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on Central and Western Asia |
| By: | Breen, Benjamin; Hynes, Stephen |
| Abstract: | EU policy geared towards the sustainable development of European coastal areas has incorporated Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) as one of its primary mechanisms to achieve its goal. However, critical shortcomings in the ICZM paradigm have emerged. In particular, incoherence in the European Commission’s ICZM principles with respect to local and strategic objectives remains an issue. Additionally, a lack of scientific certainty about environmental processes when determining the environmental pros and cons of alternative coastal-management decisions undermines environmentally protective decisions that may otherwise hinder local regional development. With these issues in mind, a Biodiversity Portfolio Analysis (BPA) is applied to Iarras Aithneach, a peninsula on the west coast of Ireland, to test its suitability as tool for ICZM. In addition, the paper uses the BPA methodology to explore the contrast between scientific/strategic and local attitudes towards the management of a coastal area of environmental importance. Pronounced differences between the two are found and the implications for both BPA and ICZM are discussed. The spatial and participatory nature of the BPA process and the explicit treatment of risk the framework exhibits suggest there is scope for it to become a useful tool for ICZM. It also has the potential to act as a routine way of quantifying the “attitude gap” between the scientific community and the local community when managing a unique coastal area. |
| Keywords: | Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM), Biodiversity Portfolio Analysis (BPA), Environmental Economics and Policy, |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:semrui:148829&r=cwa |
| By: | Charles E. McLure, Jr. (Hoover Institution, Stanford University) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines subsidies for the consumption of fossil fuels provided by developing countries and oil-exporting countries. (In what follows all unqualified references to fuel subsidies are to subsidies for the consumption of fossil fuels, including electricity that is generated by combusting fossil fuel. Thus neither production subsidies nor subsidies for other types of energy, such as hydro, solar, wind, and nuclear, are considered.6 In this context, “consumption” does not mean only household consumption; it includes consumption by business and governments.) The next section describes the negative effects of fuel subsidies mentioned above in greater detail. Although emphasis in this paper, as in most of the literature and in policy discussions, is on eliminating fuel subsidies, it should be emphasized that reforming fuel subsidies does not necessarily mean eliminating them quickly. There may be cases in which temporary, limited, and well-targeted fuel subsidies are appropriate. No effort has been made to identify these cases, which would require case-by-case analysis of the situation in particular countries. Progress has been made in recent years in reducing or eliminating subsidies to the consumption of fossil fuels, but much remains to be done.7 Section III discusses briefly how fuel subsidies are defined, describes the price-gap methodology commonly used in cross-country comparisons of consumption subsidies, indicates some shortcomings in that methodology, and notes that the level of subsidies is quite sensitive to international fuel prices, moving in concert with them. Section IV presents estimates of fossil fuel consumption subsidies for the 37 countries on which the International Energy Agency has complete data. The section then briefly describes some of the implications of eliminating subsidies, focusing on potential budget impacts in countries that, as a fraction of GDP, run significant budget deficits and spend significant amounts on fuel subsidies. Fuel consumption subsidies are often defended as alleviating poverty, and some subsidies may further this objective. But, because fuel subsidies are often poorly targeted, the distributional impact of many subsidies is regressive, or at best proportionate to income. Regressivity is especially likely in most of the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa and some of those in Asia, where only a small minority of the population – fewer than 10 percent in many countries – uses modern fuels and may not even have access to them. It is often the middle class who benefit the most from fuel subsidies – and who defend them most adamantly.8 Section V discusses the distributional impact of eliminating subsidies, which varies from country to country, as well as by the type of fuel subsidized. Although fuel subsidies are costly and are not well-targeted to relieve poverty, eliminating subsidies may impose onerous burdens on the poor. It may thus be necessary, for humanitarian as well as political reasons, to accompany subsidy reform with measures to alleviate the burden on the poor. Section VI examines measures that can be used to protect the poor when fuel consumption subsidies are reformed. Lack of space and expertise precludes discussion of the important issues involved in implementing fuel subsidy reform, including means of increasing support for reform by addressing distributional concerns.9 The use of biomass (firewood, charcoal, straw, agricultural residue, or dung) or coal for cooking and heating has several serious disadvantages: inter alia, emissions of GHGs are greater than with fossil fuels other than coal, dangerous indoor air pollution leads to impaired health, especially for women and small children, use of biomass often requires devotion of many hours to gathering fuel, again commonly by women and children, and, where dung is used for fuel, it causes deterioration of soil fertility. In recent years substantial attention has been devoted to assuring access to clean energy for all.10 An alternative argument for subsidizing the use of fossil fuels, albeit one that probably does not explain the prevalence of subsidies, is thus to induce poor households to shift from biomass and coal (solid or “traditional fuels”) to modern (non-solid) fuels (kerosene, gas, and electricity). Section VII discusses the use of fuel subsidies to encourage consumers to switch from traditional fuels to modern fuels. A short concluding section draws some tentative conclusions, based on the analysis presented earlier. There is clearly a strong case for reforming subsidies to the consumption of fossil fuels, as reform would improve environmental, economic, and budgetary, performance in countries now providing fuel subsidies. Care must be taken, however, to avoid or offset adverse effects on the real income of the poor. |
| Date: | 2013–04–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper1312&r=cwa |
| By: | Helm, Roland; Gritsch, Stephanie |
| Keywords: | Marketing Intelligence; market-/resource-based view of strategy; Marktorientierung; Vertrieb |
| Date: | 2013–05–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bay:rdwiwi:28171&r=cwa |
| By: | Peeters R.J.A.P.; Khan A. (GSBE) |
| Abstract: | We study the evolution of imitation behaviour in a differentiated market where firms are located equidistantly on a (Salop) circle. Firms choose price and quantity simultaneously, leaving open the possibility for non-market clearing outcomes. The strategy of the most successful firm is imitated. Behaviour in the stochastically stable outcome depends on the level of market differentiation and corresponds exactly with the Nash equilibrium of the underlying game. For high level of differentiation, firms end up at the monopoly outcome. For intermediate level of differentiation, they gravitate to a ``mutually non-aggressive'' outcome where price is higher than the monopoly price. For low level of differentiation, firms price at a mark-up above the marginal cost. Market clearing always results endogenously. |
| Keywords: | Noncooperative Games; |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:umagsb:2013022&r=cwa |
| By: | Lunn, Pete |
| Abstract: | This paper challenges the increasingly common view that the findings of behavioural economics constitute a fourth type of market failure. The market failure framework elevates the standard competitive market model to the status of an ideal. It provides us with tools to identify departures from the ideal model and to deduce a direction policy might take to restore it. Many behavioural phenomena also imply departures from the ideal model. Yet rather than allowing us to deduce a good direction for policy, the findings question the legitimacy and usefulness of this deductive theoretical framework for policy analysis. Two policy problems are highlighted here: the validity of inferring that consumers' choices after an intervention improve outcomes relative to their previous choices, and the potential for distributional consequences when policy alters consumers' choices. The paper concludes that, given these problems, conceiving of the relevant behavioural phenomena as an additional form of market failure is potentially to misunderstand their implications for consumer and competition policy. |
| Keywords: | Market Failure/Decision-making biases/Behavioural economics/Regulation |
| JEL: | D03 D18 L96 |
| Date: | 2013–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esr:wpaper:wp455&r=cwa |
| By: | Anna Kowalska-Pyzalska; Katarzyna Maciejowska; Katarzyna Sznajd-Weron; Rafal Weron |
| Abstract: | Using an agent-based modeling approach we show how personal attributes, like conformity or indifference, impact the opinions of individual electricity consumers regarding switching to innovative dynamic tariff programs. We also examine the influence of advertising, discomfort of usage and the expectations of financial savings on opinion dynamics. Our main finding is that currently the adoption of dynamic electricity tariffs is virtually impossible due to the high level of indifference in today's societies. However, if in the future the indifference level is reduced, e.g., through educational programs that would make the customers more engaged in the topic, factors like tariff pricing schemes and intensity of advertising will became the focal point. |
| Keywords: | Dynamic pricing; Time-of-use tariff; Demand response; Diffusion of innovations; Agent-based model; Spinson |
| JEL: | C63 O33 Q48 Q55 |
| Date: | 2013–05–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wuu:wpaper:hsc1305&r=cwa |