nep-cwa New Economics Papers
on Central and Western Asia
Issue of 2006‒08‒12
five papers chosen by
Nurdilek Hacialioglu
Open University

  1. An Optimization-Based Decision Support System for Strategic Planning in a Process Industry: The Case of a Pharmaceutical Company in India By Dutta Goutam; Fourer Robert; Majumdar Akhilesh; Dutta Debabrata
  2. Women’s solidarity as a resistance strategy against liberalidentity politics in Turkey By Melissa Bilal
  3. Managing Bullwhip Effect: Two Case Studies By Ravichandran N.
  4. Horizontal versus Vertical Electronic Business-to-Business Marketplaces By Marco Henseler
  5. The Limits of Self-Governance in the Presence of Spite: Experimental Evidence from Urban and Rural Russia By Simon Gächter; Benedikt Herrmann

  1. By: Dutta Goutam; Fourer Robert; Majumdar Akhilesh; Dutta Debabrata
    Abstract: We describe how a generic multi-period optimization-based decision support system (DSS) can be used for strategic planning in process industries. Built on five fundamental elements – materials, facilities, activities, time periods and storage areas – this DSS requires little direct knowledge of optimization techniques to be used effectively. It is user friendly and requires little knowledge of optimization. Results based on real data from a pharmaceuticals company in India demonstrate significant potential for improvements in revenues and profits.
    Date: 2006–08–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iim:iimawp:2006-08-02&r=cwa
  2. By: Melissa Bilal
    Date: 2006–05–26
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iis:dispap:iiisdp153&r=cwa
  3. By: Ravichandran N.
    Abstract: The purpose of this article is to present two examples based on real life experiences where the Bullwhip effect in supply chain is considerably reduced. Both examples relate to the consumer durables industry in India. The first example uses Enterprise Resource Planning and Vendor Managed Inventory as tools to reduce the Bullwhip Effect. The second example uses a modification of the classical inventory control policies to eliminate Bullwhip Effect. Based on these two empirical case studies, we argue that managing Bullwhip Effect is a strategic initiative by organization and the best approach is a combination of several tactical initiatives.
    Date: 2006–08–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iim:iimawp:2006-08-01&r=cwa
  4. By: Marco Henseler (Institute of Economics and Law, Department of Microeconomics and Spatial Economics, University of Stuttgart)
    Abstract: This paper analyzes the behavior of horizontal B2B marketplaces along the supply chain in case a vertical intermediary tries to enter by attracting industry-specific buy-side and sell-side firms. It will be shown that an entrant can only integrate all firms along the vertical production chain in case the industry is strong buy-side dominated. For the remaining scenarios we will determine different levels of integration for buy-side and sell-side dominated branches, in which firms from upper stages will stay at the incumbent. Moreover, we will show that horizontal marketplaces for MRO and other simple goods will being driven out of the market in any case.
    Keywords: intermediation, matching, two-sided markets
    JEL: C78 L13 L22 L86
    Date: 2006–07–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:stt:dpaper:20061&r=cwa
  5. By: Simon Gächter (University of Nottingham, CESifo and IZA Bonn); Benedikt Herrmann (University of Nottingham)
    Abstract: We report evidence from public goods experiments with and without punishment which we conducted in Russia with 566 urban and rural participants of young and mature age cohorts. Russia is interesting for studying voluntary cooperation because of its long history of collectivism, and a huge urban-rural gap. In contrast to previous experiments we find no cooperation-enhancing effect of punishment. An important reason is that there is substantial spiteful punishment of high contributors in all four subject pools. Thus, spite undermines the scope for self-governance in the sense of high levels of voluntary cooperation that are sustained by sanctioning free riders only.
    Keywords: social norms, free riding, punishment, spite, experiments
    JEL: H41 C91 D23 C72
    Date: 2006–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2236&r=cwa

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