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on Cultural Economics |
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Issue of 2025–04–21
three papers chosen by Roberto Zanola, Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale |
| By: | Genakos, C.; Pagliero, M.; Sabatino, L.; Valletti, T. |
| Abstract: | Fixed book price (FBP) agreements are a form of resale price maintenance applied to books in various countries. FBP restricts retail price competition with the aim of promoting book production variety. Yet, despite its popularity and adoption in many countries, there is no empirical evidence on its effects. We offer systematic evidence on the impact of FBP on book variety and prices using a detailed new dataset from Italy that includes the universe of books published and bought, before and after the introduction of FBP. Our results indicate that FBP raises prices without significantly affecting the number of new books published in the marketplace. However, it also increases considerably the variety of books actually bought, especially from independent bookstores. We estimate a structural demand model that accounts for both effects, finding that consumers overall benefit from the regulation. |
| Keywords: | Cultural Goods, Resale Price Maintenance, Book Market, Ex-post Policy Evaluation |
| JEL: | L10 L40 L50 Z10 |
| Date: | 2025–03–18 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:2514 |
| By: | Guadalupe Dorna; Fabián Berho; María Lombardi; Martina Romero |
| Abstract: | La Ciudad de Buenos Aires es, sin dudas, uno de los centros culturales del país y ofrece una oferta muy variada para todo tipo de públicos. Sin embargo, existe una brecha en el consumo de bienes culturales a partir de los ingresos, el nivel educativo y el lugar de residencia. Para reducir estas diferencias, el gobierno de la ciudad creó el programa Pase Cultural: una tarjeta de beneficios con un crédito semestral y ofertas especiales para que estudiantes de secundario de 16 a 19 años y para docentes de escuelas públicas porteñas puedan ir a muestras, recitales, teatros, cines, y para la compra de libros y revistas. Para comprender si este programa realmente logra reducir la brecha de consumo cultural que existe entre los jóvenes porteños, el CEPE propuso una evaluación rigurosa, cuyo primer paso fue establecer una línea de base, es decir, conocer la realidad antes de la lanzar la tarjeta de Pase Cultural: cuáles son sus hábitos, prefieren el cine, el teatro, los museos o los recitales; cuánto tiempo les destinan a las actividades culturales y hasta dónde están dispuestos o pueden trasladarse. Este informe resume los resultados de la línea de base realizada en octubre de 2018 y, en consecuencia, describe de manera multidimensional el consumo cultural de los estudiantes secundarios en la Ciudad de Buenos Aires. |
| Date: | 2025–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:udt:wpgobi:cepe202503 |
| By: | Martina Dattilo (University of Turin, Department of Economics and Statistics “Cognetti de Martiis”, Italy); FABIO PADOVANO (Université Rennes 1, CNRS, CREM - UMR 6211, Condorcet Center for Political Economy, Rennes, France; and DSP, Università Roma Tre, Rome Italy); YVON ROCABOY (Université Rennes 1, CNRS, CREM - UMR 6211, Condorcet Center for Political Economy, Rennes, France) |
| Abstract: | We analyze, both theoretically and empirically, how rent seekers allocate resources between alternative rents in the context of UNESCO’s World Heritage List (WHL). The stylized model features representatives of member countries who lobby UNESCO to include national sites in the WHL. Sites can be of either high or low quality, depending on whether their renown alone guarantees enlisting or lobbying is necessary. The increase in tourism generated by enlisting measures the value of the rent, which is greater for sites of lower quality. The cost of rent seeking corresponds to the financial resources spent and the loss of reputation that the representative suffers when he/she supports low quality sites. Given UNESCO’s institutional structure, this loss is higher when the representative acts in the World Heritage Committee, which gives him/her greater visibility. The model predicts that the representative promotes high quality sites when he/she sits in the committee, to increase his/her reputation, and lobbies for low quality sites when he/she is not a member, using the country’s financial resources. The estimates uncover a rich pattern of rent seeking strategies: member countries usually regularize their budgetary position before they propose lower quality sites and support high quality ones when they sit in the committee. This confirms that rent seeking is conducted at the margin. |
| Keywords: | Rent-seeking at the margin, UNESCO World Heritage List, international organizations, measurement of quality |
| JEL: | H87 D72 F53 O19 Z11 L15 |
| Date: | 2025–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipu:wpaper:119 |