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on Central and Western Asia |
| By: | Daal, Elton; Naka, Atsuyuki; Sanchez, Benito |
| Abstract: | This study examines the relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty for both developed and emerging countries using the asymmetric power GARCH model. We find new evidence that suggests that positive inflationary shocks have stronger impacts on inflation uncertainty for mainly Latin American countries. We also find that inflation causes inflation uncertainty for most countries but the evidence for causality of the opposite direction is mixed. |
| Keywords: | Inflation, Emerging nations, Latin America |
| JEL: | C22 E31 |
| Date: | 2004 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uno:wpaper:2004-06&r=cwa |
| By: | Abhiman Das (Reserve Bank of India); Subhash C. Ray (University of Connecticut); Ashok Nag (Reserve Bank of India) |
| Abstract: | This paper uses Data Envelopment Analysis to measure labor use efficiency of individual branches of a large public sector bank with several thousand branches across India. We find considerable variation in the average levels of efficiency across the four metropolitan regions considered in this study. In this context, we introduce the concept of area or spatial efficiency for each region relative to the nation as a whole. Our findings suggest that the policies, procedures, and incentives handed down from the corporate level cannot fully neutralize the influence of the local work culture in the different regions. Most of the potential reduction in labor cost appears to be coming from possible downsizing the clerical and subordinate staff. Our analysis identifies branches that operate at very low levels of efficiency and may be gainfully merged with other branches wherever possible. |
| Keywords: | Bank, Efficiency, Branch, Cost |
| JEL: | G21 G28 L11 L89 C33 |
| Date: | 2005–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uct:uconnp:2005-04&r=cwa |
| By: | Daron Acemoglu; Simon Johnson; James A. Robinson; Pierre Yared |
| Abstract: | The conventional wisdom views high levels of education as a prerequisite for democracy. This paper shows that existing evidence for this view is based on cross-sectional correlations, which disappear once we look at within-country variation. In other words, there is no evidence that countries that increase their education are more likely to become democratic. |
| JEL: | O10 |
| Date: | 2005–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11204&r=cwa |
| By: | Daron Acemoglu; Simon Johnson; James Robinson; Pierre Yared |
| Abstract: | We revisit one of the central empirical findings of the political economy literature that higher income per capita causes democracy. Existing studies establish a strong cross-country correlation between income and democracy, but do not typically control for factors that simultaneously affect both variables. We show that controlling for such factors by including country fixed effects removes the statistical association between income per capita and various measures of democracy. We also present instrumental-variables using two different strategies. These estimates also show no causal effect of income on democracy. Furthermore, we reconcile the positive cross-country correlation between income and democracy with the absence of a causal effect of income on democracy by showing that the long-run evolution of income and democracy is related to historical factors. Consistent with this, the positive correlation between income and democracy disappears, even without fixed effects, when we control for the historical determinants of economic and political development in a sample of former European colonies. |
| JEL: | P16 O10 |
| Date: | 2005–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11205&r=cwa |
| By: | David Fielding; Anja Shortland |
| Abstract: | This paper uses a new database of political violence in Egypt to study the effects of political violence on the monthly arrival of tourists from the EU and the US in Egypt in the 1990s. We use time series analysis to study the impact of different aspects of political violence and counter-violence. We find that both US and EU tourists respond negatively to attacks on tourists, but do not appear to be influenced by casualties arising in confrontations between domestic groups. However, European tourists are sensitive to the counter-violence measures implemented by the Egyptian government. There is also evidence of tourism in Egypt being affected by the Israeli / Palestinian conflict, with arrivals of US tourists into Egypt rising when fatalities in Israel increase, while European tourists reduce their demand for Egyptian holidays. |
| Keywords: | Tourism; Political Violence; Egypt |
| JEL: | L83 |
| Date: | 2005–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lec:leecon:05/7&r=cwa |
| By: | Juan Pineiro Chousa (University of Santiago de Compostela); Haider Ali Khan (GSIS, University of Denver); Davit N. Melikyan (Institute of Management and Economic Reforms and AEPLAC); Artur Tamazian (University of Santiago de Compostela) |
| Abstract: | The paper tests <i>the democratization-development hypothesis</i>, namely that democratization has a positive impact on growth, economic development and changes in well-being. We employ a probit model to estimate the probabilistic indicator for democracy for a large sample of countries. Panel regressions are applied to explain the impact on growth of democratic political institutions, economic institutions and efficiency of financial management, along with other more "traditional" factors. The empirical findings support the hypothesis of the decisive role of democratic political and efficient economic institutions in stimulating economic growth. The main results also highlight the importance of effective allocation of financial resources. In addition to the growth regression results, it is argued, consistently with the capabilities approach to development by Sen, that many of the explanatory variables in the growth regression are positively related to development as capabilities enhancement. This is particularly true for democratic freedoms. Finally the problem of 'optimal' institutional development is discussed within the context of resource allocation, migration flows and political decision making. |
| Date: | 2005–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tky:fseres:2005cf326&r=cwa |
| By: | Chang-Tai Hsieh; Enrico Moretti |
| Abstract: | From 1997 through early 2003, the United Nations Oil for Food Program allowed Iraq to export oil in exchange for humanitarian supplies. We measure the extent to which this program was corrupted by Iraq's attempts to deliberately set the price of its oil below market prices in an effort to solicit bribes, both in the form of direct cash bribes and in the form of political favors, from the buyers of the underpriced oil. We infer the magnitude of the potential bribe by comparing the gap between the official selling price of Iraq's two crude oils (Basrah Light and Kirkuk) and the market price of several comparison crude oils during the Program to the gap observed prior to the Program. We find consistent evidence that underpricing of Basrah Light averaged $1 per barrel from 1997 through 1999 and reaches a peak (almost $3 per barrel) from May 2000 through September 2001. The estimated underpricing quickly declines after the UN introduced a retroactive pricing scheme that reduced Iraq's ability to set the price of its oil. The evidence on whether Kirkuk was underpriced is less clear. Notably, we find that episodes of underpricing of Basrah Light are associated with a decline in the share of major oil multinationals among the oil buyers, and an increase in the share of obscure individual traders. The observed underpricing of Iraqi oil suggests that Iraq generated $5 billion in rents through its strategic underpricing. Of this amount, we estimate that Iraq collected $0.7 to $2 billion in bribes (depending on Iraq's share of the rents implied by the price gap), which is roughly 1 to 3 percent of the total value of oil sales under the Program. Finally, we find little evidence that underpricing was associated with increases in the relative supply or declines in the relative demand of Iraqi oil. |
| JEL: | J0 K4 |
| Date: | 2005–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11202&r=cwa |