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on Central and Western Asia |
| By: | Subrata Mandal (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy); M. Govinda Rao (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy) |
| Abstract: | The paper analyses the assignment systems and implementation aspects of environmental regulation in regard to water, air, and forests. The assignment of environmental functions and its overlapping is analysed in terms of not only the different levels of government, but also between the executive and judiciary. Specifically, the paper examines judicial intervention in environmental protection in India and argues that judicial activism although can be construed as a part of "checks and balances" in a federal system, it cannot be a substitute to the failure of executive in undertaking the task of environmental protection. The paper also analyses the implementation aspects of environmental policy, particularly the effectiveness of policies and institutions relating to environmental governance. Despite a reasonably clear assignment system, the implementation of environmental functions has not been satisfactory. In most cases, an important factor impeding effective implementation is seen in the structure of incentives to bureaucracy and policy makers and influence of polluters on them. Besides, the environmental regulators do not have access to modern technology and inadequate resources to measure and regulate pollution levels. The paper highlights overlapping roles of executive and judiciary in implementing environmental regulation. In other words, failure of the executive to regulate and monitor pollution levels as well as forest cover has led to the Supreme Court intervention. Interpreting that access to clean water and air as a fundamental right, the courts have pronounced several judgements on the implementation of environmental regulation virtually taking over the role of executive. This has helped to resolve the issues in the short term and in some cases has led to the improvement in environmental quality. However, the solution is ad hoc as the courts cannot undertake the task of implementation nor do they have the technical knowledge to deal with complex problems of environmental regulation. Besides, technology is not static and mandating a technical solution through a judgement such as the use of a particular technology or particular fuel for running of commercial vehicles can create serious problems in the long term. The solution lies in reforming the incentive structure and institutions of governance to make the executive much more sensitive and accountable to environmental issues. |
| Date: | 2005–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ind:nipfwp:25&r=cwa |
| By: | Carin van der Cruijsen; Maria Demertzis |
| Abstract: | In contrast to previous empirical attempts to examine the effect ofincreasing central bank transparency on macroeconomic magnitudes, we investigate how the link between inflation and inflation expectations alters with increasing transparency. Our motivation stems from the belief that changes in the institutional features or operations of the Central Bank affect, first and foremost, the way that private agents form their expectations about the future behaviour of the Central Bank, and only through them, inflation. We apply the framework used by Levin et al (2004) who differentiate between inflation targeters and countries that do not have explicit quantitative objectives. They discover that inflation targeters benefit from a weaker link between inflation and expectations, and the more so for longer horizons. We, in turn, examine whether this observation still holds as central banks become more transparent. Our attempt is facilitated by the recent development of quantitative measures for transparency, used in the main text. We find that our results provide some evidence to substantiate the beneficial impact of transparency, on helping fix private sector expectations. |
| Keywords: | Central Bank Transparency; Infl;ation Expectations; Monetary Policy |
| JEL: | E31 E52 E58 |
| Date: | 2005–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dnb:dnbwpp:031&r=cwa |
| By: | Ageeva Svetlana; Suslov Nikita |
| Abstract: | A cross-country analysis of factors affecting the levels of the energy intensity of production in the countries with both the market and the transitional economies is provided. Climatic conditions, variables of institutional environment, production structure variations and evaluations of unofficial economy shares are involved into consideration. These variables turned out to be significant when explaining the differences of energy intensity. We construct regressions for both the values of absolute levels and their time change indices involving 1993, 1995, 1996 and 2000 statistics. We show that the quality of institutional environment directly affects the process of energy consumers' adjustment to energy price changes: the higher is the institutions' quality the more effective are the measures aimed at the energy conservation. The samples used include up to 117 economies. |
| Keywords: | Russia, energy intensity, institutions, prices, unofficial economy |
| JEL: | C21 O13 |
| Date: | 2005–04–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eer:wpalle:05-05e&r=cwa |