Taliban's Islamism. On social media in Central Asia, however, the Islamic emirate of the Taliban is portrayed as a political counter-model; one which is more positively received in countries with greater discursive freedom and under governments whose policies more openly confront the Taliban. This reveals a trend towards Islamist-inspired identity formation that will be difficult to stop through censorship and repression. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:172022&r= |
| By: | Eldem, Tuba |
| Abstract: | On June 26, the Turkish government began constructing the first bridge over Canal Istanbul, the huge waterway project designed to run parallel to the Bosporus Strait. Ankara has presented the megaproject as a strategic move that will turn Turkey into a logistics base and grant it geopolitical leverage over both regional and international trade and transportation routes. However, Turkey's political opposition considers Canal Istanbul to be a rent-seeking project designed to attract international - probably Chinese and Arab - investment in the hope of reviving Turkey's deteriorating economy. The Canal may also affect the Montreux Convention, the decades old treaty that governs the Turkish Straits. Given the rivalry between the US and Russia, questions around the Montreux Convention will add another point of contention, increase tensions and may also present serious consequences for Turkey. |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:432021&r= |
| By: | Tastan, Kadri |
| Abstract: | Russia's attack on Ukraine has once again highlighted Europe's heavy dependence on Russian natural gas and thus, among other things, underlined the significance of energy cooperation between the European Union (EU) and Turkey. Traditionally, Turkish-European energy relations have prioritised the diversification of energy resources in the face of Europe's dependence on Russia. The new emerging political, geopolitical, and energy context will have repercussions on Turkish-European energy relation. However, it is the ambitious process of decarbonisation of the economy and energy launched by the EU that will decisively shape the nature and future of Turkey-EU energy relations. Indeed, both European and Turkish interests related to energy security, energy affordability, and climate change mitigation require EU-Turkey cooperation in the decarbonisation process, which is expected to be very challenging. Energy transition is the key to medium- and long-term energy security for both sides. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:232022&r= |
| By: | Smolnik, Franziska; Sarjveladze, Mikheil; Tadumadze, Giorgi |
| Abstract: | Since the parliamentary elections in October 2020, Georgia's government and opposition have found themselves in a political deadlock. This is evidenced above all by the fact that the majority of elected opposition parties have boycotted entering parliament. The country is not only facing domestic political challenges. The war over Nagorno-Karabakh has also changed the regional constellation. While Russia and Turkey have positioned themselves as influential actors in the region, the EU has been barely visible. For Georgia, which is the only country in the South Caucasus to have clear EU and NATO ambitions, this change is a potential threat to its pro-Western course. Tbilisi continues to have high expectations of the EU, which claims to be a geopolitical actor. Both the new regional context and the Georgian domestic political crisis should be an inducement for the EU to engage more with its eastern neighbourhood, and especially to give new impetus to its relations with Euro-Atlantic orientated Georgia. |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:262021&r= |
| By: | Rau, Moritz; Seufert, Günter; Westphal, Kirsten |
| Abstract: | The EU and Germany have set themselves ambitious climate and energy policy targets. Taking into account the need to reduce emissions from all sectors of the economy, they now have a different perspective on the energy situation in the Eastern Mediterranean than a few years ago. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:82022&r= |
| By: | Dalay, Galip |
| Abstract: | Turkey and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are taking steps to mend their ties. The UAE, it seems, is eager to refashion its image as a bridge-builder in regional politics and hedge its options in the face of the US downsizing its regional security commitments in the Middle East. Turkey, on its end, is eager to get out of the political/ideological box that it has found itself in since the onset of the Arab Uprisings and to lessen the economic cost of its geopolitical activism in the time of a deepening economic crisis at home. Though economic interests can bring the two countries closer, geopolitics can just as easily drive them apart. In spite of a seeming thaw, major sources of tension in these relations remain. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:12022&r= |
| By: | Seufert, Günter |
| Abstract: | In stark contrast to Germany's Bundestag elections in 2017, Turkey has hardly been mentioned in this year's election campaign. Nevertheless, today's relatively relaxed atmosphere between Berlin and Ankara and the lack of prominence ascribed to their relationship in the German election campaign do not mean that shaping future foreign policy on Turkey will be an easy undertaking. Ankara is making a number of demands on the European Union (EU). Cooperation on refugee matters and efforts to deepen the customs union with the EU are to continue. The Turkish government also wants to be involved in European consultations. It is now up to Germany's new federal government to make its position known on these matters. However, Turkey is no easy partner to deal with and in order to achieve rules-based cooperation, Berlin and Brussels must, for their part, formulate clear conditions, for example, when it comes to cooperation on migration and defence. They also need to decide how to shape Turkey's future relationship with Europe. |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:552021&r= |
| By: | Adar, Sinem |
| Abstract: | Undermining the foundational pillars of the post-Cold War security order, Vladimir Putin's war against Ukraine is a watershed event for Europe and the wider world, Turkey included. While Ankara is trying to protect its economy and security interests, anti-Western narratives dominate the public debate. The war has indeed accentuated anti-Westernism as one of the main fault lines of political competition. Given the geopolitical imperatives that February 24 brought to the fore, it is highly likely that, in the short-term, Turkey's NATO membership and its Association Agreement with the EU will - geopolitically and economically - continue to anchor it to the West. Whether or not a full strategic alignment with the EU will accompany such an anchoring is far from certain, however, mainly due to Turkey's domestic political dynamics, but also due to the unclarity about how far the EU is willing to move beyond a transactional approach. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:252022&r= |
| By: | Adar, Sinem; Püttmann, Friedrich |
| Abstract: | Managing irregular migration is a focal point of EU-Turkey relations today. European perspectives on this issue, for the most part, are split into two camps: a 'caring' one, which concentrates on the well-being of refugees, and a 'concerned' one, which focusses on the external border security of the European Union (EU) and the anxieties of EU citizens. Widely overlooked in the European discussions is the mounting social and political discontent in Turkey, which is hosting the largest refugee population worldwide while facing a serious economic crisis alongside a severe governance deadlock. To bear fruits in the long run, any EU-Turkey migration cooperation should account for this growing discontent. After all, neither the advancement of the rights of refugees in Turkey nor reliable security cooperation is possible without accord by the Turkish political class and society. To this end, the EU should signal to Turkey its intention to resettle more refugees and support local integration efforts more proactively. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:72022&r= |
| By: | Tanrıverdi Yaşar, Nebahat; Aksoy, Hürcan Aslı |
| Abstract: | Ankara adopted notably toned-down language towards Tunisian President Kaïs Saïed's power grab and avoided calling it a coup, although it considers the course of events as a potential threat that could endanger its policies towards North Africa. In fact, Turkey revised its approach to Tunisia after secular parties became more prominent in Tunisian politics following the 2014 elections. This policy adjustment consists of developing a balanced network of relations by reaching out to secular parties on the one hand, but retaining close ties with the Islamist Ennahda party on the other hand. To this end, Ankara is giving weight to defence diplomacy and soft power. This tactful approach is in line with Turkey's efforts to strengthen its geostrategic and geo-economic ties with the Maghreb countries and overlaps with ongoing normalisation efforts between Ankara and Arab capitals. But this approach is limited to a pragmatic policy adjustment. Germany and other European states should see this as an opportunity to encourage regional de-escalation and contribute to a constructive regional dialogue. |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:522021&r= |
| By: | Abbas Moosvi (Pakistan Institute of Development Economics) |
| Abstract: | The widespread phenomenon of street vending, particularly in the developing world, is a fascinating one. With gradual industrialisation, countries in the Global South have experienced significant levels of urban migration—people moving out of their rural settings in the search for better economic opportunities in closer proximity to commercial hubs (Recchi, 2020). |
| Keywords: | Street Vending |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pid:kbrief:2021:39&r= |
| By: | Raja Rafiullah (Pakistan Institute of Development Economics) |
| Abstract: | Domestic Commerce historically has been ignored by both policy-makers and researchers in Pakistan to date. This is reflected in the reflected by the dearth of existing research on domestic commerce and its potential for driving economic growth. [1] The poor state of domestic markets is reflected in the Global Competitiveness Index rankings. |
| Keywords: | Domestic Commerce, |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pid:kbrief:2021:25&r= |
| By: | Dalay, Galip; Isachenko, Daria |
| Abstract: | The Ukraine crisis poses two particularly uneasy questions for Turkey: How to uphold a power balance in the Black Sea? And how to manage its relations between Russia, Ukraine and the West? So far, Ankara's policy towards Moscow consists of both deterrence and dialogue. In regards deterrence, Turkey is closer to the non-EU members of NATO such as the US and the UK. Meanwhile, Turkey's policy of dialogue is similar to that of EU members, most notably Germany. However, while there is a certain degree of similarity between the stances of Turkey and some Western countries in the current crisis, their convergence of interests has not yet resulted in any meaningful cooperation. In the short term, the parallel track of deterrence and dialogue still gives Turkey some leeway to continue its multi-vector manoeuvring. The Ukrainian imbroglio is, however, a manifestation of a crisis concerning the current European security order, or more precisely the lack thereof, thus making it necessary to define the role of not only Russia but also Turkey in any European design for a new security architecture. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:92022&r= |
| By: | Seufert, Günter |
| Abstract: | Ahead of his trip to Turkish-occupied northern Cyprus on July 20, 2021, the Turkish President announced that he would be bringing 'good news' to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Speculation ran rampant that Erdoğan would use the 47th anniversary of the Turkish invasion to announce that Azerbaijan, Pakistan, or Kyrgyzstan would establish diplomatic relations with the TRNC, which is currently recognized only by Turkey. But Erdoğan merely unveiled the construction of a pompous presidential palace that would befit a future, independent "Turkish Cypriot State". The Turkish president is still reluctant to back up his words of international recognition of the TRNC with deeds. But the visit shows that Ankara is working toward the final division of the island, and Erdoğan's actions made it clear once again that he alone calls the shots in northern Cyprus. |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:472021&r= |
| By: | Can, Osman |
| Abstract: | On 2 March 2021, the Turkish Prosecutor General's office opened investigations into the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP). On 17 March it filed its application with the Constitutional Court to have the party banned. The Prosecutor General further sought to prohibit 687 HDP officials from engaging in political activities for five years. This would have amounted to excluding almost all HDP politicians from politics, and thus closing political channels for discussing and solving the Kurdish question for years. On 31 March the Constitutional Court rejected the application due to procedural flaws. However, on 6 June, the Prosecutor General's office announced that it had filed a further motion to ban the party. This move to prohibit civilian and non-violent Kurdish politics risks augmenting the illegal Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and perpetuating the Kurdish conflict. It reveals the entanglement of politics and the judiciary in Turkey, and highlights structural deficits in the Turkish Constitution. |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:382021&r= |
| By: | Aksoy, Hürcan Aslı; Roll, Stephan |
| Abstract: | The visit of a high-ranking Turkish delegation to Cairo in early May 2021 indicates a turning-point in the relations between Turkey and Egypt. Since the 2013 military coup in Egypt, the leaders of these two Mediterranean countries had been extremely hos-tile towards each other. The current rapprochement, which might lead in a best case scenario to a resumption of diplomatic relations, thus comes as a surprise. But it is limited in scope. The main obstacles to a closer partnership between Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdel Fatah al-Sisi are differences in the ideological foundations of their regimes. The aim of these current shifts in foreign policy is to increase the presidents' room for manoeuvre. Their regimes are under pressure due to regional, international, and domestic developments. Germany and the EU should support the normalisation attempts because they can contribute to de-escalation in the region. Both regimes' current weaknesses in foreign policy and the economy provide an opportunity to call for political change in other areas. |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:392021&r= |
| By: | Akbulut-Yuksel, Mevlude (Dalhousie University); Mocan, Naci (Louisiana State University); Tumen, Semih (TED University); Turan, Belgi (TOBB University of Economy and Technology) |
| Abstract: | We analyze the impact on crime of 3.7 million refugees who entered and stayed in Turkey as a result of the civil war in Syria. Using a novel administrative data source on the flow of offense records to prosecutors' offices in 81 provinces of the country each year, and utilizing the staggered movement of refugees across provinces over time, we estimate instrumental variables models that address potential endogeneity of the number of refugees and their location, and find that an increase in the number of refugees leads to more crime. We estimate that the influx of refugees between 2012 and 2016 generated additional 75,000 to 150,000 crimes per year, although it is not possible to identify the distribution of these crimes between refugees and natives. Additional analyses reveal that low-educated native population has a separate, but smaller, effect on crime. We also highlight the pitfalls of employing incorrect empirical procedures and using poor proxies of criminal activity which produce the wrong inference about the refugee-crime relationship. Our results underline the need to quickly strengthen the social safety systems, to take actions to dampen the impact on the labor market, and to provide support to the criminal justice system in order to mitigate the repercussions of massive influx of individuals into a country, and to counter the social and political backlash that typically emerges in the wake of such large-scale population movements. |
| Keywords: | refugees, crime, instrumental variables, measurement of crime |
| JEL: | J08 J2 J3 J38 J61 J68 K14 K37 K42 |
| Date: | 2022–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp15335&r= |
| By: | Steinberg, Guido; Albrecht, Aljoscha |
| Abstract: | Since the United States withdrew from Afghanistan in August 2021 and the Taliban took power in the country, the local branch of Islamic State (IS) - the so-called Khorasan Province - has carried out dozens of attacks on Taliban 'security forces' and civilians, resulting in hundreds of deaths. Many attacks have been in the old IS stronghold of Nangarhar in eastern Afghanistan and in the capital, Kabul, but the jihadists have also been active in Kandahar, Kunduz and Kunar. The latest terrorist acts demonstrate the enormous challenge that IS poses for the Taliban. Owing to a lack of funds, personnel and structures, the latter is unable to exercise effective control over all Afghan territory and significantly weaken IS. In fact, there is a danger that these shortfalls will allow IS to expand its terrorist activities beyond Afghanistan. While the neighbouring states of Pakistan, Iran, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are particularly at risk, Europe, too, could become a target. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:122022&r= |
| By: | Yeğen, Mesut |
| Abstract: | Not long ago, the Kurdish question (KQ) topped the agenda of Turkish politics. Thanks mainly to what was called the Resolution Process between 2009 and 2015, there was a tense but lively political and public discussion on this colossal problem that the Turkish republic has long been tackling with since its foundation. In the past few years, however, the KQ ceased to be a priority issue in Turkish politics. So much so that the "terror question", a watchword for the KQ in the daily lexicon of mainstream Turkish politics, is no longer regarded by the Turkish public as being among the country's top political problems. However, recently, there have appeared some new signs which indicate that the KQ will most likely return to the political agenda. Both Turkish President Erdoğan and the leaders of the country's opposition parties have taken steps that reveal that they will revisit the KQ as the 2023 Turkish general election approaches. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:282022&r= |
| By: | Azizi, Hamidreza |
| Abstract: | On January 3, 2020, the Iranian Quds Force commander, Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, was assassinated by the United States in Iraq. He was considered the mastermind behind Iran's regional strategy, especially in Syria and Iraq. A year and a half later, the Islamic Republic continues to wield considerable influence in Iraq, and Iran-backed militias continue to violently pressure US forces to leave Iraq. However, Iran now faces a series of serious challenges that are directly and indirectly related to Soleimani's death. In the geopolitical and economic spheres, the influence of Iran's rivals in Iraq has increased, while Tehran's room for maneuver has become increasingly limited. In the political arena, divisions among Iran-backed forces in Iraq have increased, while Iran's direct influence over the Iraqi government has been declining. At the same time, rising anti-Iranian sentiments among the Iraqi people have reduced Iran's social capital in the neighboring country. The combination of these factors seems to be limiting Iran's influence in Iraq. The EU should build upon this opportunity to support a strong Iraqi government that pursues a multi-vector foreign policy. |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:442021&r= |
| By: | Yukimi Shimoda |
| Abstract: | Over the last decade, collaboration with the private sector in international development has accelerated to empower target populations and realise a sustainable society without inequality and poverty. Existing studies show that paid work could empower vulnerable people, such as women, by expanding their opportunities and the lifestyles to which they have access. However, interrelationships between economic (e.g. income) and non-economic (e.g. empowerment) benefits are not as straightforward as the literature on inclusive business suggests. This paper explores the case of a development project in the Kyrgyz Republic supported by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) in collaboration with a Japanese retail and manufacturing corporation. The felt business upon which they collaborated eventually involved hundreds of women (producers) in villages scattered around Lake Issyk-Kul. This study analyses interviews with local stakeholders, especially felt producers and their families, and reveals both the economic and non-economic effects of the business and their impacts on producers, families, and communities at large. Paid work allows producers to contribute to their household economy, which, in turn, enhances their self-respect. In contrast, the data also show that women’s decisions to participate in the business depended on their individual circumstances, such as the availability of family support and particularly the understanding of their husbands. The paper suggests that the application of business approaches to development has both potential benefits and limitations, since the creation and maintenance of choices and empowerment for women are affected by the intricate relationships between the economic and non-economic aspects of their lives. |
| Keywords: | inclusive business, women, choice, empowerment, capability, Kyrgyzstan |
| Date: | 2022–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jic:wpaper:231&r= |