|
on Cultural Economics |
Issue of 2025–05–05
two papers chosen by Roberto Zanola, Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale |
By: | Sascha O. Becker; Amma Panin; Steven Pfaff; Jared Rubin |
Abstract: | This chapter examines the role of religion in economic development, both historically and today. Religion’s influence varies globally, with high religiosity in countries like Pakistan and low rates in China. Despite declines in some Western countries, religion remains influential worldwide, with projected growth in Muslim populations due to higher fertility rates. Religion continues to shape societal norms and institutions, such as education and politics, even after its direct influence fades. The chapter explores how religious institutions and norms have impacted economic outcomes, focusing on both persistence and decline. It also examines cultural transmission, institutional entrenchment, networks, and religious competition as mechanisms sustaining religion’s influence. We explore the relationship between religion and secularization, showing that economic development does not always reduce religiosity. Lastly, the chapter highlights gaps in the literature and suggests future research areas on the evolving role of religion in economic development. |
Keywords: | religion, economic development, religiosity, cultural transmission, secularization, historical persistence, religious competition, networks, social norms |
JEL: | D85 I25 J10 N30 O33 O43 P48 Z10 Z12 |
Date: | 2025 |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11724 |
By: | Julia Cagé; Moritz Hengel; Nicolas Hervé; Camille Urvoy |
Abstract: | How does the media bias the news? And in particular, how much does it cost owners to ensure that journalists comply with their stance? We compile a unique dataset of journalists and guests appearing on French television and radio shows between 2002 and 2020 to quantify the role played by journalist selection and compliance in political coverage. First, we leverage the movements of thousands of journalists between media outlets, and estimate a model in which the share of coverage for each political group is determined both by journalist and outlet components. We find that outlet-level decisions account for three-fourths of the differences in political coverage; in contrast, journalists’ personal editorial preferences play only a minor role. Second, we examine how journalists respond to a major takeover-induced editorial change. Using a difference-in-differences strategy, we show that while many journalists left in response to the shock, those who stayed largely adapted to the new editorial direction. Notably, exploiting unique data on journalist salaries, we show that this compliance came at nearly no cost for the new owner, reflecting journalists’ low bargaining power in an industry in crisis. |
Keywords: | media bias, slant, journalists, media ownership, media concentration, pluralism, media capture, news organizations, wage compensation, monopsony power |
JEL: | L15 L82 J40 |
Date: | 2025 |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11741 |