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on Central and Western Asia |
| By: | Andrew E. Clark (CNRS, PSE and IZA Bonn) |
| Abstract: | Job quality may usefully be thought of as depending on both job values (how much workers care about different job outcomes) and the job outcomes themselves. Here both crosssection and panel data are used to examine changes in job quality in OECD countries over the 1990s. Despite rising wages and falling hours, overall job satisfaction is either stable or declining. These movements are not due to changes in the type of workers, nor to changes in their job values. A number of pieces of evidence point to stress and hard work as being strong candidates for what has gone wrong with employees’ jobs. We find evidence of increasing inequality in a number of job outcomes. Some groups of workers have done better than others: the young and the higher-educated have been insulated against downward movements in job quality, and there is tentative evidence that trade unions may have protected their members against adverse job outcomes. |
| Keywords: | job values, job outcomes, job satisfaction, effort |
| JEL: | J28 J3 J81 |
| Date: | 2005–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1610&r=cwa |
| By: | Hakan Berument (Bilkent University); Nukhet Dogan (Gazi University); Aysit Tansel (Middle East Technical University and IZA Bonn) |
| Abstract: | This article examines whether various macroeconomic policy shocks have different effects on overall unemployment rate and the unemployment rate by different levels of education in Turkey. These effects are assessed for total, male and female unemployment rates separately. To examine the relationship, a quarterly VAR model with a recursive order is employed to estimate the effects of real GDP, price, exchange rate, interbank interest rate, money supply and unemployment for the period from 1988:01 to 2003:04. Main findings indicate that a positive income shock reduces total unemployment while positive exchange rate and interbank interest rate innovations both increase the unemployment rate during the initial periods. The responses of high school educated unemployment rate to five macroeconomic variable shocks are different than the response of other educational unemployment rates. Furthermore, the overall results across gender are similar. |
| Keywords: | unemployment, economic performance and vector autoregressive regression |
| JEL: | E24 C32 |
| Date: | 2005–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1614&r=cwa |
| By: | Carolyn Currie (School of Finance and Economics, University of Technology, Sydney) |
| Abstract: | Regulatory failure causing financial crises has occurred with great frequency in the last ten years in both advanced and emerging nations. Theories of regulation have failed to define and describe the meanings of deregulation, the range of regulatory models and their goals, the significance of regulatory failure, how to measure it and how to prevent it. This paper is motivated by the perception that incorrect design and failure to conduct ongoing performance monitoring of regulatory models in emerging economies as well as in some advanced industrial states is precipitating financial crises. Deregulation is redefined in a framework that recognises the diversity between financial systems that exists due to differences in regulatory models, in the ability to comply with best international structure, in the ownership of the means of production and in the calibre of human and social capital, within the framework of the limiting features of government goals and economic resources and infrastructure. Case studies of regulatory failure in an advanced and an emerging nation illustrate the necessity for a staged approach to liberalisation of a financial system, which takes account of the capacity of the underlying economy and society to conduct effective prudential supervision before attempts are made to remove protective measures. The comparison of fin de millennium solutions in advanced nations of integrated supervisors also illustrates the correct embodiment of government goals in regulatory models and the importance of feedback mechanisms such as the establishment of early warning systems. |
| Keywords: | regulatory failure; regulatory models, deregulation |
| JEL: | K2 N20 N40 P00 |
| Date: | 2005–05–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uts:wpaper:142&r=cwa |
| By: | Asim Mishra (Indian Institute of Management) |
| Abstract: | Past researches have revealed significant abnormal returns for bonus issues even though the bonus issue date is known in advance and the distribution contains no new information. This study examines the stock price reaction to the information content of bonus issues with a view of examining the Indian stock market is semi-strong efficient or not. The period of the study is June 1998 to August 2004. Samples of 46 bonus issues have been used to study the announcement effect by using event study methodology. The results indicate that there are significant positive abnormal returns for a five-day period prior to bonus announcement in line with evidence from developed stock market. On the announcement day the average abnormal return of -0.10% is observed. The results provide stronger evidence of semi-strong market efficiency of the Indian stock market. |
| Keywords: | Bonus Issues, India, stock market, abnormal returns, semi strong efficient, event study, cumulative abnormal return, Cowan Test, Standardized abnormal return, |
| JEL: | G |
| Date: | 2005–05–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwpfi:0505025&r=cwa |
| By: | Martin Brown; Christian Zehnder |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the impact of a public credit registry on the repayment behavior of borrowers. We implement an experimental credit market in which loan repayment is not third-party enforceable. We compare market outcome with a credit registry to that without a credit registry. This experiment is conducted for two market environments: first a market in which interactions between borrowers and lenders are one-o. and, second, a market in which borrowers and lenders can choose to trade repeatedly with each other. In the market with one-o. interactions the credit market collapses without a credit registry as lenders rightly fear that borrowers will default. The introduction of a registry in this environment significantly raises repayment rates and the credit volume extende by lenders. In the market where repeat transactions are possible a credit registry is not necessary to sustain high market performance. In such an environment relationship banking enforces repayment even when lenders cannot share information, so that there is little value added of a public credit registry. |
| Keywords: | Credit Market, Information Sharing, Relationship Banking |
| JEL: | G21 G28 D82 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:iewwpx:240&r=cwa |
| By: | Patricia Justino (Poverty Research Unit at Sussex, Department of Economics, University of Sussex) |
| Abstract: | This paper discusses the importance of social security policies in developing economies, using empirical evidence from India. The paper discusses the viability of implementing systems of social protection in developing countries and provides an empirical analysis of the effects of socio-economic security policies on Indian’s economic performance between 1973 and 1999, using a two-stage least square model adapted to data from a panel of 14 Indian states. The results show that policies that strengthen the social and economic security of the Indian population have been an important endogenous variable to both the reduction of poverty and the economic growth in India. |
| Keywords: | Social security, social protection, economic growth, India, simultaneous equation models, panel data |
| JEL: | C33 H50 I38 O10 O40 O53 |
| Date: | 2003–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pru:wpaper:20&r=cwa |
| By: | Friedrich Schneider; Robert Klinglmair |
| Abstract: | Using various statistical procedures, estimates about the size of the shadow economy in 110 developing, transition and OECD countries are presented. The average size of the shadow economy (in percent of official GDP) over 1999-2000 in developing countries is 41%, in transition countries 38% and in OECD countries 18.0%. An increasing burden of taxation and social security contributions combined with rising state regulatory activities are the driving forces for the growth and size of the shadow economy. If the shadow economy increases by one percent the annual growth rate of the “official” GDP of a developing country (of a industrialized and/or transition country) decreases by 0.6% (increases by 0.8 and 1.0 respectively). |
| Keywords: | shadow economy; interaction of the shadow economy with the official one; tax burden |
| JEL: | O17 O5 D78 H2 H11 H26 |
| Date: | 2004–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cra:wpaper:2004-03&r=cwa |