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on Central and Western Asia |
| By: | B Bhaskara Rao (University of the South Pacific); Singh Rup (University of the South Pacific) |
| Abstract: | The demand for money, especially in the developing countries, is an important relationship for formulating appropriate monetary policy and targeting monetary variables. In this paper we estimate the demand for narrow money in India and evaluate its robustness. It is found that there is a stable demand for money for almost half a century from 1953 to 2003. There is no evidence for any significant effects of the $1991$ financial reforms. |
| Keywords: | Demand for money, Developing countries, Income and interest rate elasticities, Cointegration, Financial reforms. |
| JEL: | C1 C5 C8 |
| Date: | 2005–10–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0510002&r=cwa |
| By: | Arturo Galindo; Fabio Schiantarelli (Boston College); Andrew Weiss (Boston University) |
| Abstract: | Using firm level panel data from twelve developing countries we explore if financial liberalization improves the efficiency with which investment funds are allocated. A summary index of the efficiency of investment allocation that measures whether investment funds are going to firms with a higher marginal return to capital is developed. We examine the relationship between this and various measures of financial liberalization and find that liberalization increases the efficiency with which investment funds are allocated. This holds after various robustness checks and is consistent with firm level evidence that a stronger association between investment and fundamentals after financial liberalization. |
| Keywords: | financial liberalization, investment, efficiency, reform, development |
| JEL: | E22 E44 G28 O16 |
| Date: | 2005–10–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:boc:bocoec:625&r=cwa |
| By: | Roger Gordon; Wei Li |
| Abstract: | Observed economic policies in developing countries differ sharply both from those observed among developed countries and from those forecast by existing models of optimal policies. For example, developing countries rely little on broad-based taxes, and make substantial use of tariffs and seignorage as nontax sources of revenue. The objective of this paper is to contrast the implications of two models designed to explain such anomalous policies. One approach, by Gordon-Li (2005), focuses on the greater difficulties faced in poor countries in monitoring taxable activity, and explores the best available policies given such difficulties. The other, building on Grossman-Helpman (1994), presumes that political-economy problems in developing countries are worse, leading to worse policy choices. The paper compares the contrasting theoretical implications of the two models with the data, and finds that the political-economy approach does poorly in reconciling many aspects of the data with the theory. In contrast, the forecasts from Gordon-Li model are largely consistent with the data currently available. |
| JEL: | H21 O23 O17 F13 F23 |
| Date: | 2005–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11661&r=cwa |
| By: | Ajit K. Ghose (International Labour Office, Employment Strategy Department) |
| Date: | 2004 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ilo:empstr:2004-11&r=cwa |
| By: | Eli Berman; Laurence R. Iannaccone |
| Abstract: | This paper challenges conventional views of violent religious extremism, particularly those that emphasize militant theology. We offer an alternative analysis that helps explain the persistent demand for religion, the different types of religious that naturally arise, and the special attributes of the “sectarian” type. Sects are adept at producing club goods both spiritual and material. Where governments and economies function poorly, sects often become major suppliers of social services, political action, and coercive force. Their success as providers is much more due to the advantages of their organizational structure than it is to their theology. Religious militancy is most effectively controlled through a combination of policies that raise the direct costs of violence, foster religious competition, improve social services, and encourage private enterprise. |
| JEL: | Z12 H56 H41 K4 |
| Date: | 2005–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11663&r=cwa |